WHAT EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW

The Family Rights Act

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The Family Rights Act - (rev e 10/10/01)

I. AN ACT:

to recognize:

that the current patchwork of Family Law in the United States has become a tragedy in which both parents and children are victims,

that one of the most basic Civil Rights of any person is to associate with their children,

that the vast, vast majority of mothers and fathers are good people and good parents trying to do the best they can,

that most practioners in the present "system" mean well but are operating in a difficult environment where there is great administrative power,

that the "best interests of the child" are served by recognition of these rights and regular and frequent contact with both parents.

to enforce some of our most basic Civil Rights:

the Constitutional right of both parents to associate equally with their children and participate in their lives free of government interference ,

the Constitutional right of family members to be secure in their homes,

the Constitutional right of parents to change employment or careers throughout their lives,

by applying the traditional protection of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt when any of the preceding freedoms are challenged

the standard of conduct and proof required for a parent to maintain an equal relationship with their children should be no more for a parent who is experiencing a divorce from their spouse -- than for a parent not experiencing a divorce.

to encourage:

the American people to realize the birth and raising of a child is an important decision that is not to be taken lightly and which will place them (whether they like it or not) in proximity to the other parent for many years.

the States to institute programs in parenting and marriage and to encourage attendance in pre-marriage classes before a Marriage License is granted.

to provide:

that the provisions of this Act become the "default" agreement between individuals before they form a family,

that the States and/or individuals are free to institute other agreements to replace this Act, but the acceptance of those provisions must require free will acceptance by the part of any individual to be affected,

for the involuntary termination of the preceding rights only when the family member is found unfit to parent -- with the same standard of jury protection and speedy trial,

to confer jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief,

to authorize the attorney General to institute suits to protect such rights

and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Family Rights Act".

II. DEFINITIONS:

The term "parent" applies to both the biological father and mother of a child. If the biological parent is deceased or has taken action to leave the child for adoption --it then means the adopted parent(s).

The term "family member" means either a child or parent. The term applies to parents who are unmarried, married, or divorced.

The term "home" means a living area which is either owned or rented by the individual.

The term "Unfit to Parent" means to be found guilty of threatening the safety of their child. This is a criminal accusation, and a person accused has the protection of a Jury. The burden of proof is on the prosecutor to show this person has engaged in conduct of the type, such that if similar conduct were done by any other parent in the community, they would be found guilty of the same crime.

The term "attempting to escape support" means a willful attempt by a parent to reduce their Child Support obligation by reducing their income primarily for the purpose of reducing the payment. This is a serious accusation, and a person accused has the protection of a Jury.

The term "speedy trial" means that if a parent is charged with misconduct which results in a "temporary" order either limiting access to their home or to their children -- they have the right to be brought to trial on the charges within 60 days.

III. BACKGROUND:

This Act is drawn in the light of the following sections of the U.S. Constitution:

Seventh Amendment - "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . "

Ninth Amendment - "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people … "

While the framers of the Constitution did not include "matrimonial" issues specifically within these amendments, divorces were not then considered matters within the "common" law, but rather church law - we consider the present day frequency and ease of Divorce proceedings (and their devastating effect on families). This "evolution" have would have caused the "founding fathers" some concern. Especially when considered with those words from our:

Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness."

Americans have always held to the tradition that "Liberty" and "Life" rights deserve our greatest protections. In response to recent government activism over the past 40 years, we must now clearly recognize our right to associate with our children, to be secure in our homes. What greater and purer "Happiness" can there be in life than the relation between parent and child.

Who among us, when faced with a Court proceeding in which we felt a Judge or Government official was about to unjustly limit contact with our children - would not want the safety valve of a jury?

Who among us would not want a presumption we be allowed equal contact with our children?

The right to the company of one's children/parent is a right preserved to the people.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

The following scenarios are examples reflecting adherence to the goals of this Act. Unless a parent is found unfit -- the relationship with the children continues unbroken. (In the Draft these are to be seen as examples of what would really happen, your input is valuable in making changes/updates as part of the process. Wording is very crucial).

There is a family living in a home with children. One parent decides to initiate a Divorce Proceeding against the other. Regarding Physical Custody:

Other than voluntarily, the other parent cannot be forced to leave the home unless they are found "Unfit to Parent". They have the right to Jury protection if such a charge is brought.

If both parents are seeking divorce one may be required by the Court to leave the home.

Voluntarily, either of the parents may leave the home and start residence elsewhere in the same locality (within app. 30 minutes driving). The children will continue at the school of the original residence and will spend app. equal time at the homes of both parents. The standard arrangement will have the child spend alternating weeks with each parent.

The preceding paragraph applies even after a Divorce is granted.

If a parent decides to move farther away the children will not be moved unless the other parent is "Unfit to Parent". Special emphasis will be given for the children having vacation time with that parent.

Regarding Legal Custody. Unless a parent is found "Unfit to Parent", there shall be JOINT legal custody of children between the parents. Both parents shall be aware of what is going on in their children's lives. If there is disagreement regarding a decision which must be made:

One parent will have the "tie breaking" vote for the year. That authority will alternate each year.

If the other parent wishes to pursue the decision in Court, mediation will be required first.

There is a family living in a home with children. One parent makes an accusation of domestic violence (between parents) against the other:

Other than voluntarily, the other parent cannot be forced to leave the home unless they are found guilty of Criminal misconduct. They have the right to Jury protection if such a charge is brought and to speedy trial.

Any law which provides for "automatic" arrest, without requiring independent corroborating evidence for the responding police officer, violates this Act.

In and of itself, a charge or conviction of "Domestic Violence" against another parent does not make someone "Unfit to Parent".

There is a family living in a home with children. One parent makes an accusation of domestic violence, sexual abuse by the other parent against the children:

Any law which provides for "automatic" arrest, without requiring independent corroborating evidence for the responding police officer, violates this Act.

Other than voluntarily, the other parent cannot be forced to permanently leave the home unless they are found guilty of such misconduct. They have the right to Jury protection if such a charge is brought and to speedy trial.

There is a separated family, with the children spending equal time with both parents. Regarding financial support of the children:

The amount of support paid may be based on both real assets and income as reported in Federal Tax Returns. The use of "imputed" income is not allowed unless the person is found to be guilty (by a Jury) of attempting to escape support.

A parent is always free to change their job and the Support Payment must be adjusted to reflect actual income (and may be adjusted retroactively and slowly corrected). The only exception is if the person is found to be guilty (by a Jury) of attempting to escape support.

A finding of "Unfit to Parent" is a severe finding and should be infrequent. This is the standard to be used by the Jury before contact between parent/child is limited in any way [we welcome your comments on the DRAFT. This is the crucial item and must be defined well]:

All parents can be a little better or improve in their skills (this should NOT reduce their time with their children). The standard is not to be applied to just parents going through a divorce, but to all parents in the community. Their are a wide variety in parenting styles in our nation.

We would hope States could offer parents optional "skills" classes in different areas of child-rearing.

A life threatening injury requiring medical attention delivered with mal intent is included.

How/should you quantify "mental abuse"?

It is NOT based on predicted conduct, but actual severe conduct. It also includes the elements of intent to harm. Consider the following:

Parents who smoke - we know second hand smoke is a clear health threat. Imagine parents who both "smoke like chimnies". They are a threat to their children, but their is no intent to harm.

Religious convictions - there are communities of Amish/Mennonites (among others) who do not believe in certain types of medical treatment. Withholding treatment would not be considered an intent to harm.

V. Unsupported Implementations & Rationale

The following implementation ideas were not supported, brief rationale is given:

"Having Juries would slow the system down to much!" - This has not been proven at all.

This same argument would probably be made against our criminal justice system -- but actually it encourages a fair decision and settlement. Any suspected criminal who is presented with a "plea" to avoid trial can make the decision to accept the punishment -- or demand a trial and have his accusers prove their case. In Family Law, once a Judge feels a parent should be separated from children -- there is little hope.

With a clear standard of "Unfit to Parent" -- most of the petty accusations that really do bog the system down would be dropped.

"Let the child decide who they want to live with is -- it is their right"

None of us had even the smallest say in deciding who our parents were. Adults have the great responsibility and right in determining who they will share parenting with. While they are children they have a "right" to contact with two parents.

We don't allow children to cast a vote for President (as intelligent, well read, and politically involved as they may be). Do we let them 'cast' an even more important vote?

It is simple human nature for an adult going through divorce to place the primary "blame" on the other spouse. It is also natural for them to seek affirmation from their friends (how many of us have had our "ears talked off" by someone describing a bitter divorce). Unfortunately, it is also natural to expect such an adult to attempt to "convince" their children of the same thing.

With older teenage children -- how many of us would be tempted to play one parent off the other in an attempt to gain extra freedom or privileges?

"Custody decisions will be based on the Primary Caregiver"

Whatever parent happens to have the ability/desire to stay with a child at home should not have a preference over the one pursuing a career at that time, outside the home.

Both parents have valuable contributions to make to the child. The parent/child relationship is dynamic and changes as both grow in the relationship, and to the benefit of both. This is consistent with appreciating the basic Civil Right of parents/children to associate.

"Standards of evidence should be relaxed for Family Custody matters. There just aren't enough facts some times..."

This is probably the greatest reason for the tragedy of the present system. The overworked staff, lawyers, and Judges try to make critical decisions -- and they don't have enough time or facts -- and sometimes not even the desire. They are tired & overworked. It becomes a "job", and sometimes you make mistakes, get a little callous, start to form biases. This is why there are rules of evidence. This why the Nation's founders installed the jury system. The jury requires the "system" to prove to people "off the street" that it can justify its claims.

The criminal "rules of evidence" are used to prevent abuse of the system. They recognize that people lie to get what they want. The motivation to lie is certainly present in a Divorce. It is very easy to rationalize pure fabrication or dramatization -- as long as you don't really have to prove anything. When just allegations are rewarded, you get more allegations.

We recognize that sometimes there could be a real problem, but we just don't have the proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" necessary to take action. We do much more harm by allowing people to play a "hunch" or "suspicion" and destroy a family.

"We need more scientific studies on this..." -- It is not uncommon to see various statistics presented as justification for Family Law Reform, e.g. 63% of children raised in single parent homes grow up with this problem, OR, you get comparisons of the effectiveness of men versus women as parents!!!!

This is about your Civil Rights to have a relationship with your children. We are not talking about a technical issue of road construction or fresh water management.

Imagine "modern sociological studies" done before the Civil War on the issue of whether the slaves should be freed? "... We really are concerned about their physical well being and that of their children. To release this great mass of people all at once would be fool hardy. Some of them can't handle freedom, their children would starve, what are they going to do for work? Maybe a phased approach would be best, we'll release some of the more educated ones (after they pass some tests) and take it slow with the rest." (We might still have slavery now!)

Please remember our criminal law system, you are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Even if 80% of teenagers picked up by police are eventually found guilty -- would you just want to remove the "formality" of a trial and just find everyone guilty?

Consider the recognition and protection of our most basic right to associate with our children. The slave had a right to immediate freedom, and so do we.

Comment on the Act.

The Constitutional Right to Be a Parent

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Below are excerpts of caselaw from state appellate and federal district courts and up to the U.S. Supreme Court, all of which affirm, from one perspective or another, the absolute Constitutional right of parents to actually BE parents to their children.

No case authoritative within this circuit, however, had held that the state had a comparable obligation to protect children from their own parents, and we now know that the obligation does not exist in constitutional law.” K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1990.

"Rights to marry, have children and maintain relationship with children are fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, strict scrutiny is required of any statutes that directly and substantially impair those rights." P.O.P.S. v. Gardner, 998 F2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993)

"Parents right to rear children without undue governmental interference is a fundamental component of due process."
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997)

The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. Doe v. Irwin, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985).

The several states have no greater power to restrain individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than does the Congress of the United States. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S Ct 2479; 472 US 38, (1985).

Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).

Law and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, (1886).

Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain vital interest in preventing irretrievable destruction of their family life; if anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S Ct 1388; 455 US 745, (1982).

Parents have a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children. Matter of Delaney, 617 P 2d 886, Oklahoma (1980). .

The liberty interest of the family encompasses an interest in retaining custody of one's children and, thus, a state may not interfere with a parent's custodial rights absent due process protections. Langton v. Maloney, 527 F Supp 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).

Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).

Parent's interest in custody of her children is a liberty interest which has received considerable constitutional protection; a parent who is deprived of custody of his or her child, even though temporarily, suffers thereby grievous loss and such loss deserves extensive due process protection. In the Interest of Cooper, 621 P 2d 437; 5 Kansas App Div 2d 584, (1980).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that severance in the parent-child relationship caused by the state occur only with rigorous protections for individual liberty interests at stake. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F 2d 1205; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1984).

Father enjoys the right to associate with his children which is guaranteed by this amendment (First) as incorporated in Amendment 14, or which is embodied in the concept of "liberty" as that word is used in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F Supp 620; DC, WI (1973).

"Separated as our issue is from that of the future interests of the children, we have before us the elemental question whether a court of a state, where a mother is neither domiciled, resident nor present, may cut off her immediate right to the care, custody, management and companionship of her minor children without having jurisdiction over her in personam. Rights far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody." May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).

A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In re: J.S. and C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.

The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).

Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).

The U.S. Supreme Court implied that "a (once) married father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child" could not constitutionally be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child. Quilloin v. Walcott, 98 S Ct 549; 434 US 246, 255^Q56, (1978).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (California) held that the parent-child relationship is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. (See; Declaration of Independence --life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution -- No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor deny any person the equal protection of the laws.) Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F 2d 651; US Ct App 9th Cir, (1985).

The parent-child relationship is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 f 2d 1205, 1242^Q45; US Ct App 7th Cir WI, (1985).

No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child." Carson v. Elrod, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).

A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship derives from the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult. Franz v. U.S., 707 F 2d 582, 595^Q599; US Ct App (1983).

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the 5th Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Matter of Gentry, 369 NW 2d 889, MI App Div (1983).

Reality of private biases and possible injury they might inflict were impermissible considerations under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S Ct 1879; 466 US 429.

Legislative classifications which distributes benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the proper place of women and their need for special protection; thus, even statutes purportedly designed to compensate for and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination against women must be carefully tailored. the state cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex. Orr v. Orr, 99 S Ct 1102; 440 US 268, (1979).

The United States Supreme Court held that the "old notion" that "generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials" can no longer justify a statute that discriminates on the basis of gender. No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 US 7, 10; 95 S Ct 1373, 1376, (1975).

Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411; Pfizer v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).

State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. Gross v. State of Illinois, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).

The Constitution also protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Federal Courts (and State Courts), under Griswold can protect, under the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" phrase of the Declaration of Independence, the right of a man to enjoy the mutual care, company, love and affection of his children, and this cannot be taken away from him without due process of law. There is a family right to privacy which the state cannot invade or it becomes actionable for civil rights damages. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, (1965).

The right of a parent not to be deprived of parental rights without a showing of fitness, abandonment or substantial neglect is so fundamental and basic as to rank among the rights contained in this Amendment (Ninth) and Utah's Constitution, Article 1 § 1. In re U.P., 648 P 2d 1364; Utah, (1982).

The rights of parents to parent-child relationships are recognized and upheld. Fantony v. Fantony, 122 A 2d 593, (1956); Brennan v. Brennan, 454 A 2d 901, (1982). State's power to legislate, adjudicate and administer all aspects of family law, including determinations of custodial; and visitation rights, is subject to scrutiny by federal judiciary within reach of due process and/or equal protection clauses of 14th Amendment...Fourteenth Amendment applied to states through specific rights contained in the first eight amendments of the Constitution which declares fundamental personal rights...Fourteenth Amendment encompasses and applied to states those preexisting fundamental rights recognized by the Ninth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment acknowledged the prior existence of fundamental rights with it: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The United States Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, has recognized that matters involving marriage, procreation, and the parent-child relationship are among those fundamental "liberty" interests protected by the Constitution. Thus, the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147, (1973), was recently described by the Supreme Court as founded on the "Constitutional underpinning of ... a recognition that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life." The non-custodial divorced parent has no way to implement the constitutionally protected right to maintain a parental relationship with his child except through visitation. To acknowledge the protected status of the relationship as the majority does, and yet deny protection under Title 42 USC § 1983, to visitation, which is the exclusive means of effecting that right, is to negate the right completely. Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, (1981).

One of the most precious rights possessed by parents is the right to raise their children free of government interference. That right, "more precious than mere property rights," is a liberty interest, protected by the substantive and procedural Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). Moreover, the fact that the custodians are grandparents rather than parents is legally insignificant, because families headed by extended family members are entitled to the same constitutional protections as those headed by parents, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) Even relatives who are licensed as foster parents enjoy the same constitutional rights as other custodial relatives. Rivera v. Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1982).

Because of the magnitude of the liberty interests of parents and adult extended family members in the care and companionship of children, the Fourteenth Amendment protects these substantive due process liberty interests by prohibiting the government from depriving fit parents of custody of their children. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 824 (2d Cir. 1977); Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1991). In the United States Supreme Court’s view, the state registers "no gains toward its stated goals [of protecting children] when it separates a fit parent from the custody of his children." Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652.

Grandparents are also entitled to procedural due process. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed.2d 865 (1950)).

The grandchildren have a Fourth Amendment right not to be seized by the government for child protective purposes unless it has probable cause to believe that the children have been neglected. Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098, 120 S.Ct. 1832, 146 L.Ed.2d 776 (2000). Probable cause exists only if the officials have persuasive evidence of serious ongoing abuse and reason to fear imminent recurrence. Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1987).

Grandparents cannot be dismissed from the dependency case because the dependency case is the only legal way that the state can interfere with their custody. The state must prove that they are abusive or neglectful and that the children would be at risk of immediate serious harm if returned.

FROM THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT, 1910

In controversies affecting the custody of an infant, the interest and welfare of the child is the primary and controlling question by which the court must be guided. This rule is based upon the theory that the state must perpetuate itself, and good citizenship is essential to that end. Though nature gives to parents the right to the custody of their own children, and such right is scarcely less sacred than the right to life and liberty, and is manifested in all animal life, yet among mankind the necessity for government has forced the recognition of the rule that the perpetuity of the state is the first consideration, and parental authority itself is subordinate to this supreme power. It is recognized that: 'The moment a child is born it owes allegiance to the government of the country of its birth, and is entitled to the protection of that government. And such government is obligated by its duty of protection, to consult the welfare, comfort and interest of such child in regulating its custody during the period of its minority.' Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 64, 103, 35 Am. Dec. 653; McKercher v. Green, 13 Colo. App. 271, 58 Pac. 406. But as government should never interfere with the natural rights of man, except only when it is essential for the good of society, the state recognizes, and enforces, the right which nature gives to parents [48 Colo. 466] to the custody of their own children, and only supervenes with its sovereign power when the necessities of the case require it.

The experience of man has demonstrated that the best development of a young life is within the sacred precincts of a home, the members of which are bound together by ties entwined through 'bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh'; that it is in such homes and under such influences that the sweetest, purest, noblest, and most attractive qualities of human nature, so essential to good citizenship, are best nurtured and grow to wholesome fruition; that, when a state is based and builded upon such homes, it is strong in patriotism, courage, and all the elements of the best civilization. Accordingly these recurring facts in the experience of man resulted in a presumption establishing prima facie that parents are in every way qualified to have the care, custody, and control of their own offspring, and that their welfare and interests are best subserved under such control. Thus, by natural law, by common law, and, likewise, the statutes of this state, the natural parents are entitled to the custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be intrusted with their care, control, and education, or when some exceptional circumstances appear which render such custody inimicable to the best interests of the child. While the right of a parent to the custody of its infant child is therefore, in a sense, contingent, the right can never be lost or taken away so long as the parent properly nurtures, maintains, and cares for the child.

Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 P. 21, 25-26, 48 Colo. 454 (Colo. 1910)

RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR COURTS IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA

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RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR COURTS IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA

ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 101. Scope
Rule 102. Purpose and Construction
Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence
Rule 104. Preliminary Questions
Rule 105. Limited Admissibility
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements

ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS

Rule 301. Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings (Not Adopted)
Rule 302. Applicability of State Law in Civil Actions and Proceedings (Not Adopted)

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

AZ ST REV Art. IV, Refs & Annos

Rule 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence"
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
Rule 404. Character Evidence not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes
Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise
Rule 409. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
Rule 410. Offer to Plead Guilty; Nolo Contendere; Withdrawn Plea of Guilty
Rule 411. Liability Insurance

ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES

Rule 501. General Rule

ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES

AZ ST REV Art. VI, Refs & Annos

Rule 601. General Rule of Competency
Rule 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge
Rule 603. Oath or Affirmation
Rule 604. Interpreters
Rule 605. Competency of Judge as Witness
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness
Rule 607. Who May Impeach
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime
Rule 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh Memory
Rule 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses
Rule 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court
Rule 615. Exclusion of Witnesses

ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY

Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

Rule 801. Definitions
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable
Rule 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay
Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification
Rule 902. Self-Authentication
Rule 903. Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary

ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Rule 1001. Definitions
Rule 1002. Requirement of Original
Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates
Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents
Rule 1005. Public Records
Rule 1006. Summaries
Rule 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party
Rule 1008. Functions of Court and Jury

ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES

Rule 1101. Applicability of Rules
Rule 1102. Amendments (deleted)
Rule 1103. Title

Rule 101. Scope

These rules govern proceedings in courts in the State of Arizona, with the
exceptions stated in Rule 1101.

Rule 102. Purpose and Construction

These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and the promotion of growth and development of
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.

Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected,
and

(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection
or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or

(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance
of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.

(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further statement
which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the
objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.

(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent
practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the
jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking
questions in the hearing of the jury.

(d) Fundamental error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of errors
affecting fundamental rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.
Rule 104. Preliminary Questions

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

Rule 104. Preliminary Questions

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or may
admit it subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition.

(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an
accused is a witness and so requests.

(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary
matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case.

(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
Navigation

Rule 105. Limited Admissibility

When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.

Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any
other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.

Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or
not.

(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary information.

(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request
may be made after judicial notice has been taken.

(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.

(g) Instructing jury. The court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive
any fact judicially noticed.

Rule 401. Definition of Relevant Evidence

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence

Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of Arizona or by applicable
statutes or rules. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character Evidence not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of accused or civil defendant. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of the aberrant sexual propensity of the accused or a civil defendant
pursuant to Rule 404(c);

(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the
first aggressor;

(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Except as provided in Rule 404(c) evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

(c) Character evidence in sexual misconduct cases

In a criminal case in which a defendant is charged with having committed a sexual
offense, or a civil case in which a claim is predicated on a party's alleged
commission of a sexual offense, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be
admitted by the court if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait
giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged. In
such a case, evidence to rebut the proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, or an
inference therefrom, may also be admitted.

(1) In all such cases, the court shall admit evidence of the other act only if
it first finds each of the following:

(A) The evidence is sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the
defendant committed the other act.

(B) The commission of the other act provides a reasonable basis to infer that
the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual
propensity to commit the crime charged.

(C) The evidentiary value of proof of the other act is not substantially
outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or other factors
mentioned in Rule 403. In making that determination under Rule 403 the court
shall also take into consideration the following factors, among others:

(i) remoteness of the other act;

(ii) similarity or dissimilarity of the other act;

(iii) the strength of the evidence that defendant committed the other act;

(iv) frequency of the other acts;

(v) surrounding circumstances;

(vi) relevant intervening events;

(vii) other similarities or differences;

(viii) other relevant factors.

(D) The court shall make specific findings with respect to each of (A), (B),
and (C) of Rule 404(c)(1).

(2) In all cases in which evidence of another act is admitted pursuant to this
subsection, the court shall instruct the jury as to the proper use of such
evidence.

(3) In all criminal cases in which the state intends to offer evidence of other
acts pursuant to this subdivision of Rule 404, the state shall make disclosure
to the defendant as to such acts as required by Rule 15.1, Rules of Criminal
Procedure, no later than 45 days prior to the final trial setting or at such
later time as the court may allow for good cause. The defendant shall make
disclosure as to rebuttal evidence pertaining to such acts as required by Rule
15.2, no later than 20 days after receipt of the state's disclosure or at such
other time as the court may allow for good cause. In all civil cases in which a
party intends to offer evidence of other acts pursuant to this subdivision of
Rule 404, the parties shall make disclosure as required by Rule 26.1, Rules of
Civil Procedure, no later than 60 days prior to trial, or at such later time as
the court may allow for good cause shown.

(4) As used in this subsection of Rule 404, the term "sexual offense" is as
defined in A.R.S. Sec. 13-1420(C) and, in addition, includes any offense of
first-degree murder pursuant to A.R.S. Sec. 13-1105(A)(2) of which the
predicate felony is sexual conduct with a minor under Sec. 13-1405, sexual
assault under Sec. 13-1406, or molestation of a child under Sec. 13-1410.

Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character

(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, or
pursuant to Rule 404(c), proof may also be made of specific instances of that
person's conduct.

Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice

Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization,
whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is
relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular
occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.

Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures

When, after an event, measures are taken, which if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.

Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.

Rule 409. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses

Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital or
similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for
the injury.
Rule 410. Offer to Plead Guilty; Nolo Contendere; Withdrawn Plea of Guilty

Except as otherwise provided by applicable Act of Congress, Arizona statute, or
the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, evidence of a plea of guilty, later
withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere or no contest, or an offer to plead
guilty, nolo contendere or no contest to the crime charged or any other crime, or
of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers is not
admissible against the person who made the plea or offer in any civil or criminal
action or administrative proceeding.

Rule 411. Liability Insurance

Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control,
or bias or prejudice of a witness

Rule 501. General Rule

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States, the
Constitution of Arizona, or by applicable statute or rule, privilege shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted in light
of reason and experience, or as they have been held to apply in former decisions.

Rule 601. General Rule of Competency

Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these
rules or by statute

Rule 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge

A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence
to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own
testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to
opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

Rule 603. Oath or Affirmation

Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness
will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated
to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to
do so.

Rule 604. Interpreters

An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules relating to
qualification as an expert and the administration of an oath or affirmation to
make a true translation.

Rule 605. Competency of Judge as Witness

The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No
objection need be made in order to preserve the point.

Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness

(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that
jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is
called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to
object out of the presence of the jury.

(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict in civil action. Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict in a civil action, a juror may not testify as to any matter
or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict, or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the
juror, concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying, be received for these purposes.

Rule 607. Who May Impeach

The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party
calling the witness.

Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness

(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness
may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but
subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.

(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination
of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified.

The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.

Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime

(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if
elicited from the witness or established by public record, if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect, and if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which the witness was convicted or (2) involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of
the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.

(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted and
that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the
subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence.

(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudication is generally not
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.

(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.

Rule 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions

Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness'
credibility is impaired or enhanced

Rule 611. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation

(a) Control by Court; Time Limitations. The court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. The court may impose
reasonable time limits on the trial proceedings or portions thereof.

(b) Scope of cross-examination. A witness may be cross-examined on any relevant
matter.

(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness'
testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on
cross-examination. A party may interrogate an unwilling, hostile or biased
witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership
or association which is an adverse party or a witness whose interests are
identified with an adverse party and interrogate that person by leading questions.
The witness thus called may be interrogated by leading questions on behalf of the
adverse party also.

Rule 612. Writing Used to Refresh Memory

If a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying,
either--

(1) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary
in the interests of justice, or

(2) while testifying,

an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence
those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed
that the writing contains matters not related to the subject matter of the action,
the court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so related,
and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled thereto. Any portion
withheld over objections shall be preserved and made available to the appellate
court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or delivered
pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice
requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply,
the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion
determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.

Rule 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses

(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness
concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the
statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that
time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.

(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless
the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the
opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or
the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to
admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).

Rule 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court

(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses
thus called.

(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called
by itself or by a party.

(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to
interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity
when the jury is not present.

Rule 615. Exclusion of Witnesses

At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural
person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person
designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence
is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's cause, or
(4) a victim of crime, as defined in Rule 39(a), Rules of Criminal Procedure, who
wishes to be present during proceedings against the defendant.

Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.

Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue

Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.

Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts

(a) Appointment. Appointment of experts by the court is subject to the
availability of funds or the agreement of the parties concerning compensation.
The court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, enter an order to
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An
expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to
act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court
in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in
which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed
shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party, and the witness may be called to testify by
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party, including a party calling the witness.

(b) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness.

(c) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection.

Rule 801. Definitions

The following definitions apply under this article:

(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.

(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.

(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.

(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if--

(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person or

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or
belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment,
made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Rule 802. Hearsay Rule

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by applicable constitutional
provisions, statutes, or rules.

Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter.

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.

(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health),
but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms
of declarant's will.

(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment.

(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which
a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the
witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the
witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that
knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into
evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse
party.

(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or
diagnoses, if:

(a) Made at or near the time of the underlying event,

(b) by, or from information transmitted by, a person with first hand knowledge
acquired in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,

(c) made and kept entirely in the course of that regularly conducted business
activity,

(d) pursuant to a regular practice of that business activity; and

(e) all the above are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11).

However, such evidence shall not be admissible if the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness or to
the extent that portions thereof lack an appropriate foundation.

The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.

(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph (6), to prove the non-occurrence or non-existence of the matter, if
the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public records and reports. Unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness, records, reports, statements, or
data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A)
the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however,
in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law.

(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a
public office pursuant to requirements of law.

(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the non-occurrence or
non-existence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or
agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or
testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement,
or data compilation, or entry.

(11) Records of religious organizations. Statements of births, marriages,
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.

(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained
in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or
administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person
authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to
perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the
act or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions
on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.

(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents
of that kind in that office.

(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property
if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings
with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the
truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.

(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations,
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied
upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.

(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members
of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's
associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage,
ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.

(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a
community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community or State or nation in which located.

(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among
associates or in the community.

(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere or no
contest), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but
not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.

(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history or boundaries. Judgments
as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries,
essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of
reputation.

(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

(25) Former testimony (non-criminal action or proceeding). Except in a criminal
action or proceeding, testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony
is now offered, or a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.

Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable

(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes
situations in which the declarant--

(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or

(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or

(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable
to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception
under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance or testimony)
by process or other reasonable means.

A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending
or testifying.

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former testimony (criminal action or proceeding). Former testimony in
criminal actions or proceedings as provided in Rule 19.3(c), Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide or
in a civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing
that the declarant's death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances
of what the declarant believed to be the declarant's impending death.

(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or
family history, even though declarant had no means of acquiring personal
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the
matter declared.

(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts, and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

Rule 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay

Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule
provided in these rules.

Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant

When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or
(E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be
attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be
admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence
of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a
witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if
under cross-examination.

Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification

(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:

(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is
claimed to be.

(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness
of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the
litigation.

(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or
by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.

(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance,
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction
with circumstances.

(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based
upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the
alleged speaker.

(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call
was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a
particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances,
including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called,
or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and
the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.

(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be
recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a
purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is
from the public office where items of this nature are kept.

(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data
compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion
concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would
likely be, and (C) has been in existence twenty years or more at the time it is
offered.

(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce
a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.

(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of authentication or
identification provided by applicable statute or rules.

Rule 902. Self-Authentication

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is
not required with respect to the following:

(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting to
be that of the United States, or of any State, district, Commonwealth, territory,
or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency
thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.

(2) Domestic public documents not under seal. A document purporting to bear the
signature in the official capacity of an officer or employee of any entity
included in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a public officer having a
seal and having official duties in the district or political subdivision of the
officer or employee certifies under seal that the signer has the official capacity
and that the signature is genuine.

(3) Foreign public documents. A document purporting to be executed or attested in
an official capacity by a person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to
make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a final certification as to
the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the executing or
attesting person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness
of signature and official position relates to the execution or attestation or is
in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position
relating to the execution or attestation. A final certification may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign
country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity
has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of
official documents, the court may, for good cause shown, order that they be
treated as presumptively authentic without final certification or permit them to
be evidenced by an attested summary with or without final certification.

(4) Certified copies of public records. A copy of an official record or report or
entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and
actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any
form, certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the
certification, by certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this
rule or complying with any applicable statute or rule.

(5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to
be issued by public authority.

(6) Newspapers and periodicals. Printed materials purporting to be newspapers or
periodicals.

(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags, or labels
purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and indicating
ownership, control, or origin.

(8) Acknowledged documents. Documents accompanied by a certificate of
acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law by a notary public or other
officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.

(9) Commercial paper and related documents. Commercial paper, signatures thereon,
and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law.

(10) Presumptions under statutes. Any signature, document, or other matter
declared by applicable statute to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or
authentic.

(11) Certified domestic records of regularly conducted activity. The original or
a duplicate of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be
admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration of its
custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:

(a) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by,
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters;

(b) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and

(c) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.

A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph must
provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and must make the
record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their
offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity to
challenge them.

(12) Certified Foreign Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. In a civil case,
the original or a duplicate of a foreign record of regularly conducted activity
that would be admissible under Rule 803(6) if accompanied by a written declaration
by its custodian or other qualified person certifying that the record:

(a) was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by,
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge of those matters;

(b) was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and

(c) was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular practice.

The declaration must be signed in a manner that, if falsely made, would subject
the maker to criminal penalty under the laws of the country where the declaration
is signed. A party intending to offer a record into evidence under this paragraph
must provide written notice of that intention to all adverse parties, and must
make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance
of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party with a fair opportunity
to challenge them.

Rule 903. Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary

The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing
unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of
the writing.

Rule 1001. Definitions

For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:

(1) Writings and recordings. "Writings" and "recordings" consist of letters,
words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic
recording, or other form of data compilation.

(2) Photographs. "Photographs" include still photographs, x-ray films, video
tapes, and motion pictures.

(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording
itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing
or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print
therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or
other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an
"original".

(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as
the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including
enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic rerecording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent technique which accurately
reproduces the original.

Rule 1002. Requirement of Original

To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules
or by applicable statute or rule.

Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates

A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.

Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents

The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph is admissible if--

(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed,
unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or

(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available
judicial process or procedure; or

(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under the
control of the party against whom offered, the party was put on notice, by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the
hearing, and the party does not produce the original at the hearing; or

(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely
related to a controlling issue.

Rule 1005. Public Records

The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or
filed and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if
otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance
with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the
original. If a copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be
given.

Rule 1006. Summaries

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made available
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and
place. The court may order that they be produced in court

Rule 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party

Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be proved by the testimony or
deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party's written admission,
without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.

Rule 1008. Functions of Court and Jury

When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of writings, recordings, or
photographs under these rules depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact,
the question whether the condition has been fulfilled is ordinarily for the court
to determine in accordance with the provisions of Rule 104. However, when an
issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or (b) whether
another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the trial is the original,
or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the
issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of
fact.

Rule 1101. Applicability of Rules

(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all courts of the State and to
magistrates, and court commissioners and justices of the peace, masters and
referees in actions, cases, and proceedings and to the extent hereinafter set
forth. The terms "judge" and "court" in these rules include magistrates, court
commissioners and justices of the peace.

Rule 1103. Title

These rules may be known and cited as the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

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Under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, individuals convicted of a crime have the right to be free of "cruel and unusual" punishment while in jail or prison. This means that after a criminal defendant is convicted and sentenced, the Constitution still acts to guarantee his or her fundamental rights concerning conditions of confinement and treatment by corrections personnel. Inmates' Eighth Amendment challenges to punishment and confinement conditions are typically brought in connection with federal civil rights laws, including 42 U.S. Code, Section 1983, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

What is "Cruel and Unusual" Punishment?

No universal definition exists, but any punishment that is clearly inhumane or that violates basic human dignity may be deemed "cruel and unusual." For example, in 1995, a federal court in Massachusetts found that inmates' rights were violated when they were held in a 150-year-old prison that lacked toilets, and was fraught with vermin and fire hazards.

Challenging Confinement Conditions: What Must be Shown?

When challenging conditions of confinement, such as a corrections institution's procedure for providing food or medical services, a prisoner usually must show that the institution's officials or officers acted with "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's constitutional rights. This means that:

The institution's employees were aware of some danger or risk of harm to an inmate; and

The employees chose not to take any steps to remedy the problem; and

The inmate's fundamental rights were violated as a result.

Deliberate indifference is a fairly high standard to meet, because the inmate must show more than mere negligent behavior on the part of corrections personnel.

Right to Assistance of Counsel: First Appeal

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A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel has been extended by the U.S. Supreme Court to include representation during the first appeal after conviction. This stage is sometimes called the "appeal as a matter of right."

If You Cannot Afford to Hire an Attorney for a First Appeal

Just as with the right to assistance of counsel at earlier stages such as preliminary hearing and trial, the government appoints an attorney to represent any criminal defendant who cannot afford a lawyer for a first appeal. For any subsequent appeal, the person usually must pay to hire an attorney. In many states, however, public interest or civil rights groups sometimes represent convicted persons for free at subsequent appeals.

A person who has been convicted of a crime may have certain options for relief in both state and federal court.

The 6th Amendment's Confrontation Clause

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The 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution sets out many rights for defendants during a criminal prosecution, including the right of the accused to confront their accusers. The relevant text of the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment reads as follows: ?In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ? to be confronted with the witnesses against him?.

The 14th Amendment has made the 6th Amendment's right to confrontation applicable to state court as well as federal court.

The confrontation clause guarantees criminal defendants the opportunity to face the prosecution's witnesses in the case against them and dispute the witnesses' testimony. This guarantee applies to both statements made in court and statements made outside of court that are offered as evidence during trial.
The Right to Cross-Examine

For in-court statements, the confrontation clause essentially means that the defendant has a right to cross-examine witnesses in order to challenge their testimony. Trial rules can shape or limit the manner of the cross-examination, so long as those rules stand up to a confrontation clause analysis. A trial court may prevent repetitive or unduly harassing cross-examination, but defendants otherwise enjoy a wide latitude when confronting witnesses during a cross-examination. If a trial judge restricts cross-examination too severely, a violation of the confrontation clause may have occurred.
Out-of-Court Statements

In building a case, prosecutors may want to use statements that people have made outside of the courtroom as evidence against the defendant. If the person making the statements does not appear in court to testify, however, using such statements may constitute a confrontation clause violation.

Here are some examples of out-of-court statements that may run afoul of the confrontation clause:

Statements by a non-testifying victim made during a police interrogation
Statements by a non-testifying victim to emergency medical responders, hospital staff or social workers
An autopsy report by a non-testifying medical examiner

Crawford v. Washington and Out-of-Court Statements

In 2004, the Supreme Court decided an important case, Crawford v. Washington, that altered the rules for when prosecutors can use out-of-court statements against a defendant.

Before Crawford, the Supreme Court had held that out-of-court statements did not violate the confrontation clause as long as they were adequately reliable. In Crawford, the Court changed course and determined that defendants had a right to cross-examine out-of-court statements, regardless of whether or not the statements were reliable.

After Crawford, the government cannot use out-of-court statements that are offered as testimony against the defendant unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

The Supreme Court recently carved out an important exception to this general rule for so-called "dying declarations". In Michigan v. Bryant, the Court ruled that a statement made by a dying person can be entered into evidence at trial if the statement was made to assist police with an "ongoing emergency" as opposed to merely helping the police investigate a past crime.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and Forensic Tests

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court extended its rule from Crawford to cover reports from forensic analysts. Specifically, the Court ruled that prosecutors cannot use a report on the chemical makeup of a batch of alleged illegal drugs if the laboratory technician who prepared the report does not testify at trial.

The Court upheld, however, the use of "notice and demand" statutes. Notice and demand statutes allow the prosecution to notify the defendant of the prosecution's intent to use a drug report without additional testimony. If the defendant does not object to the prosecution's use of the report, no confrontation clause violation has occurred.

Recently, the Court further enhanced the rules for forensic analyses in a case known as Bullcoming v. New Mexico. In that case, the Court clarified the Melendez rule by stating that the actual person who performed the forensic test must also give testimony at trial. Testimony from a different forensic analyst from the same lab would not satisfy the 6th Amendment's requirements, according to the Court.

Testimony from a different analyst could constitute an acceptable substitute, however, if the original analyst was not available to testify and the defense had a previous opportunity to perform cross-examination.

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

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"Double Jeopardy" protections in the U.S. Constitution keep criminal defendants from facing prosecution more than once for the same offense (with a few exceptions). Below you will find information on "Double Jeopardy" protections, eligibility, and more.
Double Jeopardy Protection Basics

The Concept of Double Jeopardy: Background - Explains the basics of what Double Jeopardy is and how it works.
Reasons for Double Jeopardy Protection - There are five main reasons for preventing the government from engaging in multiple prosecutions.

State-Specific Information on Double Jeopardy

Samples of State Court Decisions on Double Jeopardy - States can provide more protection than the U.S. Constitution, but not less. Here are some examples of how states handle double jeopardy.

Eligibility for Double Jeopardy Protection

When Jeopardy Protection Applies: Only in Certain Proceedings - The restriction against multiple prosecutions only affects certain types of proceedings.
When Jeopardy Protections Take Hold - Discusses at what point in a proceeding that protections take effect.
When Jeopardy Protection Ends: Acquittals, Dismissals, and More - Determining when jeopardy ends impacts whether the government can bring further proceedings in a case.
What Constitutes the Same Offense? - Protection only defends individuals against prosecution for the same offense.

RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

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In addition to guaranteeing the right to an attorney, the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a speedy trial by an "impartial jury." This means that a criminal defendant must be brought to trial for his or her alleged crimes within a reasonably short time after arrest, and that before being convicted of most crimes, the defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury, which must find the defendant guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt."

What is a "Speedy" Trial?

A "speedy" trial basically means that the defendant is tried for the alleged crimes within a reasonable time after being arrested. Although most states have laws that set forth the time in which a trial must take place after charges are filed, often the issue of whether or not a trial is in fact "speedy" enough under the Sixth Amendment comes down to the circumstances of the case itself, and the reasons for any delays. In the most extreme situations, when a court determines that the delay between arrest and trial was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendant, the court dismisses the case altogether.

What is the Jury's Role at Trial?

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be tried before an "impartial jury," representative of a cross-section of the community, which will consider the evidence against the defendant and decide whether to find him or her guilty of the crime(s) charged. In almost all states, 12 jurors must agree in order to find a defendant "guilty" or "not guilty." In such states, if the jury fails to reach a unanimous verdict and finds itself at a standstill (a "hung" jury), the judge may declare a "mistrial," after which the case may be dismissed or the trial may start all over again.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

2011-08-05T05:32:00.001-07:00

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution give criminal defendants the right to counsel, or in other words, to be represented by an attorney in most criminal proceedings. However, it is important to understand how far the right to counsel reaches, as well as its limitations. This section has information on the types of proceedings and situations in which someone is entitled to an attorney, plus what this right guarantees. Click on the links below for more in-depth information:
Right to Counsel Basics:

The Right to Counsel Overview - A summary of the right to an attorney, and how an attorney can help in a criminal case.

The Right to Counsel in Specific Situations:

Judicial Proceedings and Custodial Interrogation - An explanation of the various stages of judicial proceedings, plus interrogations.
Lineups and Other Identification Situations - Answers to whether an attorney needs to be present at lineups, blood sampling, and more.
Post-Conviction Proceedings - The right to counsel does not disappear after a trial and conviction.

Right to Counsel Guarantees:

What the Sixth Amendment Guarantees - Information on the host of rights provided by the Sixth Amendment, including the right to counsel.
The Right to Adequate Representation - Learn what "adequate" representation means under the Constitution, and how it affects cases.

See also:

Your Rights: Miranda and the Fifth Amendment - This section contains in-depth information on a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, including the famous "Miranda" rights.
U.S. Constitution: The Fifth Amendment - The text of the Fifth Amendment, with explanatory annotations.
U.S. Constitution: The Sixth Amendment - The text of the Sixth Amendment, with explanatory annotations.

RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

2011-08-05T05:31:00.000-07:00

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives individuals the right to refuse to answer any questions or make any statements, when to do so would help establish that the person committed a crime or is connected to any criminal activity. This right is also known as the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which is invoked when someone is said to "plead the Fifth".

Can a Criminal Defendant be Forced to Testify at Trial?

At trial, the Fifth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right not to testify. This means that the prosecutor, the judge, and even the defendant's lawyer cannot force the defendant to take the witness stand at trial, if he or she does not want to do so. Furthermore, when a defendant exercises his or her right not to testify, the jury is not permitted to take that refusal into consideration when deciding whether the defendant is guilty of the crime(s) charged.

It is important to note that, once a defendant does take the stand and testify at trial, he or she cannot ordinarily choose to answer some questions but not others. Rather, the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege is deemed waived through the act of testifying.

Does the Privilege Apply to Fingerprints and Blood Tests?

The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does ensure that a defendant in a criminal case cannot be forced to testify and "be a witness against himself or herself". But it does not apply when a defendant is fingerprinted, or made to provide a DNA sample in connection with a criminal case. In other words, a defendant may not refuse to submit to these procedures by asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Who Can Claim the Fifth Amendment Privilege at Trial?

At a criminal trial, it is not only the defendant who enjoys the Fifth Amendment privilege. Witnesses who are asked to testify can refuse to answer certain questions by asserting their Fifth Amendment rights, if to answer would implicate them in any type of criminal activity. Unlike defendants in a criminal case, who have the right not to take the witness stand at all, a witness may be forced to testify (by subpoena or other means) but may exercise his or her Fifth Amendment right by refusing to answer certain questions.

[Note: The Fifth Amendment also provides one of the grounds for an individual's "Miranda" rights while in police custody.]

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

2011-08-05T05:30:00.002-07:00

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens and criminal suspects from unreasonable searches of their property and persons, and prohibits police officers from making unlawful arrests ("seizures"). Although this may seem straightforward, the law on these rights is not necessarily so. This section contains information on searches and seizures, what the law requires from police, what constitutes "probable cause", and much more. Click on the links below to get started:
"Search and Seizure" Basics:

"Search and Seizure" and the Fourth Amendment - An outline of the guarantees provided by the Fourth Amendment, when it applies, and violations of the right.
Search and Seizure Law - An in-depth look at what may constitute unreasonable searches and seizures, individuals' expectations of privacy, and more.
Searches and Seizures FAQ - Explanations of just what a "search" is, search warrants, police powers, traffic stops, impounds, and more.
Searches and Seizures: The Limitations of the Police - What police may, and may not do, when it comes to searches and seizures of people and their property.
Probable Cause - Clarification on just what it means for police to have "probable cause".

See also:

Police Misconduct and Civil Rights - Find out what happens in circumstances where police conduct illegal searches or seizures.

Search and Seizure and the Fourth Amendment In-Depth:

When is an Arrest a Legal Arrest? - An explanation of when an arrest has taken place, and its legality.
When the Fourth Amendment Applies - An outline of when the Fourth Amendment's protections apply.
Search Warrants: What They Are and When They're Necessary - A close look at warrants and when they are required.
The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement - A more detailed explanation of the warrant requirement.
The "Reasonableness" Requirement - Information on what the "reasonableness" requirement demands from police.
The Fourth Amendment and the "Exclusionary Rule" - Learn about how the law penalizes police for improper searches and seizures.
U.S. Constitution: The Fourth Amendment - The text of the Fourth Amendment, with explanatory annotations.
Sample State Court Decisions on "Search and Seizure" - Some state court cases interpreting state law on search and seizure.

MIRANDA RIGHTS

2011-08-05T05:30:00.001-07:00

The famous Miranda rights for criminal suspects, often heard recited in movies or on TV, came from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona and are based on the Fifth Amendment. The ruling in Miranda and subsequent cases provide criminal suspects with a number of rights when being questioned by law enforcement officers. Click on the links below for in-depth information on just what the Miranda rights are, when those rights apply, plus more information on the Fifth Amendment and police questioning.
Miranda and the Fifth Amendment Basics:

"Miranda" Rights and the Fifth Amendment - A breakdown of the rights provided under Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.
Focus on the Fifth: Miranda v. Arizona - A look at the famous case itself, plus subsequent rulings.
U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment - The text of the Fifth Amendment, with explanatory annotations.

Miranda and Police Questioning:

Miranda Warnings and Police Questioning - An in-depth explanation of the warnings, what it means to be in police custody, and police questioning.
FAQs: Police Interrogations - Answers to questions about police interrogiations, including when police need an arrest warrant, police stops, Miranda warnings, and more.

Miranda Rights:

The Miranda Case and the Right to Counsel - Learn about what it means to have the right to an attorney.
Invoking the Right to Counsel - Information on how to invoke the right to counsel, and when it can be done.
Invoking the Right to Remain Silent - Find out how to invoke the right to remain silent, and what it means to do so.
Waiving Miranda Rights - Giving up your Miranda rights is a critical decision. Find out more about it here.

Related Topics:

Stages of a Case: Arrest - Learn more about the law surrounding a criminal arrest.
Your Rights: Right to Counsel - Visit FindLaw's section on the right to counsel, with information and resources on this key right.

Your Rights in the Criminal Justice System

2011-08-05T05:27:00.001-07:00

Your Rights with Police:

Miranda Rights - a criminal suspect's rights during police interrogations, including the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present.
Search and Seizure - the 4th Amendment offers protection from unreasonable searches and unlawful arrests.
Strip Search after an Arrest - courts are split over whether jails and prisons can strip search inmates without an individualized suspicion.

Rights of the Accused:

Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination - the government can't force individuals to make statements that would implicate them in a crime.
Right to Counsel - criminal defendants have the right to legal representation by a qualified and competent attorney.
Right to Speedy Jury Trial - the government must bring a defendant to trial in a reasonable amount of time.
"Double Jeopardy" Protections - with a few important exceptions, the government can't prosecute individuals for the same crime twice.
The 6th Amendment?s Confrontation Clause - defendants in a criminal case have the right to confront the witnesses against them.

Your Rights if Convicted:

Right to Counsel - 1st Appeal - defendants have a right to an attorney for an appeal as well as at trial.
No Cruel & Unusual Punishment - the sentences meted out by the criminal justice system cannot be unduly harsh.
Prisoner Rights (Civil Rights Center)- a defendant's rights in the criminal justice system don't end after sentencing. Learn more about prisoner rights here.

See also:

U.S. Constitution: The 4th Amendment - the full text of the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with explanatory notes.
U.S. Constitution: The 5th Amendment - the full text of the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with explanatory notes.
U.S. Constitution: The 6th Amendment - the full text of the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with explanatory notes.
U.S. Constitution: The 8th Amendment - the full text of the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, with explanatory notes.

2011-07-23T23:14:00.000-07:00

Christy Ann Fornoff's murder not easily forgotten

2011-05-25T22:32:00.003-07:00

Posted: Wednesday, May 11, 2011 5:30 am | Updated: 4:31 pm, Wed May 25, 2011.

Christy Ann Fornoff's murder not easily forgotten By Dan Zeiger, Tribune East Valley Tribune | comments

A man is scheduled to be executed soon for the kidnapping, rape and murder of a girl in a Tempe apartment complex more than a quarter-century ago. (See related story.)

For many of us who lived in the Valley at the time of the senseless incident, the victim’s name, Christy Ann Fornoff, is remembered almost instantaneously, recalling a time when an entire community was sickened, its faith and innocence shattered. For thousands of parents, Fornoff — killed on May 9, 1984, five days after her 13th birthday — could have been their son or daughter.

For many more children, including me, she could have been them.

At the time, Fornoff was a student at Connolly Middle School; I attended nearby Fees Intermediate School. Both fed into Marcos de Niza High School, where I attended with some of Fornoff’s former Connolly classmates. Fornoff was collecting payments for her newspaper route when she was abducted; I often helped out or filled in for a friend on his route.

Maybe those similarities are the biggest reason I have never forgotten Fornoff’s name. Or it could be the picture of her that was on the front page of every paper and led every television newscast for days.

Life in the Valley was much different then; the Phoenix metro area was less than half of its current population of 4.1 million. There were big-city crime realities, for sure, but nothing that held the attention of the entire area — particularly during the two days she was missing. Ask anyone who remembers: Fornoff’s disappearance and death was a big, big story.

Donald Beaty, the maintenance supervisor at the apartment complex where Fornoff disappeared, said he found her body behind a trash Dumpster. Ten days later, he was arrested for the murder and is slated to be executed on May 25.

People were outraged and disgusted — but most of all, scared.

“There was a sense of fear; it was pervading everything,” Peter DeCindis, a teacher at Connolly at the time of the murder, told the Tribune in 2004. “Every little kid was looking over their shoulder coming home. Parents coming to pick up their kids — no one was going to let their kid walk home.”

I lived the first nine years of my life in Indiana. On weekend and summer days, I, my sister, cousins and friends were often our own child care, heading off to play wherever in the mornings and not expected back home until dinner time. Our safety was not given a second thought.

Today, I will not let my boys go to the park behind our Gilbert home without them being in my line of sight.

After Fornoff’s death, more adults began handling newspaper routes, with each day’s edition more likely to be tossed into a driveway from a moving car than an over-the-shoulder bag. And technology has enabled billing to be conducted electronically, not door-to-door.

No, what happened to Fornoff did not result in all this. Her death was simply a symptom of an evolving society.

Through it all, life has gone on.

No Connolly teachers were available for recollection; a Tempe Elementary School District spokeswoman said that all of the faculty at the school when Fornoff died have retired or moved on. Harry Mitchell, then the mayor of Tempe who wrote a letter of condolence to the Fornoff family, declined an interview request through a spokesman. Even Fornoff’s parents, Carol and Roger, no longer live in Tempe.

But for myself and many others, Christy Ann Fornoff will live on in our memories, a name and face associated with tragedy and times changing.

• Contact writer: (480) 898-6301 or dzeiger@evtrib.com

Inmate executed with 1st Arizona use of new drug

2011-05-25T22:32:00.001-07:00

FLORENCE, Ariz. — An Arizona inmate convicted of raping and killing a 13-year-old girl in 1984 has been executed with a drug that has never been used before in the state.

Arizona death row inmate Donald Beaty is seen in an undated photo provided by the Arizona Dept. of Corrections. The Arizona Supreme Court scheduled a hearing Wednesday morning, May 25, 2011 after temporarily halting the planned execution of inmate Beaty, who is scheduled to die Wednesday by lethal injection for the 1984 rape and murder of a 13-year-old Tempe girl. The Arizona court's temporary stay of execution was issued late Tuesday night after Arizona officials said they had planned to replace one of three drugs to be used in the execution because federal officials contended the state failed to fill out a form to import the drug being swapped out. That prompted Beaty's lawyers to file motions seeking the stay of execution from the state's highest court and the U.S. District Court in Phoenix, arguing he hadn't had adequate opportunity to review the late change in drug protocol. (AP Photo/The Arizona Republic via Arizona Dept. of Corrections)

Arrizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Rebecca White Berch, center, asks a question Wednesday, May 25, 2011 during a hearing in Phoenix on whether to allow the scheduled execution of inmate Donald Beaty to take place on Wednesday or keep a stay in place to give his lawyers time to study the state's last-minute plan to substitute one of three execution drugs. Beaty, was scheduled to die Wednesday by lethal injection for the 1984 rape and murder of a 13-year-old Tempe girl. (AP Photo/The Arizona Republic, Mark Henle)

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Fifty-six-year-old Donald Edward Beaty died by lethal injection at 7:38 p.m. Wednesday at the state prison in Florence after failing to win a flurry of appeals.

The state used a new execution drug as part of a three-drug method, replacing the controversial drug sodium thiopental with pentobarbital.

Beaty was on death row for well over two decades after being convicted of raping and murdering Christy Ann Fornoff.

She was making collections on her newspaper route with her mother at a Tempe apartment complex where Beaty was a custodian when he took her into his apartment, and raped and suffocated her.

___

Davenport reported from Phoenix. Associated Press writers Carmen Castro in Florence and Jesse Holland in Washington contributed to this report.

___

May 25, 2011 11:31 PM EDT

MY CHILDREN TODAY

2011-05-20T12:16:00.001-07:00

Richard James (17) and his daughter Adelyn Rose ( 6 Mo)

Alexia Mae and Aurora Mae (08)

Jessalynn Marie (10)

Stephen JD (11)

Makayla (17)

Alexandria Effie Mae

More Than 200 Tips Received On Boy's Identity Memorial Grows Where Boy's Body Found

2011-05-20T11:42:00.003-07:00

POSTED: 7:37 am EDT May 17, 2011
UPDATED: 8:00 am EDT May 18, 2011
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SOUTH BERWICK, Maine --
Investigators later released this computer generated photo of the boy. The photo was created by the State Police Computer Crimes Unit.
Police are still trying to determine the identity of a boy whose body was found over the weekend in South Berwick.

The body of the boy, believed to be 4 to 6 years old, was found Saturday on Dennett Road, but no one has come forward to claim him.

In an afternoon news conference, Maine State Police said they have received more than 200 tips but still don't know who the boy is.

"This is just really bizarre that we're into day four now, and he's not reported missing," said Lt. Brian McDonough.

McDonough said investigators are exploring the possibility that a person associated with a truck seen in the area Saturday morning could be connected with the military.

He said the possibility is based on a witness statement that there may have been a naval insignia on and around the license plate.
Tuesday Press Conference Part 1
Tuesday Press Conference Part 2

He said that a military person might also not have as many ties in the neighborhood, explaining why neighbors might not know that a child was present in the home. Police are checking with local military officials to see if they have any information, McDonough said.

McDonough said police are also planning to submit the boy's DNA to databases to see if they can come up with a match.

Investigators said they have finished processing the scene where the body was found, and there is no longer need for them to be there, so neighbors have fashioned a memorial to the boy at the site.

Resident Debby Spaulding placed a red rose at the memorial.

"It stands for love," she said.

"I came down to say a prayer for the little guy," said resident Dawn Belanger.

Police released a computer-generated image of the boy, which has led to tips coming in from across the country. He was 3 feet 8 inches tall, weighed 45 pounds and had dirty blond hair and blue eyes.

Police say the boy was wearing these "Lightning McQueen" shoes, size 12 1/2. They appear to be recently purchased.

At a local diner, the grim discovery has been the main subject of conversation. Residents said they are puzzled why no one has stepped forward with an identity.

"Nobody can understand how nobody can recognize a child," said Eileen Mayo, owner of Mayo's Family Restaurant. "There's got to be a grandparent or a parent or somebody that knows what's become of him."

Waitress Brandi Turnbull said customers are still having trouble dealing with the fact that this has happened in their community.

"It's a tragedy, an absolute tragedy," she said. "They are just in disbelief about everything that happened. It's just too close to home."

The town has planned a vigil for Tuesday evening. A Facebook page has also been created to try to get more tips for police. More than 68,000 people had joined the page by Tuesday morning.

Hundreds Attend Memorial In Boy's Honor

Hundreds of people turned out in South Berwick on Tuesday night to honor the child.

Images From Memorial

"We don't know who he belongs to, and you don't want that for any human being," vigil organizer Amy Aiguier said. "You want to see other members of your community. You want to talk, you want to discuss it, and you want to show your support, because you know for everybody here, it hit home."

Vigil goers said they are praying someone can come forward with information leading to the child's identity.

People said that even though they don't know the child, they would want him to know he's not alone.

"Just the entire situation is completely -- is so disturbing, it terrifies me, and it makes me so sick that someone would do this to a little boy, a little child," resident Brianna Hale said.

Parents held on tightly to their children during the vigil.

"I have two little kids that look nothing like him, but every time I look at them I see -- look at that picture -- I see my kids," mourner Patrice McLean said.

For people in the community and in other nearby towns, the mystery makes for unsettling times.

"I know there's a lot of folks here in South Berwick that are nervous just cause maybe this guy's a local guy, maybe this person did this and they're unsure of themselves -- we don't know," resident David Flores said.

Some residents said the case has an eerie echo to another from 1997, when a 10-year-old Massachusetts boy was dumped in a local river.

While police continue to field tips about the boy's possible identity, community members want whoever is responsible to step forward.

Sanford resident Marge Trowbridge said, "Do the right thing -- turn yourself in. It breaks my heart because it's like, 'What animal would do such a thing to a little boy?'"

Previous Stories:

May 17, 2011: Police Receive Multiple Tips After Child's Body Found
May 16, 2011: Child's Body Found Along Remote Road

PRESS RELEASE

2011-05-20T11:42:00.001-07:00

Copyright© 2004 – Pima County Attorney Pima County Attorney's Office
PRESS RELEASE
For more information contact:
Marcia Fraioli-Nugent
Communications Coordinator
(520) 740-5613
(520) 419-8685 (cell)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Local Agencies Announce Implementation of
Pima County Drug Endangered Children Multidisciplinary Protocol
(Tucson, Arizona) September 15, 2005
The Pima County Attorney’s Office in partnership with the Arizona Attorney
General’s Office, Pima County Sheriff’s Office, Southern Arizona Children’s
Advocacy Center, Child Protective Services, City Attorney’s Office, Tucson
Police Department, University of Arizona Police Department, University of
Arizona Health Sciences Center,
South Tucson Police Department, Marana Police Department, Oro Valley
Police Department, Tohono O’Odham Nation Police Department, Sahuarita
Police Department and the Pasqua Yaqui Nation Police Department announced
today the implementation of the Pima County Drug Endangered Children
Multidisciplinary Protocol.
The protocols, developed by members of the Pima County Drug Endangered
Task Force, will ensure that children who may be at risk for exposure to
clandestine drug laboratories receive protection, advocacy and support through
a multidisciplinary approach. The protocols also state that investigations
provide the best opportunity for prosecution of individuals involved in
manufacturing, selling and abusing methamphetamine and other drugs,
endangering children in the process.
Pima County Attorney Barbara LaWall stated, “Children are often the forgotten
victims in drug activity. They are neglected, abused and exposed to a toxic
environment in which they cannot possibly thrive. This partnership of local law
enforcement, medical and social services agencies is crucial to the success of
eradicating methamphetamine from our community. By putting into place a
system that protects the youngest victims of this toxic drug we are taking a very
important first step.”
LaWall added, “The protocols will ensure that the children involved in these
highly volatile households receive the best possible care, that law enforcement
is able to conduct thorough investigations without the additional stress of
contamination and that prosecution may proceed in order to hold these
offenders accountable.”
Copyright© 2004 – Pima County Attorney Pima County Attorney's Office
Attorney General Terry Goddard stated, “Law enforcement in Arizona and
around the country say that meth has replaced marijuana and cocaine as the
nation’s number one drug problem,” Goddard continued, “I am proud we have
initiated the Drug Endangered Children Protocols for Southern Arizona. My
office will provide the training to effectively implement the new partnership.”
Sheriff Clarence Dupnik stated, “As a law enforcement agency, deputies will
play a large part of protecting our future generation from the ill effects of
methamphetamine use. The Pima County Sheriff’s Department is tasked with
investigating the crime as well as investigating possible child abuse or child
neglect. Methamphetamine is the fastest growing drug of the times and as a
law enforcement agency, we dedicate our efforts to ensure the children of Pima
County are protected and the perpetrators are prosecuted to the full extent of the
law.”
Joining LaWall at today’s announcement were, Attorney General Terry
Goddard, Sheriff Clarence Dupnik, Wilene Lampert Ph.D, Executive Director
of the Southern Arizona Children’s Advocacy Center and members of the Pima
County Drug Endangered Task Force.
* * * * *

Subject: Fw: Parent of Columbine HS slain student

2011-05-20T11:40:00.001-07:00

Guess our national leaders didn't expect this, hmm? On Thursday, Darrell Scott, the father of Rachel Scott, a victim of the Columbine High School shootings in Littleton, Colorado, was invited to address the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee. What he said to our national leaders during this special session of Congress was painfully truthful.

They were not prepared for what he was to say, nor was it received well. It needs to be heard by every parent, every teacher, every politician, every sociologist, every psychologist, and every so-called expert! These courageous words spoken by Darrell Scott are powerful, penetrating, and deeply personal. There is no doubt that God sent this man as a voice crying in the wilderness.. The following is a portion of the transcript:

"Since the dawn of creation there has been both good & evil in the hearts of men and women. We all contain the seeds of kindness or the seeds of violence. The death of my wonderful daughter, Rachel Joy Scott, and the deaths of that heroic teacher, and the other eleven children who died must not be in vain. Their blood cries out for answers.

"The first recorded act of violence was when Cain slew his brother Abel out in the field. The villain was not the club he used.. Neither was it the NCA, the National Club Association. The true killer was Cain, and the reason for the murder could only be found in Cain's heart.

"In the days that followed the Columbine tragedy, I was amazed at how quickly fingers began to be pointed at groups such as the NRA. I am not a member of the NRA. I am not a hunter. I do not even own a gun. I am not here to represent or defend the NRA - because I don't believe that they are responsible for my daughter's death. Therefore I do not believe that they need to be defended. If I believed they had anything to do with Rachel's murder I would be their strongest opponent.
I am here today to declare that Columbine was not just a tragedy -- it was a spiritual event that should be forcing us to look at where the real blame lies! Much of the blame lies here in this room. Much of the blame lies behind the pointing fingers of the accusers themselves. I wrote a poem just four nights ago that expresses my feelings best.

     You've outlawed simple prayer.
    Now gunshots fill our classrooms,
    And precious children die.
     You seek for answers everywhere,
     And ask the question "Why?"
    You regulate restrictive laws,
     Through legislative creed.
    And yet you fail to understand,
    That God is what we need!

"Men and women are three-part beings. We all consist of body, mind, and spirit. When we refuse to acknowledge a third part of our make-up, we create a void that allows evil, prejudice, and hatred to rush in and wreak havoc. Spiritual presences were present within our educational systems for most of our nation's history. Many of our major colleges began as theological seminaries. This is a historical fact. What has happened to us as a nation? We have refused to honor God, and in so doing, we open the doors to hatred and violence. And when something as terrible as Columbine's tragedy occurs -- politicians immediately look for a scapegoat such as the NRA. They immediately seek to pass more restrictive laws that contribute to erode away our personal and private liberties. We do not need more restrictive laws. Eric and Dylan would not have been stopped by metal detectors. No amount of gun laws can stop someone who spends months planning this type of massacre. The real villain lies within our own hearts.

"As my son Craig lay under that table in the school library and saw his two friends murdered before his very eyes, he did not hesitate to pray in school. I defy any law or politician to deny him that right! I challenge every young person inAmerica, and around the world, to realize that on April 20, 1999, at ColumbineHigh School prayer was brought back to our schools. Do not let the many prayers offered by those students be in vain. Dare to move into the new millennium with a sacred disregard for legislation that violates your God-given right to communicate with Him. To those of you who would point your finger at the NRA -- I give to you a sincere challenge.. Dare to examine your
own heart before casting the first stone!

My daughter's death will not be in vain! The young people of this country will not allow that to happen!"

Do what the media did not - - let the nation hear this man's speech.. Please send this out to everyone you can.
God Bless

Death Sentence for Arizona Child Killer

2011-05-20T11:39:00.001-07:00

Terry Greene Sterling – Thu Apr 7, 2:02 am ET

NEW YORK – Death Sentence for Arizona Child KillerSuspected serial killer and alleged white supremacist Jason Bush is condemned for the murder of a Mexican-American girl and her father, as the jury rejects attempts to portray him as a head case. Terry Greene Sterling reports.

Jason Bush, a tall, skinny suspected serial killer with alleged white supremacist ties, was sentenced to death in Tucson for murdering a Mexican-American child and her father in an Arizona borderlands home invasion. Bush, 36, a drifter and ex-con with a history of mental troubles, has been associated with the Aryan Brotherhood, and authorities suspect him in two additional race-related killings, in 1997 in Washington state. In one of the Washington cases, a Mexican man was stabbed to death. In another, a white man thought to be a “race traitor” was executed on a hunting trip.

Bush now joins 43-year-old border vigilante Shawna Forde on Arizona’s death row for the 2009 killing of Brisenia Flores and her father, Raul. Forde is a former beautician and Boeing worker from Everett, Washington. She founded Minutemen American Defense several years ago, supposedly to keep America safe from “illegals.” This year, a Pima County Superior Court jury found her guilty of masterminding the deadly 2009 invasion of the Flores home in Arivaca, Arizona, in order to steal drugs and money to fund her vigilante activities. Forde called Jason Bush “Gunny” and she apparently believed his wild tales about being a star sniper in the Army.

The slayings of Brisenia and her father, both American citizens of Latino descent, were followed a year later by the mysterious shooting of Arizona rancher Robert Krentz, an Anglo. The rancher’s murder, still unsolved but widely blamed on a Mexican narco trafficker in the country illegally, sparked panic in Arizona and fueled the passage of Arizona’s notorious immigration law, SB 1070, which makes it a state crime for unauthorized immigrants to set foot on Arizona soil. (Parts of the law have been stayed in federal court.) Arizona’s Latinos have long said the Flores murders should have provoked more outrage but did not because the victims were Latinos.

Like the killers of the Clutter family, memorialized in Truman Capote’s In Cold Blood, the Arizona killers didn’t find the bounty they expected. The home invaders walked away from the Flores home empty-handed, except for a few cheap jewels, but they slaughtered the family anyway.

After the jury walked out, the suspected serial killer looked at his lawyer and appeared to say: “This sucks.”

While Forde barked orders, Bush, 36, was the tall triggerman in blackface. Wearing a bulletproof vest beneath his camouflage, Bush killed Raul Flores, gravely injured his wife, Gina Gonzalez, then put a gun up the nose of their 9-year-old daughter, Brisenia, who pleaded for her life. He shot her twice. Her terrified mother survived by playing dead, and called 911 after Bush and Forde left the trailer. When Bush re-entered the mobile home to kill Gonzalez, she shot him with her husband’s gun. Bush sustained a wound in the leg, and later boasted to friends that the bullet he pulled out of his vest was a “souvenir” from his secret mission.

“Gunny” Bush was nabbed a few days after the slaughter at his girlfriend’s house in northern Arizona. The girlfriend later testified that Bush seemed pleased with the outcome of what he described as a covert military foray and was ready to go out on another. In jail, though, Bush lost his military bravado. He confessed to the Flores killings. But later, in a desperate attempt to save himself from the death penalty, he pleaded not guilty to the killings.

Bush’s defense was weak. He had already confessed. Gina Gonzalez survived to be the prosecution’s star eyewitness. Authorities found Bush’s DNA at the crime scene and on the murder weapon. The crime was “indefensible,” said Bush’s attorney Richard Parrish, who opted not to dispute Gunny’s guilt, but to focus instead on trying to save him from death on a gurney.

In Arizona, the same jury that finds a killer guilty must then also decide whether to put the killer to death during the death-penalty phase of the trial. During this phase, prosecutor Rick Unklesbay painted Bush as a cold-blooded “manipulator” who “does what he wants for his own gains” and faked mental illness to get drugs and perks.

Parrish launched what amounted to an insanity defense, portraying his furrow-browed client as a full-blown paranoid schizophrenic with “military delusions.” Bush created fraudulent military certificates, photos, and a fake letter from President George Bush complimenting him on his supposedly covert missions in South America, psychologist Marc Walter testified, to maintain his paranoid delusion that he was a military hero.

Ellen Bower, Bush’s mother, testified that his mental problems surfaced in early childhood—he never grew out of his “terrible twos.” She temporarily severed parental rights when he was 11 so he could get psychological treatment she couldn’t afford. After authorities told Bower her son had been sexually abused by older boys, Bower resumed custody.

Bush cycled in and out of trouble. For instance, after he was “kicked off” a school bus for “misbehaving and pestering” other children, “he got on his motorbike, put a .410 shotgun on his back, and went after the school bus,” Bower said. Her son was always good with younger kids, Bower told the jury, and if he killed Brisenia Flores, then a “monster” she did not know lurked within him.

Bush smiled only once during the trial—at his mother. A psychologist testified Bush has been taking a heavy dose of numbing antipsychotic medication for months—the drugs were prescribed after Bush told jail officials the floor was moving beneath his feet and that barking dogs bothered him.

After the verdict, prosecutors, jurors and defense attorneys refused comment. Gina Gonzalez could not comment because she must testify at the upcoming June trial of the last alleged accomplice in the killings, Arivaca resident Albert Gaxiola. She appeared calm after the verdict, and quickly left the courtroom.

Dressed in a striped shirt, dark pants and second-hand black shoes with pink socks, Bush had pulled his shoulder-length black hair into a ponytail and rocked slightly in his seat as he waited for the verdict. When the jury came in, he rose and blinked when he heard the sentence. After the jury walked out, the suspected serial killer looked down at his lawyer and appeared to say: “This sucks.”

His appeal will be automatically filed.

Terry Greene Sterling is an award-winning Arizona-based journalist and author of ILLEGAL, Life and Death in Arizona's Immigration War Zone. Visit her on Facebook, or her website.

Tucson man convicted of child abuse in death of newborn

2011-05-20T11:38:00.001-07:00

By Kim Smith Arizona Daily Star | Posted: Thursday, March 4, 2010 2:17 pm

A Tucson man accused of starving his newborn baby to death was acquitted of first-degree murder Thursday and was convicted of reckless child abuse, a probation-eligible offense.

Scott Sullivan's daughter, Kimberlie, was born on July 14, 2008, weighing 7 pounds, 12 ounces and died Aug. 30, 2008, weighing 5 pounds, 7 ounces.

Her mother, Terri Sullivan, 27, pleaded guilty to child abuse and first-degree murder and is now serving a life sentence with parole possible after 25 years.

The jury found that Sullivan's wife was responsible for the child's death.

Defense attorney Dan Cooper said he told jurors the evidence showed Scott Sullivan, 28, was oblivious to Kimberlie's declining health because he was rarely home and when he was, he was exhausted.

Scott Sullivan was working two jobs much of the summer of 2008 and often had to walk 20 miles roundtrip to work because his vehicle was broken down, Cooper said.

Scott Sullivan counted on his wife to care for the baby and their three other children while he was working, Cooper said.

His client's family testified Scott Sullivan was a shy, reserved man who was married to a bossy, domineering and forceful woman, Cooper said.

Terri Sullivan told a probation officer she was having an affair with an 18-year-old man that summer and smoking marijuana daily, court documents indicate.

On Aug. 30, 2008, Terri Sullivan called 911 saying she found Kimberlie in her swing and she wasn't breathing. When paramedics arrived, they found Scott Sullivan performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation. They took over CPR but declared the emaciated baby dead a short time later.

The couple's three other children now live with Scott Sullivan's parents.

Contact reporter Kim Smith at 573-4241 or kimsmith@azstarnet.com

Investigation into the Death of Alex B.

2011-05-20T11:37:00.001-07:00

released March 12, 2001
conducted by Connecticut's Child Fatality Review Panel
Key elements of the report:
Executive Summary
Findings
Recommendations
The full, 17-page investigative report, is available for viewing or download in Microsoft Word format by using the following link: Alex B.

Executive Summary
Alex B. was a three-year-old victim of homicide while in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF). On September 8, 2000, DCF placed Alex in the care of a Florida couple. Less than three weeks later, Alex died and the prospective adoptive father was arrested and charged with first-degree felony murder.
Alex was born on January 25, 1997 and was placed with a foster family in Connecticut shortly after birth. When Alex was seven months old, DCF moved him to Maine to live with a maternal uncle and his partner, who had expressed interest in adopting Alex. Shortly after moving to Maine, Alex was diagnosed with numerous special health and developmental needs.
DCF ultimately decided to remove Alex from his relative’s care after three years and, without appropriate assessment or preparation, placed him with prospective adoptive foster parents in Florida. Within a week of leaving Maine, Alex was dead.
The fatality review investigation revealed that DCF made errors throughout the course of Alex’s life. The most significant mistakes, which led to Alex’s death, include the following:

    DCF failed to obtain even basic information about Alex’s prospective adoptive parents before sending him to live with them.
    DCF violated the requirements of the Interstate Compact of the Placement of Children that would have protected Alex from harm in order to expedite his placement in Florida.
    DCF provided inadequate supervision of the caseworker’s decisions.
    DCF failed to ensure that Alex had health insurance or providers in Florida to meet his special needs.

The mishandling of Alex’s case predates the Florida placement and began with his placement in foster care. The investigation found the following:

    DCF failed to adequately monitor his care by the foster family in Maine.
    DCF failed to provide support or guidance to the foster family despite Alex’s complex needs.
    DCF must address these problems in an effort to prevent other tragedies from occurring. Recommendations include the following:
    DCF needs to ensure that all employees understand and obey the Interstate Compact requirements.
    DCF must clearly communicate to its employees that existing rules for monitoring and visiting the child apply equally to children placed with out-of-state families.
    DCF must simplify the voluminous and often irrelevant policies that dictate employees’ daily practice. Employees also need ongoing training so that they understand the policies they are expected to implement.
    DCF should develop a management system that allows supervisors to obtain accurate information upon which to evaluate case practice decisions and employee performance. With access to objective, independent information, supervisors will be able to ensure that employees engage in sound case practice and that agency policies are followed.

A single failure connects the many mistakes that led to Alex’s death: DCF failed to recognize and act in the best interests of Alex. DCF treated him as a case to be processed and not a child to be nurtured.
DCF was Alex’s legal parent. The agency was responsible for providing a safe, nurturing home for him. Yet, DCF failed to act like a responsible parent.
No responsible parent would send a three-year-old child 1,500 miles away to live with strangers. No responsible parent would fail to monitor the child’s care by relatives in another state. No responsible parent would ignore the obvious needs of the relative caregivers for guidance and support.
In this case, the failure to focus on Alex’s best interests, combined with poor judgment, resulted in a tragedy. The most urgent issue that must be addressed is the inadequate supervision of caseworker decisions. Supervisors rely almost exclusively on the caseworker for information about the case and the child. This lack of objective information prevents supervisors from effectively monitoring performance and case practice. In addition, DCF policies are voluminous, unclear, and poorly communicated, making practice inconsistent and noncompliance routine.
______________________________
Jeanne Milstein, Child Advocate
Chairperson, Child Fatality Review Panel
Findings

    DCF inadequately documented events in Alex’s life.
    DCF placed Alex with relatives in Maine when he was seven months old. Soon thereafter he was identified as having emerging special health and developmental needs.
    DCF did not maintain regular contact with Alex’s relative foster family nor did they ensure that Maine authorities were providing oversight of Alex’s placement through Interstate Compact.
    DCF was concerned about the quality of care that Alex was receiving in his relative foster placement as early as July 1998. Yet he remained in this placement for 2 more years with minimal state oversight.
    In the transfer to Florida, DCF failed to follow the policies and procedures established by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
    DCF failed to adequately assess the suitability of Alex’s prospective Florida adoptive family to parent him and to meet his special needs. Key indicators of potential parenting problems were ignored.
    DCF failed to ensure that Alex had the necessary health insurance to meet his special health and developmental service needs in Florida.
    DCF failed to adequately supervise Alex’s caseworkers in their case management of a child determined to be "medically fragile" and placed out of state, for whom they were the statutory parent.
    Supervisors lack an independent source of information upon which to monitor case practice and evaluate job performance.
    DCF workers are overwhelmed with the volume of policy and procedural information disseminated through the internal computer system.

Recommendations

    DCF must obey the requirements of the Interstate Compact on the placement of children.
    DCF must ensure adequate supervision of employees.
    DCF must ensure tht their employees understand and effectively implement DCF policy and procedures.
    DCF must improve external and internal communication.
    DCF must develop policies and procedures for placement and oversight of children in out-of-state foster care.
    DCF must ensure that Connecticut children placed in out-of-state foster care have adequate medical insurance coverage.

Printable Version

More Than 200 Tips Received On Boy's Identity - Manchester News Story - WMUR Manchester

2011-05-18T08:55:00.000-07:00

More Than 200 Tips Received On Boy's Identity - Manchester News Story - WMUR Manchester

Maine police follow hunch, seek Navy’s help in death of boy - The New Haven Register - Serving New Haven, Connecticut

2011-05-18T08:47:00.000-07:00

Maine police follow hunch, seek Navy’s help in death of boy - The New Haven Register - Serving New Haven, Connecticut

Discovery of child’s body in same town Jeffrey Curley found - BostonHerald.com

2011-05-18T08:44:00.000-07:00

Discovery of child’s body in same town Jeffrey Curley found - BostonHerald.com

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious

2011-05-18T08:41:00.000-07:00

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious

Dozens Gather For Vigil In Support Of Child's Death

2011-05-18T08:40:00.001-07:00

Dozens Gather For Vigil In Support Of Child's Death

Maine Police Look For Clues In Mystery Boy’s Death - Story Analysis by BuzzBox

2011-05-18T08:40:00.000-07:00

Maine Police Look For Clues In Mystery Boy’s Death - Story Analysis by BuzzBox

Review: CPS errors, bias contributed to child's death - CPS - sacbee.com

2011-05-18T08:36:00.000-07:00

Review: CPS errors, bias contributed to child's death - CPS - sacbee.com

OCA: Investigation Into Death of Alex B.

2011-05-18T08:34:00.000-07:00

OCA: Investigation Into Death of Alex B.

death inv protocol.pdf (application/pdf Object)

2011-05-18T08:32:00.000-07:00

death inv protocol.pdf (application/pdf Object)

maine state police - latest news

2011-05-18T08:30:00.000-07:00

maine state police - latest news

Body of Child Found in Maine May be Connected... | Gather

2011-05-18T08:28:00.000-07:00

Body of Child Found in Maine May be Connected... | Gather

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious | Reuters

2011-05-18T08:24:00.000-07:00

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious | Reuters

Maine police investigate 100 leads in boy's death | 7online.com

2011-05-18T08:19:00.000-07:00

Maine police investigate 100 leads in boy's death | 7online.com

Maine police seek truck in child's death

2011-05-18T08:14:00.000-07:00

Maine police seek truck in child's death

Death Sentence for Arizona Child Killer - Yahoo! News

2011-05-18T08:07:00.000-07:00

Death Sentence for Arizona Child Killer - Yahoo! News

Tucson man convicted of child abuse in death of newborn

2011-05-18T08:04:00.000-07:00

Tucson man convicted of child abuse in death of newborn

Charges could be dropped in Tucson child-death case

2011-05-18T08:01:00.000-07:00

Charges could be dropped in Tucson child-death case

CHRISTINA TAYLOR GREENE -9 yo- Tucson AZ

2011-05-18T06:01:00.000-07:00

CHRISTINA TAYLOR GREENE -9 yo- Tucson AZ

HAL838 : Message: CPS hands over reports involving murdered children

2011-05-18T06:00:00.000-07:00

HAL838 : Message: CPS hands over reports involving murdered children

Calif. allows sealing murdered children's records - KGUN9 On Your Side, Tucson News, Weather & Sports

2011-05-18T05:58:00.000-07:00

Calif. allows sealing murdered children's records - KGUN9 On Your Side, Tucson News, Weather & Sports

ANGEL DIAZ - 7 Months - Tucson AZ

2011-05-18T05:56:00.000-07:00

ANGEL DIAZ - 7 Months - Tucson AZ

Maine Police Flooded With Tips In Mystery Boy’s Death « CBS Boston

2011-05-18T05:52:00.000-07:00

Maine Police Flooded With Tips In Mystery Boy’s Death « CBS Boston

The History Of Child Protection

2011-05-05T19:45:00.000-07:00

in Australia and internationally.

Introduction
Social and political interest in the protection of children from abuse or neglect at the hands of caregivers is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since the early colonial days in Australia, there have been some forms of protection for children. Abused and abandoned children were either boarded out to approved families or placed in orphanages run by voluntary organisations (Tomison, 2001). However, provisions of care throughout most of the 19th century were established solely for the needs of abandoned or "illegitimate" children whose parents were seen as socially inadequate. The concept of providing protection of children from their parents or caregivers did not exist (Liddell, 1993). Governments took the position that children were the property of parents who had the right to treat their child any way they saw fit. Western society showed little interest in, and had no specific policies for, protecting children from their parents or caregivers (Fogarty, 2008).

Although child maltreatment has been occurring since before there were laws to protect children from abuse and neglect, western society in the 19th century was characterised by particularly brutal attitudes towards children (National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [NSPCC], 2000), a fact immortalised by authors of the time such as Charles Dickens (1812–1870).
International developments in the late 19th century: The "first wave" of the child rescue movement
The first manifestations of child protection services with a legal mandate to intervene to protect children from abuse and neglect emerged in the late 19th century, initially in the form of charitable and philanthropic endeavours (Jeffreys & Stevenson, 1996). Often referred to as the first wave of the child rescue movement, developments in the United States and the United Kingdom helped to pave the way for change in Australia. In the United States, the much-publicised case of Mary Ellen McCormack in the 1870s is widely accepted as the catalyst for the creation of laws to protect children from maltreatment by caregivers. Mary Ellen McCormack was a 10-year old girl who experienced ongoing physical abuse by her adoptive mother in New York. As there were no laws to protect children from cruelty, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was approached to assist. It took the case to court on the basis that Mary Ellen was a "human animal" and therefore entitled to protection comparable to that given to animals. The case saw Mary Ellen placed in an orphanage and her caregiver imprisoned. This soon led to the establishment of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC). Founded in December 1874, the society was the first child protection agency in the world (NSPCC, 2000; NYSPCC, 2000). The establishment of the NYSPCC also led to child protection legislation and the establishment of juvenile courts in the United States (Fogarty, 2008)

In the United Kingdom there was considerable resistance towards protection of children from their parents as this was seen as "interfering" into the private sphere of the family. Specific child protection legislation was viewed as an invasion of the family (Fogarty, 2008). Nevertheless, child protection did emerge in the United Kingdom after Thomas Agnew, a banker from Liverpool, England, visited America in 1881 where he observed the work of the NYSPCC (NSPCC, 2000). Agnew returned to England in 1882 where, inspired by the NYSPCC, he went about establishing the first child protection service in the United Kingdom, the Liverpool Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in 1883. This paved the way for the establishment of the London Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in 1884. The society changed its name to the British National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) in 1889 and expanded its charter to include all children living in the United Kingdom. In the same year, the lobbying efforts of NSPCC were rewarded with the passing of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, commonly known as the "Children's Charter". The Act enabled society to intervene for the first time to protect children from cruelty or neglect perpetrated by their parents, where previously a parent's ownership of a child gave parents the right to treat their child in any way they saw fit, barring murder.
Developments in Australia in the late 19th century
Child protection in the late 19th century in Australia followed a similar path to the United States and the United Kingdom. An increased public awareness of child abuse issues led to the establishment of non-government and voluntary child protection societies, partly in imitation of those established in the United States and the United Kingdom. The New South Wales Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSWSPCC) was established in 1890, the Victorian Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (VSPCC) in 1894, and the Western Australian Children's Protection Society in 1906 (CPSWA) (Liddell, 1993; Scott & Swain, 2002). Modelled on the British NSPCC, these groups were responsible for investigating and reporting child abuse and neglect, a mandate that continued well into the 20th century (Children's Protection Society, 2003; Jeffreys & Stevenson, 1996; Scott & Swain, 2002). The development of such agencies strengthened the role of the non-government sector in carrying out early forms of child protection work (Tomison, 2001). By the end of the 19th century most states in Australia had also established Children's Courts and developed legislation to protect children from the more "obvious" forms of child maltreatment, such as severe physical abuse (Tomison, 2001). "Boarding out" to approved families became a preferred option over institutional care for children abandoned or abused (Liddell, 1993). Although the Commonwealth of Australia was established in 1901, the provision of child protection services remained a state responsibility, which ensured that each state and territory had its own unique child protection response. The continuation of state responsibility for child protection has meant that legislation and practice has differed somewhat between each state and territory throughout the 20th century and today.
The "second wave" of the child rescue movement: Developments in the 1960s
The first half of the 20th century was not notable for big changes in child welfare in Australia. Institutionalised care re-emerged as a preferred method of out-of-home care over boarding out. However, by the 1950s, concerns on the standard of living in such institutions led to a shift toward smaller group care (Liddell, 1993). Although government agencies and voluntary organisations continued their work, particularly directed to neglected children, the general public and the government were not interested in child protection in the first half of the century (Fogarty, 2008).

The child protection landscape changed significantly in the early 1960s- referred to as the second wave of the child rescue movement. Modern professional interest in the early 1960s was prompted by research-the most famous of which was a study in the United States led by Dr Henry Kempe (Fogarty, 2008). Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, and Silver (1962) coined the term the "battered-child syndrome" in describing evidence of untreated physical injuries caused by physical abuse by caregivers. The authors argued that "battered-child syndrome" was a significant cause of childhood disability and death for children under the age of 3 years (Lonne, Parton, Thompson, & Harries, 2009). Unlike the original "first wave" developments of the 19th century, the issue was identified by medical professionals rather than by survivors and community groups, which professionalised the issue and brought it back to public attention (Lonne et al., 2009). The research evoked significant media attention, which helped to increase public awareness of child protection issues. Many researchers have argued that media coverage throughout the 60s was just as important as the research itself (Tomison, 2001). Dramatic changes to approaches in protecting children soon followed in America. Within a few years, all fifty American states had introduced major legislative changes implementing professionally staffed child protection services. The establishment of mandatory reporting laws requiring all health and welfare professionals to report suspected and actual cases of child abuse and neglect to public authorities were also introduced in all states of America by the late 1960s (Fogarty, 2008; Lonne et al., 2009)

In Australia, similar research was emerging. Work by Wurfel and Maxwell (1965) investigated abuse of 26 children from 18 families at the Adelaide Children's Hospital and Bialestock (1966) investigated 289 neglected babies admitted to a reception centre. This research and the research by Kempe and colleagues (1962) also led to mass media and public debate on child abuse issues, which put increasing pressure on state governments to take greater responsibility. Welfare departments were establishment in each state throughout the 1960s (with the exception of Victoria) and Australian states and territories soon moved to government-based child protection approaches. In Victoria, child protection investigations continued to be performed by the police and the Children's Protection Society (formerly the VSPCC) (Fogarty, 2008). The new research on the effects of child abuse in the 60s and the subsequent media attention that followed helped to increase public and political awareness of child protection matters and led to continued debates and various changes to government approaches in the decades to follow.
Developments in the 1970s and 80s in Australia
Over the next two decades, state governments continued to develop and refine systems for investigating and dealing with child abuse and neglect in Australia. The 70s and 80s were characterised by significant social change, particularly in relation to family structures. New families were emerging that varied from traditional family structures, including more families of single parents and families where parents had divorced or remarried. This broadened the scope of families in the child welfare system and added to the complexities of providing child protection services where risks of abuse and or neglect were identified (Liddell, 1993). Definitions of what constituted child abuse and neglect also greatly expanded throughout the period. By the late 1980s, definitions in each state included emotional abuse, neglect, sexual abuse and physical abuse. The focus of child abuse and neglect moved beyond just young children and included all young people up to the age of 18 (Lonne et al., 2009).

The 70s and 80s continued the process of de-institutionalisation of out-of-home care, as permanency planning became a popular principle (Liddell, 1993). Returning children either to their homes, to foster care or to smaller group care became the preferred option for most child protection departments.
After generating significant political debate, the influences from the United States led to mandatory reporting laws of child abuse and neglect in most states of Australia in the 1970s. Tasmania first introduced mandatory laws in 1974, followed by South Australia in 1975, New South Wales in 1977 and Queensland in 1980. Today all states in Australia have some form of mandatory reporting laws (Higgins, Bromfield, Richardson, Holzer, & Berlyn, 2009).
Changes to child protection in Victoria
The biggest changes in child protection practices in the 1980s occurred in Victoria. By the mid-1980s, the Victorian Children's Protection Society was unable to obtain sufficient funding to meet the increased demand for its services (Scott & Swain, 2002). A review was conducted on child protection in Victoria and the state took over the provision of statutory child protection services in 1985. Rather than fund a 24-hour service, the government elected to continue with a dual track model of child protection, in which the police responded to those cases to which the statutory child protection service was unable to respond due to a lack of resources or the need for after-hours intervention. The combined child protection service and police responsibility for child protection was known as the dual-track system (Liddell, 2001). The dual-track system was abolished in 1994 following an Inquiry by Fogarty and Sargeant (1989) as the statutory child protection service assumed full responsibility for investigations of child abuse and neglect. This also coincided with the introduction of mandatory reporting laws in Victoria (See Box 1).

Box 1: The role of the media in child protection reform
In Victoria-as in other jurisdictions-media attention surrounding the death of a child (e.g., the death of Victoria Climbè in the UK) galvanised public support and resulted in significant legislative change in the area of child protection in the late 1980s.

In 1989, a 2-year old boy, Daniel Valerio, died as a result of physical assault at the hands of his step father Paul Aiton. Both the police and child protection service had received allegations that Daniel was being physically abused. The departmental enquiry into Daniel's death reinforced the need for the abolition of the dual-track system (Scott & Swain, 2002). In 1993 Paul Aiton was tried and convicted for Daniel's death. A major Victorian tabloid newspaper, The Herald-Sun, used the trial and accompanying photographs of Daniel taken by a police surgeon days before his death to campaign for mandatory reporting in Victoria (Goddard & Liddel, 1995). The campaign created a groundswell of public support and forced the state government to amend the 1989 Children and Young Persons Act making it mandatory for prescribed professionals (e.g., teachers, police) to notify the state child protective services if they suspected that a child was being physically or sexually abused (Goddard & Liddel, 1995; Liddell & Goddard, 1995).
The 1990s and the child protection legalistic approach
Although developments in the late 1980s and 1990s continued to vary in each state, most states moved to "professionalise" the response to child abuse and neglect. This led to the widespread adoption of professional decision-making aids, guides and checklists that assessed the risks of child maltreatment (Holzer & Bromfield, 2008). The aids assisted child protection workers in determining if abuse and neglect had occurred, the risk of further harm, and whether the child should be removed from the family home. The focus on professionalising child protection services also saw most states move to a more legalistic approach to child abuse and neglect. Under a legalistic framework, child protection work became predominantly focused on developing a legal response to allegations of child abuse and neglect and determining whether abuse or neglect was serious enough to warrant protective intervention (Tomison, 2001). This approach meant that for child protection workers, investigative and administrative work took up a significant amount of time. Government funding for child protection and non-government family support services was also significantly reduced, which meant that support for families suffering from social problems was limited (Tomison, 2001). Child protection systems became the sole point of contact for families at risk of abuse and neglect, which increasingly made it difficult for departments to meet demand.
Child protection in the 21st century
By the late 1990s, child protection services in all Australian states and territories were finding it difficult to cope with high numbers of reports of suspected child abuse and neglect. The legal/forensic approach was being criticised for subjecting low risk families to unnecessary investigations, while at the same time letting some high risk families fall through the cracks (Lonne et al., 2009). This led governments and child protection services to seek alternative solutions in the 21st century. New models of child protection and family support were adopted in most states and territories in Australia (Bromfield & Holzer, 2008). Child protection approaches at the beginning of the 21st century recognised the vital role played by the broader child and family welfare system in supporting families and therefore preventing child abuse and neglect. New child protection models sought to achieve a balance between statutory child protection services and family support services. Under such models, statutory child protection services no longer drive the system but become one facet in an overall welfare system for children and their families (Bromfield & Holzer, 2008). This has led to child protection services and family support services working more collaboratively in order to assess family needs. In working more collaboratively with other family welfare services, child protection workers have had more options when responding to a report of suspected child abuse or neglect. This has enabled workers to tailor responses more to the perceived needs of the family rather than an across the board assessment of the risks of actual child abuse and neglect (Tomison, 2001). For example, for cases where risks of actual child abuse and neglect are low, a less intrusive assessment process involving non-government agencies can be arranged to provide general support to the family. These approaches have aimed to reduce the risk of families having negative or traumatic experiences from inappropriate or unnecessary investigations.
A public health model for child protection services in Australia
Today, child protection systems continue to vary across states and territories. In most states child protection services are part of a broader department of human services. Although a greater focus has been placed on prevention and providing family support services to families at risk of child abuse and neglect, statutory child protection services in each state and territory continue to struggle to meet demand (Holzer & Bromfield, 2008). There is a growing acceptance that applying a public health model to child protection may help to reduce the burden on child protection departments and deliver better outcomes for children and families (Council of Australian Governments, 2009). The public health model provides a framework that expands the service continuum, where preventative interventions are categorised as primary, secondary or tertiary. In the public health model approach, priority is placed on having universal services available to all families, such as health and education. Secondary prevention interventions are provided to families that are deemed to be at risk of child maltreatment, while tertiary child protection services are deemed to be a last resort for families where child abuse and neglect has occurred (Holzer, 2007). The public health model as applied to child abuse and neglect is an encouraging approach to service delivery because the central focus is on the prevention of child abuse and neglect, as opposed to focusing on services where abuse and neglect has already occurred (O'Donnell, Scott, & Stanley, 2008).
Box 2: Recognising different types of child maltreatment
By the late 1980s and 1990s, the category of child abuse expanded from being severe physical abuse and extreme neglect to a much broader idea of what constitutes child maltreatment. Below is a brief timeline of when different types of child maltreatment were recognised in child protection legislation.

1960s Severe physical abuse
Kempe and colleagues (1962) research on the "battered-child syndrome" pushed child physical abuse into the realm of professionals and resulted in the application of a medical model to the problem. Professionals focused on the psychopathology of perpetrators, which led to a substantial growth in government-run child protection services around the world.

1980s Child sexual abuse recognised on the world stage
There is no definitive reason for why sexual abuse emerged as a key issue for child protection in the 1980s, however the most prominent theory suggests that the impact of feminism lead to the public recognition of child sexual abuse (Scott & Swain, 2002). Significant media attention was given to any case of child sexual abuse and statutory child protection services found it difficult to cope with the influx of reports. Tensions arose between child protection services, police and child sexual assault services as roles and responsibilities became blurred (Scott & Swain, 2002).

1980–90s Neglect re-discovered
The original child rescue movement of the late 19th and early 20th century was primarily focused on "rescuing" children from neglect by "morally corrupt and lazy" parents (Bromfield & Holzer, 2008). Research in the 80s and 90s started to recognise that child neglect was a prominent form of maltreatment that could severely impact on a child's development. Over the last three decades, child neglect has had the most child protection substantiations.

1990s Emotional abuse started to be recognised
Research in the 1980s and 1990s started to identify that child physical abuse and neglect was often accompanied by psychological or emotional abuse. Child emotional abuse eventually became recognised as an abuse type in its own right with specific adverse effects for children. Child protection substantiations of child emotional abuse have been higher than child physical abuse or sexual abuse in Australia (Australian Institute of Health & Welfare, 2010), however, research on the risks and effects of emotional abuse have been less prominent.

2000s Exposure to family violence became a mandatory reporting trigger
The 1990s saw increasing support for the recognition of witnessing family violence as a separate and distinct maltreatment sub-type. Although witnessing family violence has not been recognised as a maltreatment type within child protection services, exposure to domestic violence has been introduced as a trigger for mandatory reporting in New South Wales and Tasmania. Exposure to domestic violence is typically recorded as "emotional abuse" (Bromfield & Holzer, 2008).
Conclusion
The history of child protection in Australia has seen a variety of responses to protecting children and supporting families in need. Child protection and the child welfare system as a whole will continue to evolve and adapt to ever-changing social environments. Twenty-first century developments in protecting children in Australia have recognised that statutory child protection services in isolation are unable to provide support to all families in need and reduce the risk of child abuse and neglect. Child protection approaches now recognise that protecting children is everyone's business and that parents, communities, governments, non-government organisations and businesses all have a role to play.
Authors
Alister Lamont is a Research Officer for the National Child Protection Clearinghouse at the Australian Institute of Family Studies.

At the time of writing, Dr Leah Bromfield was the Manager of the National Child Protection Clearinghouse and the Communities and Families Clearinghouse Australia at the Australian Institute of Family Studies.
References
Australian Institute of Health & Welfare. (2010). Child protection Australia 2008–09. Canberra: AIHW.

Bialestock, D. (1966). Neglected babies. A study of 289 babies admitted consecutively to a reception centre. Medical Journal of Australia, 2, 1129–1133.

Bromfield, L. M., & Holzer, P. (2008). A national approach for child protection: Project report (PDF 1.0 MB).

Children's Protection Society. (2003, November). Children's Protection Society: Working together for children.

Council of Australian Governments. (2009). Protecting children is everyone's business: National framework for protecting Australia's children 2009–2020 (PDF 1.2 MB).

Fogarty, J. (2008). Some aspects of the early history of child protection in Australia. Family Matters, 78, 52–59.

Fogarty, J., & Sargeant, D. (1989). Protective services for children in Victoria: An interim report. Melbourne: Community Services Victoria.

Goddard, C., & Liddel, M. (1995). Child abuse fatalities and the media: Lessons from a case study. Child Abuse Review, 4, 356–364.

Higgins, D. J., Bromfield, L. M., Richardson, N., Holzer, P., & Berlyn, C. (2009). Mandatory reporting of child abuse (NCPC Resource Sheet).

Holzer, P. (2007). Defining the public health model for the child welfare services context (NCPC Resource Sheet).

Holzer, P., & Bromfield, L. M. (2008). NCPASS comparability of child protection data: Project report (PDF 1.4 MB). Melbourne: Australian Institute of Family Studies.

Jeffreys, H., & Stevenson, M. (1996). Statutory social work in a child protection agency: A guide for practice. Whyalla, S.A.: Department of Family and Community Services and the University of South Australia.

Jordan, B., & Sketchley, R. (2009). A stitch in time saves nine. Preventing and respondiong to the abuse and neglect of infants (NCPC Issues No. 30).

Kempe, C. H., Silverman, F. N., Steele, B. F., Droegemueller, W., & Silver, H., K. (1962). The battered-child syndrome. Journal of the American Medical Association, 181, 17–24.

Liddell, M. (1993). Child welfare and care in Australia: Understanding the past to influence the future. In C. R. Goddard & R. Carew (Eds.), Responding to children: Child welfare practice. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire (pp. 28–62).

Liddell, M. (2001). Radical changes and false dawns: Lessons from 30 years of child welfare policy development. Paper presented at the Eighth Australasian Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect, Melbourne.

Liddell, M., & Goddard, C. (1995). Victorian child welfare: A continuing crisis of policy and provision. Paper presented at the Social Policy and the Challenges of Social Change, Sydney.

Lonne, B., Parton, N., Thompson, J., & Harries, M. (2009). Reforming child protection. London & New York: Routledge.

National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. (2000). A history of the NSPCC: Protecting Children from Cruelty since 1884. London: NSPCC.

New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. (2000). The New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children: 125th Anniversary (1875–2000). New York: NYSPCC.

O'Donnell, M., Scott, D., & Stanley, F. (2008). Child abuse and neglect—is it time for a public health approach? Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health, 32(4), 325–330.

Scott, D. (2006). Towards a public health model of child protection in Australia. Communities, Children and Families Australia, 1(1), 9–16.

Scott, D., & Swain, S. (2002). Confronting cruelty: Historical perspectives on child protection in Australia. Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press.

Tomison, A. (2001). A history of child protection. Back to the future? Family Matters, 60, 46–57.

Wurfel, L., & Maxwell, G. (1965). The battered child syndrome in South Australia. Australian Paediatric Journal, 1, 127–130.
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Mom pleads guilty in connection with son's death

2011-05-05T19:43:00.000-07:00

Posted: Apr 26, 2011 6:04 PM MST Updated: Apr 29, 2011 4:24 PM MST

By Leasa Conze, producer - email

TUCSON, AZ (KOLD) - A Tucson mother admits she didn't do all she could to save her son from his step-father.

Today Monica Ibarra-Dogbevi pleaded guilty to child abuse in the death of 6-year-old Michael Ibarra.

She admitted in court that she didn't protect him and didn't get medical help for him after he'd been beaten.

She told Judge Leonardo she saw her son's bruises over several months but kept quiet because she was afraid and she didn't know how to get out of the situation.

Paramedics found Michael unconscious suffering from a head injury at the family's home last August.

Before going into surgery, he woke up and told paramedics he fell down the stairs while being spanked by his step-father.

Michael went through a second emergency surgery and he was on life support for more than a week before it was removed and he died.

He was covered in bruises and his autopsy revealed he had had two spinal fractures and a broken hand.

Today his mother pleaded guilty to two counts of child abuse and as part of the plea agreement, she will testify against her husband.

Koffi Dogbevi, who is charged with first degree murder and child abuse, is set to go on trial June 28.

Child Protective Services interviewed the boy twice in the month before he died.

Both CPS and the Tucson Police Department investigated Dogbevi but he wasn't charged with anything until Michael died.

Copyright 2011 KOLD. All rights reserved.

Tucson mom accused of harming baby pleads not guilty to attempted murder, child abuse charges

2011-05-05T19:42:00.000-07:00

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First Posted: April 22, 2011 - 8:30 pm
Last Updated: April 22, 2011 - 8:30 pmAAA

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TUCSON, Ariz. — A Tucson woman accused of harming her baby has pleaded not guilty to charges of attempted murder and child abuse.

Pima County prosecutors say 21-year-old Blanca Reneis Montano allegedly contaminated the 7-month-old girl's intravenous lines.

Montano was arraigned Friday. Her next court hearing is June 9.

Authorities say Montano took her daughter and a son to University Medical Center on Feb. 23 for the flu, but tests showed they had E. coli.

Both children improved after treatment, but the baby ended up in critical condition after developing nine different fungal, bacterial and viral infections.

Tucson police and state Child Protective Services were called by medical personnel because they were suspicious Montano was causing the baby's ill health. She was arrested April 5. The baby recovered and is in CPS custody.

AUTHORS UPDATE

2010-08-24T05:48:00.000-07:00

It has been quite awhile, since I last posted, and unfortunately there is no good news to report. My pain and emptiness, still consume, and I am still haunted by the memories of What Could Have Been and What Might Have Been. I will include a few updated pictures of my children, - the only things I have left...

The 2008 NASW Delegate Assembly approved the following revisions to the NASW Code of Ethics:

2009-06-14T00:46:00.000-07:00

1.05 Cultural Competence and Social Diversity
(c) Social workers should obtain education about and seek to understand the nature of social diversity and oppression with respect to race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability.
2.01 Respect
(a) Social workers should treat colleagues with respect and should represent accurately and fairly the qualifications, views, and obligations of colleagues.
(b) Social workers should avoid unwarranted negative criticism of colleagues in communications with clients or with other professionals. Unwarranted negative criticism may include demeaning comments that refer to colleagues’ level of competence or to individuals’ attributes such as race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability.
4.02 Discrimination
Social workers should not practice, condone, facilitate, or collaborate with any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, national
origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical disability.
6.04 Social and Political Action
(d) Social workers should act to prevent and eliminate domination of, exploitation of, and discrimination against any person, group, or class on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical disability.
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Preamble
The primary mission of the social work profession is to enhance human well¬being and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. A historic and defining feature of social work is the profession’s focus on individual well¬being in a social context and the well¬being of society. Fundamental to social work is attention to the environmental forces that create, contribute to, and address problems in living.
Social workers promote social justice and social change with and on behalf of clients. “Clients” is used inclusively to refer to individuals, families, groups, organizations, and communities. Social workers are sensitive to cultural and ethnic diversity and strive to end discrimination, oppression, poverty, and other forms of social injustice. These activities may be in the form of direct practice, community organizing, supervision, consultation administration, advocacy, social and political action, policy development and implementation, education, and research and evaluation. Social workers seek to enhance the capacity of people to address their own needs. Social workers also seek to promote the responsiveness of organizations, communities, and other social institutions to individuals’ needs and social problems.
The mission of the social work profession is rooted in a set of core values. These core values, embraced by social workers throughout the profession’s history, are the foundation of social work’s unique purpose and perspective:
• service
• social justice
• dignity and worth of the person
• importance of human relationships
• integrity
• competence.
This constellation of core values reflects what is unique to the social work profession. Core values, and the principles that flow from them, must be balanced within the context and complexity of the human experience.
Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics
Professional ethics are at the core of social work. The profession has an obligation to articulate its basic values, ethical principles, and ethical standards. The NASW Code of Ethics sets forth these values, principles, and standards to guide social workers’ conduct. The Code is relevant to all social workers and social work students, regardless of their professional functions, the settings in which they work, or the populations they serve.
The NASW Code of Ethics serves six purposes:
1. The Code identifies core values on which social work’s mission is based.
2. The Code summarizes broad ethical principles that reflect the profession’s core values and establishes a set of specific ethical standards that should be used to guide social work practice.
3. The Code is designed to help social workers identify relevant considerations when professional obligations conflict or ethical uncertainties arise.
4. The Code provides ethical standards to which the general public can hold the social work profession accountable.
5. The Code socializes practitioners new to the field to social work’s mission, values, ethical principles, and ethical standards.
6. The Code articulates standards that the social work profession itself can use to assess whether social workers have engaged in unethical conduct. NASW has formal procedures to adjudicate ethics complaints filed against its members.* In subscribing to this Code, social workers are required to cooperate in its implementation, participate in NASW adjudication proceedings, and abide by any NASW disciplinary rulings or sanctions based on it.
The Code offers a set of values, principles, and standards to guide decision making and conduct when ethical issues arise. It does not provide a set of rules that prescribe how social workers should act in all situations. Specific applications of the Code must take into account the context in which it is being considered and the possibility of conflicts among the Code‘s values, principles, and standards. Ethical responsibilities flow from all human relationships, from the personal and familial to the social and professional.
Further, the NASW Code of Ethics does not specify which values, principles, and standards are most important and ought to outweigh others in instances when they conflict. Reasonable differences of opinion can and do exist among social workers with respect to the ways in which values, ethical principles, and ethical standards should be rank ordered when they conflict. Ethical decision making in a given situation must apply the informed judgment of the individual social worker and should also consider how the issues would be judged in a peer review process where the ethical standards of the profession would be applied.
Ethical decision making is a process. There are many instances in social work where simple answers are not available to resolve complex ethical issues. Social workers should take into consideration all the values, principles, and standards in this Code that are relevant to any situation in which ethical judgment is warranted. Social workers’ decisions and actions should be consistent with the spirit as well as the letter of this Code.
In addition to this Code, there are many other sources of information about ethical thinking that may be useful. Social workers should consider ethical theory and principles generally, social work theory and research, laws, regulations, agency policies, and other relevant codes of ethics, recognizing that among codes of ethics social workers should consider the NASW Code of Ethics as their primary source. Social workers also should be aware of the impact on ethical decision making of their clients’ and their own personal values and cultural and religious beliefs and practices. They should be aware of any conflicts between personal and professional values and deal with them responsibly. For additional guidance social workers should consult the relevant literature on professional ethics and ethical decision making and seek appropriate consultation when faced with ethical dilemmas. This may involve consultation with an agency¬based or social work organization’s ethics committee, a regulatory body, knowledgeable colleagues, supervisors, or legal counsel.
Instances may arise when social workers’ ethical obligations conflict with agency policies or relevant laws or regulations. When such con¬flicts occur, social workers must make a responsible effort to resolve the conflict in a manner that is consistent with the values, principles, and standards expressed in this Code. If a reasonable resolution of the conflict does not appear possible, social workers should seek proper consultation before making a decision.
The NASW Code of Ethics is to be used by NASW and by individuals, agencies, organizations, and bodies (such as licensing and regulatory boards, professional liability insurance providers, courts of law, agency boards of directors, government agencies, and other professional groups) that choose to adopt it or use it as a frame of reference. Violation of standards in this Code does not automatically imply legal liability or violation of the law. Such determination can only be made in the context of legal and judicial proceedings. Alleged violations of the Code would be subject to a peer review process. Such processes are generally separate from legal or administrative procedures and insulated from legal review or proceedings to allow the profession to counsel and discipline its own members.
A code of ethics cannot guarantee ethical behavior. Moreover, a code of ethics cannot resolve all ethical issues or disputes or capture the richness and complexity involved in striving to make responsible choices within a moral community. Rather, a code of ethics sets forth values, ethical principles, and ethical standards to which professionals aspire and by which their actions can be judged. Social workers’ ethical behavior should result from their personal commitment to engage in ethical practice. The NASW Code of Ethics reflects the commitment of all social workers to uphold the profession’s values and to act ethically. Principles and standards must be applied by individuals of good character who discern moral questions and, in good faith, seek to make reliable ethical judgments.
Ethical Principles
The following broad ethical principles are based on social work’s core values of service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person, importance of human relationships, integrity, and competence. These principles set forth ideals to which all social workers should aspire.
Value: Service
Ethical Principle: Social workers’ primary goal is to help people in need and to address social problems.
Social workers elevate service to others above self¬interest. Social workers draw on their knowledge, values, and skills to help people in need and to address social problems. Social workers are encouraged to volunteer some portion of their professional skills with no expectation of significant financial return (pro bono service).
Value: Social Justice
Ethical Principle: Social workers challenge social injustice.
Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people. Social workers’ social change efforts are focused primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources; equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision making for all people.
Value: Dignity and Worth of the Person
Ethical Principle: Social workers respect the inherent dignity and worth of the person.
Social workers treat each person in a caring and respectful fashion, mindful of individual differences and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers promote clients’ socially responsible self¬determination. Social workers seek to enhance clients’ capacity and opportunity to change and to address their own needs. Social workers are cognizant of their dual responsibility to clients and to the broader society. They seek to resolve conflicts between clients’ interests and the broader society’s interests in a socially responsible manner consistent with the values, ethical principles, and ethical standards of the profession.
Value: Importance of Human Relationships
Ethical Principle: Social workers recognize the central importance of human relationships.
Social workers understand that relationships between and among people are an important vehicle for change. Social workers engage people as partners in the helping process. Social workers seek to strengthen relationships among people in a purposeful effort to promote, restore, maintain, and enhance the well¬being of individuals, families, social groups, organizations, and communities.
Value: Integrity
Ethical Principle: Social workers behave in a trustworthy manner.
Social workers are continually aware of the profession’s mission, values, ethical principles, and ethical standards and practice in a manner consistent with them. Social workers act honestly and responsibly and promote ethical practices on the part of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
Value: Competence
Ethical Principle: Social workers practice within their areas of competence and develop and enhance their professional expertise.
Social workers continually strive to increase their professional knowledge and skills and to apply them in practice. Social workers should aspire to contribute to the knowledge base of the profession.
Ethical Standards
The following ethical standards are relevant to the professional activities of all social workers. These standards concern (1) social workers’ ethical responsibilities to clients, (2) social workers’ ethical responsibilities to colleagues, (3) social workers’ ethical responsibilities in practice settings, (4) social workers’ ethical responsibilities as professionals, (5) social workers’ ethical responsibilities to the social work profession, and (6) social workers’ ethical responsibilities to the broader society.
Some of the standards that follow are enforceable guidelines for professional conduct, and some are aspirational. The extent to which each standard is enforceable is a matter of professional judgment to be exercised by those responsible for reviewing alleged violations of ethical standards.
1. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO CLIENTS
1.01 Commitment to Clients
Social workers’ primary responsibility is to promote the well¬being of clients. In general, clients’ interests are primary. However, social workers’ responsibility to the larger society or specific legal obligations may on limited occasions supersede the loyalty owed clients, and clients should be so advised. (Examples include when a social worker is required by law to report that a client has abused a child or has threatened to harm self or others.)
1.02 Self¬Determination
Social workers respect and promote the right of clients to self¬determination and assist clients in their efforts to identify and clarify their goals. Social workers may limit clients’ right to self-determination when, in the social workers’ professional judgment, clients’ actions or potential actions pose a serious, foreseeable, and imminent risk to themselves or others.
1.03 Informed Consent
(a) Social workers should provide services to clients only in the context of a professional relationship based, when appropriate, on valid informed consent. Social workers should use clear and understandable language to inform clients of the purpose of the services, risks related to the services, limits to services because of the requirements of a third¬party payer, relevant costs, reasonable alternatives, clients’ right to refuse or withdraw consent, and the time frame covered by the consent. Social workers should provide clients with an opportunity to ask questions.
(b) In instances when clients are not literate or have difficulty understanding the primary language used in the practice setting, social workers should take steps to ensure clients’ comprehension. This may include providing clients with a detailed verbal explanation or arranging for a qualified interpreter or translator whenever possible.
(c) In instances when clients lack the capacity to provide informed consent, social workers should protect clients’ interests by seeking permission from an appropriate third party, informing clients consistent with the clients’ level of understanding. In such instances social workers should seek to ensure that the third party acts in a manner consistent with clients’ wishes and interests. Social workers should take reasonable steps to enhance such clients’ ability to give informed consent.
(d) In instances when clients are receiving services involuntarily, social workers should provide information about the nature and extent of services and about the extent of clients’ right to refuse service.
(e) Social workers who provide services via electronic media (such as computer, telephone, radio, and television) should inform recipients of the limitations and risks associated with such services.
(f) Social workers should obtain clients’ informed consent before audiotaping or videotaping clients or permitting observation of services to clients by a third party.
1.04 Competence
(a) Social workers should provide services and represent themselves as competent only within the boundaries of their education, training, license, certification, consultation received, supervised experience, or other relevant professional experience.
(b) Social workers should provide services in substantive areas or use intervention techniques or approaches that are new to them only after engaging in appropriate study, training, consultation, and supervision from people who are competent in those interventions or techniques.
(c) When generally recognized standards do not exist with respect to an emerging area of practice, social workers should exercise careful judgment and take responsible steps (including appropriate education, research, training, consultation, and supervision) to ensure the competence of their work and to protect clients from harm.
1.05 Cultural Competence and Social Diversity
(a) Social workers should understand culture and its function in human behavior and society, recognizing the strengths that exist in all cultures.
(b) Social workers should have a knowledge base of their clients’ cultures and be able to demonstrate competence in the provision of services that are sensitive to clients’ cultures and to differences among people and cultural groups.
(c) Social workers should obtain education about and seek to understand the nature of social diversity and oppression with respect to race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability.
1.06 Conflicts of Interest
(a) Social workers should be alert to and avoid conflicts of interest that interfere with the exercise of professional discretion and impartial judgment. Social workers should inform clients when a real or potential conflict of interest arises and take reasonable steps to resolve the issue in a manner that makes the clients’ interests primary and protects clients’ interests to the greatest extent possible. In some cases, protecting clients’ interests may require termination of the professional relationship with proper referral of the client.
(b) Social workers should not take unfair advantage of any professional relationship or exploit others to further their personal, religious, political, or business interests.
(c) Social workers should not engage in dual or multiple relationships with clients or former clients in which there is a risk of exploitation or potential harm to the client. In instances when dual or multiple relationships are unavoidable, social workers should take steps to protect clients and are responsible for setting clear, appropriate, and culturally sensitive boundaries. (Dual or multiple relationships occur when social workers relate to clients in more than one relationship, whether professional, social, or business. Dual or multiple relationships can occur simultaneously or consecutively.)
(d) When social workers provide services to two or more people who have a relationship with each other (for example, couples, family members), social workers should clarify with all parties which individuals will be considered clients and the nature of social workers’ professional obligations to the various individuals who are receiving services. Social workers who anticipate a conflict of interest among the individuals receiving services or who anticipate having to perform in potentially conflicting roles (for example, when a social worker is asked to testify in a child custody dispute or divorce proceedings involving clients) should clarify their role with the parties involved and take appropriate action to minimize any conflict of interest.
1.07 Privacy and Confidentiality
(a) Social workers should respect clients’ right to privacy. Social workers should not solicit private information from clients unless it is essential to providing services or conducting social work evaluation or research. Once private information is shared, standards of confidentiality apply.
(b) Social workers may disclose confidential information when appropriate with valid consent from a client or a person legally authorized to consent on behalf of a client.
(c) Social workers should protect the confidentiality of all information obtained in the course of professional service, except for compelling professional reasons. The general expectation that social workers will keep information confidential does not apply when disclosure is necessary to prevent serious, foreseeable, and imminent harm to a client or other identifiable person. In all instances, social workers should disclose the least amount of confidential information necessary to achieve the desired purpose; only information that is directly relevant to the purpose for which the disclosure is made should be revealed.
(d) Social workers should inform clients, to the extent possible, about the disclosure of confidential information and the potential consequences, when feasible before the disclosure is made. This applies whether social workers disclose confidential information on the basis of a legal requirement or client consent.
(e) Social workers should discuss with clients and other interested parties the nature of confidentiality and limitations of clients’ right to confidentiality. Social workers should review with clients circumstances where confidential information may be requested and where disclosure of confidential information may be legally required. This discussion should occur as soon as possible in the social worker¬client relationship and as needed throughout the course of the relationship.
(f) When social workers provide counseling services to families, couples, or groups, social workers should seek agreement among the parties involved concerning each individual’s right to confidentiality and obligation to preserve the confidentiality of information shared by others. Social workers should inform participants in family, couples, or group counseling that social workers cannot guarantee that all participants will honor such agreements.
(g) Social workers should inform clients involved in family, couples, marital, or group counseling of the social worker’s, employer’s, and agency’s policy concerning the social worker’s disclosure of confidential information among the parties involved in the counseling.
(h) Social workers should not disclose confidential information to third¬party payers unless clients have authorized such disclosure.
(i) Social workers should not discuss confidential information in any setting unless privacy can be ensured. Social workers should not discuss confidential information in public or semipublic areas such as hallways, waiting rooms, elevators, and restaurants.
(j) Social workers should protect the confidentiality of clients during legal proceedings to the extent permitted by law. When a court of law or other legally authorized body orders social workers to disclose confidential or privileged information without a client’s consent and such disclosure could cause harm to the client, social workers should request that the court withdraw the order or limit the order as narrowly as possible or maintain the records under seal, unavailable for public inspection.
(k) Social workers should protect the confidentiality of clients when responding to requests from members of the media.
(l) Social workers should protect the confidentiality of clients’ written and electronic records and other sensitive information. Social workers should take reasonable steps to ensure that clients’ records are stored in a secure location and that clients’ records are not available to others who are not authorized to have access.
(m) Social workers should take precautions to ensure and maintain the confidentiality of information transmitted to other parties through the use of computers, electronic mail, facsimile machines, telephones and telephone answering machines, and other electronic or computer technology. Disclosure of identifying information should be avoided whenever possible.
(n) Social workers should transfer or dispose of clients’ records in a manner that protects clients’ confidentiality and is consistent with state statutes governing records and social work licensure.
(o) Social workers should take reasonable precautions to protect client confidentiality in the event of the social worker’s termination of practice, incapacitation, or death.
(p) Social workers should not disclose identifying information when discussing clients for teaching or training purposes unless the client has consented to disclosure of confidential information.
(q) Social workers should not disclose identifying information when discussing clients with consultants unless the client has consented to disclosure of confidential information or there is a compelling need for such disclosure.
(r) Social workers should protect the confidentiality of deceased clients consistent with the preceding standards.
1.08 Access to Records
(a) Social workers should provide clients with reasonable access to records concerning the clients. Social workers who are concerned that clients’ access to their records could cause serious misunderstanding or harm to the client should provide assistance in interpreting the records and consultation with the client regarding the records. Social workers should limit clients’ access to their records, or portions of their records, only in exceptional circumstances when there is compelling evidence that such access would cause serious harm to the client. Both clients’ requests and the rationale for withholding some or all of the record should be documented in clients’ files.
(b) When providing clients with access to their records, social workers should take steps to protect the confidentiality of other individuals identified or discussed in such records.
1.09 Sexual Relationships
(a) Social workers should under no circumstances engage in sexual activities or sexual contact with current clients, whether such contact is consensual or forced.
(b) Social workers should not engage in sexual activities or sexual contact with clients’ relatives or other individuals with whom clients maintain a close personal relationship when there is a risk of exploitation or potential harm to the client. Sexual activity or sexual contact with clients’ relatives or other individuals with whom clients maintain a personal relationship has the potential to be harmful to the client and may make it difficult for the social worker and client to maintain appropriate professional boundaries. Social workers—not their clients, their clients’ relatives, or other individuals with whom the client maintains a personal relationship—assume the full burden for setting clear, appropriate, and culturally sensitive boundaries.
(c) Social workers should not engage in sexual activities or sexual contact with former clients because of the potential for harm to the client. If social workers engage in conduct contrary to this prohibition or claim that an exception to this prohibition is warranted because of extraordinary circumstances, it is social workers—not their clients—who assume the full burden of demonstrating that the former client has not been exploited, coerced, or manipulated, intentionally or unintentionally.
(d) Social workers should not provide clinical services to individuals with whom they have had a prior sexual relationship. Providing clinical services to a former sexual partner has the potential to be harmful to the individual and is likely to make it difficult for the social worker and individual to maintain appropriate professional boundaries.
1.10 Physical Contact
Social workers should not engage in physical contact with clients when there is a possibility of psychological harm to the client as a result of the contact (such as cradling or caressing clients). Social workers who engage in appropriate physical contact with clients are responsible for setting clear, appropriate, and culturally sensitive boundaries that govern such physical contact.
1.11 Sexual Harassment
Social workers should not sexually harass clients. Sexual harassment includes sexual advances, sexual solicitation, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.
1.12 Derogatory Language
Social workers should not use derogatory language in their written or verbal communications to or about clients. Social workers should use accurate and respectful language in all communications to and about clients.
1.13 Payment for Services
(a) When setting fees, social workers should ensure that the fees are fair, reasonable, and commensurate with the services performed. Consideration should be given to clients’ ability to pay.
(b) Social workers should avoid accepting goods or services from clients as payment for professional services. Bartering arrangements, particularly involving services, create the potential for conflicts of interest, exploitation, and inappropriate boundaries in social workers’ relationships with clients. Social workers should explore and may participate in bartering only in very limited circumstances when it can be demonstrated that such arrangements are an accepted practice among professionals in the local community, considered to be essential for the provision of services, negotiated without coercion, and entered into at the client’s initiative and with the client’s informed consent. Social workers who accept goods or services from clients as payment for professional services assume the full burden of demonstrating that this arrangement will not be detrimental to the client or the professional relationship.
(c) Social workers should not solicit a private fee or other remuneration for providing services to clients who are entitled to such available services through the social workers’ employer or agency.
1.14 Clients Who Lack Decision¬Making Capacity
When social workers act on behalf of clients who lack the capacity to make informed decisions, social workers should take reasonable steps to safeguard the interests and rights of those clients.
1.15 Interruption of Services
Social workers should make reasonable efforts to ensure continuity of services in the event that services are interrupted by factors such as unavailability, relocation, illness, disability, or death.
1.16 Termination of Services
(a) Social workers should terminate services to clients and professional relationships with them when such services and
relationships are no longer required or no longer serve the clients’ needs or interests.
(b) Social workers should take reasonable steps to avoid abandoning clients who are still in need of services. Social workers should withdraw services precipitously only under unusual circumstances, giving careful consideration to all factors in the situation and taking care to minimize possible adverse effects. Social workers should assist in making appropriate arrangements for continuation of services when necessary.
(c) Social workers in fee¬for¬service settings may terminate services to clients who are not paying an overdue balance if the financial contractual arrangements have been made clear to the client, if the client does not pose an imminent danger to self or others, and if the clinical and other consequences of the current nonpayment have been addressed and discussed with the client.
(d) Social workers should not terminate services to pursue a social, financial, or sexual relationship with a client.
(e) Social workers who anticipate the termination or interruption of services to clients should notify clients promptly and seek the transfer, referral, or continuation of services in relation to the clients’ needs and preferences.
(f) Social workers who are leaving an employment setting should inform clients of appropriate options for the continuation of services and of the benefits and risks of the options.
2. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO COLLEAGUES
2.01 Respect
(a) Social workers should treat colleagues with respect and should represent accurately and fairly the qualifications, views, and obligations of colleagues.
(b) Social workers should avoid unwarranted negative criticism of colleagues in communications with clients or with other professionals. Unwarranted negative criticism may include demeaning comments that refer to colleagues’ level of competence or to individuals’ attributes such as race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, and mental or physical disability.
(c) Social workers should cooperate with social work colleagues and with colleagues of other professions when such cooperation serves the well¬being of clients.
2.02 Confidentiality
Social workers should respect confidential information shared by colleagues in the course of their professional relationships and transactions. Social workers should ensure that such colleagues understand social workers’ obligation to respect confidentiality and any exceptions related to it.
2.03 Interdisciplinary Collaboration
(a) Social workers who are members of an interdisciplinary team should participate in and contribute to decisions that affect the well¬being of clients by drawing on the perspectives, values, and experiences of the social work profession. Professional and ethical obligations of the interdisciplinary team as a whole and of its individual members should be clearly established.
(b) Social workers for whom a team decision raises ethical concerns should attempt to resolve the disagreement through appropriate channels. If the disagreement cannot be resolved, social workers should pursue other avenues to address their concerns consistent with client well¬being.
2.04 Disputes Involving Colleagues
(a) Social workers should not take advantage of a dispute between a colleague and an employer to obtain a position or otherwise advance the social workers’ own interests.
(b) Social workers should not exploit clients in disputes with colleagues or engage clients in any inappropriate discussion of conflicts between social workers and their colleagues.
2.05 Consultation
(a) Social workers should seek the advice and counsel of colleagues whenever such consultation is in the best interests of clients.
(b) Social workers should keep themselves informed about colleagues’ areas of expertise and competencies. Social workers should seek consultation only from colleagues who have demonstrated knowledge, expertise, and competence related to the subject of the consultation.
(c) When consulting with colleagues about clients, social workers should disclose the least amount of information necessary to achieve the purposes of the consultation.
2.06 Referral for Services
(a) Social workers should refer clients to other professionals when the other professionals’ specialized knowledge or expertise is needed to serve clients fully or when social workers believe that they are not being effective or making reasonable progress with clients and that additional service is required.
(b) Social workers who refer clients to other professionals should take appropriate steps to facilitate an orderly transfer of responsibility. Social workers who refer clients to other professionals should disclose, with clients’ consent, all pertinent information to the new service providers.
(c) Social workers are prohibited from giving or receiving payment for a referral when no professional service is provided by the referring social worker.
2.07 Sexual Relationships
(a) Social workers who function as supervisors or educators should not engage in sexual activities or contact with supervisees, students, trainees, or other colleagues over whom they exercise professional authority.
(b) Social workers should avoid engaging in sexual relationships with colleagues when there is potential for a conflict of interest. Social workers who become involved in, or anticipate becoming involved in, a sexual relationship with a colleague have a duty to transfer professional responsibilities, when necessary, to avoid a conflict of interest.
2.08 Sexual Harassment
Social workers should not sexually harass supervisees, students, trainees, or colleagues. Sexual harassment includes sexual advances, sexual solicitation, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.
2.09 Impairment of Colleagues
(a) Social workers who have direct knowledge of a social work colleague’s impairment that is due to personal problems, psychosocial distress, substance abuse, or mental health difficulties and that interferes
with practice effectiveness should consult with that colleague when feasible and assist the colleague in taking remedial action.
(b) Social workers who believe that a social work colleague’s impairment interferes with practice effectiveness and that the colleague has not taken adequate steps to address the impairment should take action through appropriate channels established by employers, agencies, NASW, licensing and regulatory bodies, and other professional organizations.
2.10 Incompetence of Colleagues
(a) Social workers who have direct knowledge of a social work colleague’s incompetence should consult with that colleague when feasible and assist the colleague in taking remedial action.
(b) Social workers who believe that a social work colleague is incompetent and has not taken adequate steps to address the incompetence should take action through appropriate channels established by employers, agencies, NASW, licensing and regulatory bodies, and other professional organizations.
2.11 Unethical Conduct of Colleagues
(a) Social workers should take adequate measures to discourage, prevent, expose, and correct the unethical conduct of colleagues.
(b) Social workers should be knowledgeable about established policies and procedures for handling concerns about colleagues’ unethical behavior. Social workers should be familiar with national, state, and local procedures for handling ethics complaints. These include policies and procedures created by NASW, licensing and regulatory bodies, employers, agencies, and other professional organizations.
(c) Social workers who believe that a colleague has acted unethically should seek resolution by discussing their concerns with the colleague when feasible and when such discussion is likely to be productive.
(d) When necessary, social workers who believe that a colleague has acted unethically should take action through appropriate formal channels (such as contacting a state licensing board or regulatory body, an NASW committee on inquiry, or other professional ethics committees).
(e) Social workers should defend and assist colleagues who are unjustly charged with unethical conduct.
3. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN PRACTICE SETTINGS
3.01 Supervision and Consultation
(a) Social workers who provide supervision or consultation should have the necessary knowledge and skill to supervise or consult appropriately and should do so only within their areas of knowledge and competence.
(b) Social workers who provide supervision or consultation are responsible for setting clear, appropriate, and culturally sensitive boundaries.
(c) Social workers should not engage in any dual or multiple relationships with supervisees in which there is a risk of exploitation of or potential harm to the supervisee.
(d) Social workers who provide supervision should evaluate supervisees’ performance in a manner that is fair and respectful.
3.02 Education and Training
(a) Social workers who function as educators, field instructors for students, or trainers should provide instruction only within their areas of knowledge and competence and should provide instruction based on the most current information and knowledge available in the profession.
(b) Social workers who function as educators or field instructors for students should evaluate students’ performance in a manner that is fair and respectful.
(c) Social workers who function as educators or field instructors for students should take reasonable steps to ensure that clients are routinely informed when services are being provided by students.
(d) Social workers who function as educators or field instructors for students should not engage in any dual or multiple relationships with students in which there is a risk of exploitation or potential harm to the student. Social work educators and field instructors are responsible for setting clear, appropriate, and culturally sensitive boundaries.
3.03 Performance Evaluation
Social workers who have responsibility for evaluating the performance of others should fulfill such responsibility in a fair and considerate manner and on the basis of clearly stated criteria.
3.04 Client Records
(a) Social workers should take reasonable steps to ensure that documentation in records is accurate and reflects the services provided.
(b) Social workers should include sufficient and timely documentation in records to facilitate the delivery of services and to ensure continuity of services provided to clients in the future.
(c) Social workers’ documentation should protect clients’ privacy to the extent that is possible and appropriate and should include only information that is directly relevant to the delivery of services.
(d) Social workers should store records following the termination of services to ensure reasonable future access. Records should be maintained for the number of years required by state statutes or relevant contracts.
3.05 Billing
Social workers should establish and maintain billing practices that accurately reflect the nature and extent of services provided and that identify who provided the service in the practice setting.
3.06 Client Transfer
(a) When an individual who is receiving services from another agency or colleague contacts a social worker for services, the social worker should carefully consider the client’s needs before agreeing to provide services. To minimize possible confusion and conflict, social workers should discuss with potential clients the nature of the clients’ current relationship with other service providers and the implications, including possible benefits or risks, of entering into a relationship with a new service provider.
(b) If a new client has been served by another agency or colleague, social workers should discuss with the client whether consultation with the previous service provider is in the client’s best interest.
3.07 Administration
(a) Social work administrators should advocate within and outside their agencies for adequate resources to meet clients’ needs.
(b) Social workers should advocate for resource allocation procedures that are open and fair. When not all clients’ needs can be met, an
allocation procedure should be developed that is nondiscriminatory and based on appropriate and consistently applied principles.
(c) Social workers who are administrators should take reasonable steps to ensure that adequate agency or organizational resources are available to provide appropriate staff supervision.
(d) Social work administrators should take reasonable steps to ensure that the working environment for which they are responsible is consistent with and encourages compliance with the NASW Code of Ethics. Social work administrators should take reasonable steps to eliminate any conditions in their organizations that violate, interfere with, or discourage compliance with the Code.
3.08 Continuing Education and Staff Development
Social work administrators and supervisors should take reasonable steps to provide or arrange for continuing education and staff development for all staff for whom they are responsible. Continuing education and staff development should address current knowledge and emerging developments related to social work practice and ethics.
3.09 Commitments to Employers
(a) Social workers generally should adhere to commitments made to employers and employing organizations.
(b) Social workers should work to improve employing agencies’ policies and procedures and the efficiency and effectiveness of their services.
(c) Social workers should take reasonable steps to ensure that employers are aware of social workers’ ethical obligations as set forth in the NASW Code of Ethics and of the implications of those obligations for social work practice.
(d) Social workers should not allow an employing organization’s policies, procedures, regulations, or administrative orders to interfere with their ethical practice of social work. Social workers should take reasonable steps to ensure that their employing organizations’ practices are consistent with the NASW Code of Ethics.
(e) Social workers should act to prevent and eliminate discrimination in the employing organization’s work assignments and in its employment policies and practices.
(f) Social workers should accept employment or arrange student field placements only in organizations that exercise fair personnel practices.
(g) Social workers should be diligent stewards of the resources of their employing organizations, wisely conserving funds where appropriate and never misappropriating funds or using them for unintended purposes.
3.10 Labor¬Management Disputes
(a) Social workers may engage in organized action, including the formation of and participation in labor unions, to improve services to clients and working conditions.
(b) The actions of social workers who are involved in labor¬management disputes, job actions, or labor strikes should be guided by the profession’s values, ethical principles, and ethical standards. Reasonable differences of opinion exist among social workers concerning their primary obligation as professionals during an actual or threatened labor strike or job action. Social workers should carefully examine relevant issues and their possible impact on clients before deciding on a course of action.
4. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES AS PROFESSIONALS
4.01 Competence
(a) Social workers should accept responsibility or employment only on the basis of existing competence or the intention to acquire the necessary competence.
(b) Social workers should strive to become and remain proficient in professional practice and the performance of professional functions. Social workers should critically examine and keep current with emerging knowledge relevant to social work. Social workers should routinely review the professional literature and participate in continuing education relevant to social work practice and social work ethics.
(c) Social workers should base practice on recognized knowledge, including empirically based knowledge, relevant to social work and social work ethics.
4.02 Discrimination
Social workers should not practice, condone, facilitate, or collaborate with any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical disability.
4.03 Private Conduct
Social workers should not permit their private conduct to interfere with their ability to fulfill their professional responsibilities.
4.04 Dishonesty, Fraud, and Deception
Social workers should not participate in, condone, or be associated with dishonesty, fraud, or deception.
4.05 Impairment
(a) Social workers should not allow their own personal problems, psychosocial distress, legal problems, substance abuse, or mental health difficulties to interfere with their professional judgment and performance or to jeopardize the best interests of people for whom they have a professional responsibility.
(b) Social workers whose personal problems, psychosocial distress, legal problems, substance abuse, or mental health difficulties interfere with their professional judgment and performance should immediately seek consultation and take appropriate remedial action by seeking professional help, making adjustments in workload, terminating practice, or taking any other steps necessary to protect clients and others.
4.06 Misrepresentation
(a) Social workers should make clear distinctions between statements made and actions engaged in as a private individual and as a representative of the social work profession, a professional social work organization, or the social worker’s employing agency.
(b) Social workers who speak on behalf of professional social work organizations should accurately represent the official and authorized positions of the organizations.
(c) Social workers should ensure that their representations to clients, agencies, and the public of professional qualifications, credentials, education, competence, affiliations, services provided, or results to be achieved are accurate. Social workers should claim only those relevant professional credentials they actually possess and take steps to correct any inaccuracies or misrepresentations of their credentials by others.
4.07 Solicitations
(a) Social workers should not engage in uninvited solicitation of potential clients who, because of their circumstances, are vulnerable to undue influence, manipulation, or coercion.
(b) Social workers should not engage in solicitation of testimonial endorsements (including solicitation of consent to use a client’s prior statement as a testimonial endorsement) from current clients or from other people who, because of their particular circumstances, are vulnerable to undue influence.
4.08 Acknowledging Credit
(a) Social workers should take responsibility and credit, including authorship credit, only for work they have actually performed and to which they have contributed.
(b) Social workers should honestly acknowledge the work of and the contributions made by others.
5. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE SOCIAL WORK PROFESSION
5.01 Integrity of the Profession
(a) Social workers should work toward the maintenance and promotion of high standards of practice.
(b) Social workers should uphold and advance the values, ethics, knowledge, and mission of the profession. Social workers should protect, enhance, and improve the integrity of the profession through appropriate study and research, active discussion, and responsible criticism of the profession.
(c) Social workers should contribute time and professional expertise to activities that promote respect for the value, integrity, and competence of the social work profession. These activities may include teaching, research, consultation, service, legislative testimony, presentations in the community, and participation in their professional organizations.
(d) Social workers should contribute to the knowledge base of social work and share with colleagues their knowledge related to practice, research, and ethics. Social workers should seek to contribute to the profession’s literature and to share their knowledge at professional meetings and conferences.
(e) Social workers should act to prevent the unauthorized and unqualified practice of social work.
5.02 Evaluation and Research
(a) Social workers should monitor and evaluate policies, the implementation of programs, and practice interventions.
(b) Social workers should promote and facilitate evaluation and research to contribute to the development of knowledge.
(c) Social workers should critically examine and keep current with emerging knowledge relevant to social work and fully use evaluation and research evidence in their professional practice.
(d) Social workers engaged in evaluation or research should carefully consider possible consequences and should follow guidelines developed for the protection of evaluation and research participants. Appropriate institutional review boards should be consulted.
(e) Social workers engaged in evaluation or research should obtain voluntary and written informed consent from participants, when appropriate, without any implied or actual deprivation or penalty for refusal to participate; without undue inducement to participate; and with due regard for participants’ well¬being, privacy, and dignity. Informed consent should include information about the nature, extent, and duration of the participation requested and disclosure of the risks and benefits of participation in the research.
(f) When evaluation or research participants are incapable of giving informed consent, social workers should provide an appropriate explanation to the participants, obtain the participants’ assent to the extent they are able, and obtain written consent from an appropriate proxy.
(g) Social workers should never design or conduct evaluation or research that does not use consent procedures, such as certain forms of naturalistic observation and archival research, unless rigorous and responsible review of the research has found it to be justified because of its prospective scientific, educational, or applied value and unless equally effective alternative procedures that do not involve waiver of consent are not feasible.
(h) Social workers should inform participants of their right to withdraw from evaluation and research at any time without penalty.
(i) Social workers should take appropriate steps to ensure that participants in evaluation and research have access to appropriate supportive services.
(j) Social workers engaged in evaluation or research should protect participants from unwarranted physical or mental distress, harm, danger, or deprivation.
(k) Social workers engaged in the evaluation of services should discuss collected information only for professional purposes and only with people professionally concerned with this information.
(l) Social workers engaged in evaluation or research should ensure the anonymity or confidentiality of participants and of the data obtained from them. Social workers should inform participants of any limits of confidentiality, the measures that will be taken to ensure confidentiality, and when any records containing research data will be destroyed.
(m) Social workers who report evaluation and research results should protect participants’ confidentiality by omitting identifying information unless proper consent has been obtained authorizing disclosure.
(n) Social workers should report evaluation and research findings accurately. They should not fabricate or falsify results and should take steps to correct any errors later found in published data using standard publication methods.
(o) Social workers engaged in evaluation or research should be alert to and avoid conflicts of interest and dual relationships with participants, should inform participants when a real or potential conflict of interest arises, and should take steps to resolve the issue in a manner that makes participants’ interests primary.
(p) Social workers should educate themselves, their students, and their colleagues about responsible research practices.
6. SOCIAL WORKERS’ ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE BROADER SOCIETY
6.01 Social Welfare
Social workers should promote the general welfare of society, from local to global levels, and the development of people, their communities, and their environments. Social workers should advocate for living conditions conducive to the fulfillment of basic human needs and should promote social, economic, political, and cultural values and institutions that are compatible with the realization of social justice.
6.02 Public Participation
Social workers should facilitate informed participation by the public in shaping social policies and institutions.
6.03 Public Emergencies
Social workers should provide appropriate professional services in public emergencies to the greatest extent possible.
6.04 Social and Political Action
(a) Social workers should engage in social and political action that seeks to ensure that all people have equal access to the resources, employment, services, and opportunities they require to meet their basic human needs and to develop fully. Social workers should be aware of the impact of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and legislation to improve social conditions in order to meet basic human needs and promote social justice.
(b) Social workers should act to expand choice and opportunity for all people, with special regard for vulnerable, disadvantaged, oppressed, and exploited people and groups.
(c) Social workers should promote conditions that encourage respect for cultural and social diversity within the United States and globally. Social workers should promote policies and practices that demonstrate respect for difference, support the expansion of cultural knowledge and resources, advocate for programs and institutions that demonstrate cultural competence, and promote policies that safeguard the rights of and confirm equity and social justice for all people.
(d) Social workers should act to prevent and eliminate domination of, exploitation of, and discrimination against any person, group, or class on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, age, marital status, political belief, religion, immigration status, or mental or physical disability.

Bill of Rights

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The conventions of a number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added.

Article the first [Not Ratified]

After the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.
Article the second [Amendment XXVII - Ratified 1992]

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
Article the third [Amendment I]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Article the fourth [Amendment II][4]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Article the fifth [Amendment III]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
Article the sixth [Amendment IV]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article the seventh [Amendment V]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Article the eighth [Amendment VI]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Article the ninth [Amendment VII]

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Article the tenth [Amendment VIII]

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Article the eleventh [Amendment IX]

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Article the twelfth [Amendment X]

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
________________________________________
Notes:
4. In the Congressional Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, Page 97, at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=001/llsl001.db&recNum=220, the first and third commas are omitted, so that it reads:
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.
The question remains open of where those additional, and grammatically spurious, commas came from, but they do not change the legal meaning of the provision, and it would not be erroneous to omit them.
________________________________________

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America

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Articles in addition to, and amendment of, the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the several states, pursuant to the Fifth Article of the original Constitution fn1

Amendment I fn2 [ Annotations ]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Amendment II [ Annotations ]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

Amendment III [ Annotations ]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Amendment IV [ Annotations ]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment V [ Annotations ]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment VI [ Annotations ]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Amendment VII [ Annotations ]

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Amendment VIII [ Annotations ]

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Amendment IX [ Annotations ]

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Amendment X [ Annotations ]

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Amendment XI fn3 [ Annotations ]

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

Amendment XII fn4 [ Annotations ]

The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice- President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;--The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;--The person having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice- President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President--The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Amendment XIII. fn5 [ Annotations ]

Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XIV. fn6 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Amendment XV. fn7 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XVI. fn8 [ Annotations ]

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Amendment XVII fn9 [ Annotations ]

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

Amendment XVIII fn10 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Amendment XIX fn11 [ Annotations ]

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XX fn12 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Sec. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Sec. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Sec. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Sec. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

Sec. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Amendment XXI fn13 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Amendment XXII fn14 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Sec. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

Amendment XXIII fn15 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XXIV fn16 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XXV fn17 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives has written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives has written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Amendment XXVI fn18 [ Annotations ]

Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Amendment XXVII fn19 [ Annotations ]

No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

This document is sponsored by the United States Senate on the United States Government Printing Office web site.

Footnotes
1 In Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), the Supreme Court stated that it would take judicial notice of the date on which a State ratified a proposed constitutional amendment. Accordingly the Court consulted the State journals to determine the dates on which each house of the legislature of certain States ratified the Eighteenth Amendment. It, therefore, follows that the date on which the governor approved the ratification, or the date on which the secretary of state of a given State certified the ratification, or the date on which the Secretary of State of the United States received a copy of said certificate, or the date on which he proclaimed that the amendment had been ratified are not controlling. Hence, the ratification date given in the following notes is the date on which the legislature of a given State approved the particular amendment (signature by the speaker or presiding officers of both houses being considered a part of the ratification of the ''legislature''). When that date is not available, the date given is that on which it was approved by the governor or certified by the secretary of state of the particular State. In each case such fact has been noted. Except as otherwise indicated information as to ratification is based on data supplied by the Department of State.

2 Brackets enclosing an amendment number indicate that the number was not specifically assigned in the resolution proposing the amendment. It will be seen, accordingly, that only the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments were thus technically ratified by number. The first ten amendments along with two others that were not ratified were proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, when they passed the Senate, having previously passed the House on September 24 (1 Annals of Congress 88, 913). They appear officially in 1 Stat. 97. Ratification was completed on December 15, 1791, when the eleventh State (Virginia) approved these amendments, there being then 14 States in the Union.

The several state legislatures ratified the first ten amendments to the Constitution on the following dates: New Jersey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790; Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791. The two amendments that then failed of ratification prescribed the ratio of representation to population in the House, and specified that no law varying the compensation of members of Congress should be effective until after an intervening election of Representatives. The first was ratified by ten States (one short of the requisite number) and the second, by six States; subsequently, this second proposal was taken up by the States in the period 1980-1992 and was proclaimed as ratified as of May 7, 1992. Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified the first ten amendments in 1939.

3 The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 4, 1794, when it passed the House, 4 Annals of Congress 477, 478, having previously passed the Senate on January 14, Id., 30, 31. It appears officially in 1 Stat. 402. Ratification was completed on February 7, 1795, when the twelfth State (North Carolina) approved the amendment, there being then 15 States in the Union. Official announcement of ratification was not made until January 8, 1798, when President John Adams in a message to Congress stated that the Eleventh Amendment had been adopted by three-fourths of the States and that it ''may now be deemed to be a part of the Constitution.'' In the interim South Carolina had ratified, and Tennessee had been admitted into the Union as the sixteenth State.

The several state legislatures ratified the Eleventh Amendment on the following dates: New York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31, 1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794; Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, between October 9 and November 9, 1794; Virginia, November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7, 1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; North Carolina, February 7, 1795; South Carolina, December 4, 1797.

4 The Twelfth Amendment was proposed by Congress on December 9, 1803, when it passed the House, 13 Annals of Congress 775, 776, having previously passed the Senate on December 2. Id., 209. It was not signed by the presiding officers of the House and Senate until December 12. It appears officially in 2 Stat. 306. Ratification was probably completed on June 15, 1804, when the legislature of the thirteenth State (New Hampshire) approved the amendment, there being then 17 States in the Union. The Governor of New Hampshire, however, vetoed this act of the legislature on June 20, and the act failed to pass again by two- thirds vote then required by the state constitution. Inasmuch as Article V of the Federal Constitution specifies that amendments shall become effective ''when ratified by legislatures of three-fourths of the several States or by conventions in three-fourths thereof,'' it has been generally believed that an approval or veto by a governor is without significance. If the ratification by New Hampshire be deemed ineffective, then the amendment became operative by Tennessee's ratification on July 27, 1804. On September 25, 1804, in a circular letter to the Governors of the several States, Secretary of State Madison declared the amendment ratified by three-fourths of the States.

The several state legislatures ratified the Twelfth Amendment on the following dates: North Carolina, December 22, 1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky, December 27, 1803; Ohio, between December 5 and December 30, 1803; Virginia, between December 20, 1803 and February 3, 1804; Pennsylvania, January 5, 1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York, February 10, 1804; New Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, between February 27 and March 12, 1804; South Carolina, May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New Hampshire, June 15, 1804; and Tennessee, July 27, 1804. The amendment was rejected by Delaware on January 18, 1804, and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804. Massachusetts ratified this amendment in 1961.

5 The Thirteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on January 31, 1865, when it passed the House, Cong. Globe (38th Cong., 2d Sess.) 531, having previously passed the Senate on April 8, 1964. Id. (38th cong., 1st Sess.), 1940. It appears officially in 13 Stat. 567 under the date of February 1, 1865. Ratification was completed on December 6, 1865, when the legislature of the twenty-seventh State (Georgia) approved the amendment, there being then 36 States in the Union. On December 18, 1865, Secretary of State Seward certified that the Thirteenth Amendment had become a part of the Constitution, 13 Stat. 774.

The several state legislatures ratified the Thirteenth Amendment on the following dates: Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2, 1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Maryland, February 3, 1865; New York, February 3, 1865; West Virginia, February 3, 1865; Missouri, February 6, 1865; Maine, February 7, 1865; Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts, February 7, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 8, 1865; Virginia, February 9, 1865; Ohio, February 10, 1865; Louisiana, February 15 or 16, 1865; Indiana, February 16, 1865; Nevada, February 16, 1865; Minnesota, February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865 (date on which it was ''approved'' by Governor); Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14, 1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New Hampshire, June 30, 1865; South Carolina, November 13, 1865; Alabama, December 2, 1865 (date on which it was ''approved'' by Provisional Governor); North Carolina, December 4, 1865; Georgia, December 6, 1865; Oregon, December 11, 1865; California, December 15, 1865; Florida, December 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified this amendment on June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new constitution); Iowa, January 17, 1866; New Jersey, January 23, 1866 (after having rejected the amendment on March 16, 1865); Texas, February 17, 1870; Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the amendment on February 8, 1865). The amendment was rejected by Kentucky on February 24, 1865, and by Mississippi on December 2, 1865.

6 The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 13, 1866, when it passed the House, Cong. Globe (39th Cong., 1st Sess.) 3148, 3149, having previously passed the Senate on June 8. Id., 3042. It appears officially in 14 Stat. 358 under date of June 16, 1866. Ratification was probably completed on July 9, 1868, when the legislature of the twenty-eighth State (South Carolina or Louisiana) approved the amendment, there being then 37 States in the Union. However, Ohio and New Jersey had prior to that date ''withdrawn'' their earlier assent to this amendment. Accordingly, Secretary of State Seward on July 20, 1868, certified that the amendment had become a part of the Constitution if the said withdrawals were ineffective. 15 Stat. 706-707. Congress on July 21, 1868, passed a joint resolution declaring the amendment a part of the Constitution and directing the Secretary to promulgate it as such. On July 28, 1868, Secretary Seward certified without reservation that the amendment was a part of the Constitution. In the interim, two other States, Alabama on July 13 and Georgia on July 21, 1868, had added their ratifications.

The several state legislatures ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on the following dates: Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire, July 7, 1866; Tennessee, July 19, 1866; New Jersey, September 11, 1866 (the New Jersey Legislature on February 20, 1868 ''withdrew'' its consent to the ratification; the Governor vetoed that bill on March 5, 1868; and it was repassed over his veto on March 24, 1868); Oregon, September 19, 1866 (Oregon ''withdrew'' its consent on October 15, 1868); Vermont, October 30, 1866; New York, January 10, 1867; Ohio, January 11, 1867 (Ohio ''withdrew'' its consent on January 15, 1868); Illinois, January 15, 1867; West Virginia, January 16, 1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Minnesota, January 17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January 22, 1867; Indiana, January 23, 1867; Missouri, January 26, 1867 (date on which it was certified by the Missouri secretary of state); Rhode Island, February 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, February 12, 1867; Wisconsin, February 13, 1867 (actually passed February 7, but not signed by legislative officers until February 13); Massachusetts, March 20, 1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 9, 1868; Arkansas, April 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 2, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment on December 13, 1866); Louisiana, July 9, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment on February 6, 1867); South Carolina, July 8, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment on December 20, 1866); Alabama, July 13, 1868 (date on which it was ''approved'' by the Governor); Georgia, July 21, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment on November 9, 1866--Georgia ratified again on February 2, 1870); Virginia, October 8, 1869 (after having rejected the amendment on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870 (after having rejected the amendment on October 27, 1866); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the amendment on February 7, 1867). The amendment was rejected (and not subsequently ratified) by Kentucky on January 8, 1867. Maryland and California ratified this amendment in 1959.

7 The Fifteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 26, 1869, when it passed the Senate, Cong. Globe (40th Cong., 3rd Sess.) 1641, having previously passed the House on February 25. Id., 1563, 1564. It appears officially in 15 Stat. 346 under the date of February 27, 1869. Ratification was probably completed on February 3, 1870, when the legislature of the twenty-eighth State (Iowa) approved the amendment, there being then 37 States in the Union. However, New York had prior to that date ''withdrawn'' its earlier assent to this amendment. Even if this withdrawal were effective, Nebraska's ratification on February 17, 1870, authorized Secretary of State Fish's certification of March 30, 1870, that the Fifteenth Amendment had become a part of the Constitution. 16 Stat. 1131.

The several state legislatures ratified the Fifteenth Amendment on the following dates: Nevada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3, 1869; North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Louisiana, March 5, 1869 (date on which it was ''approved'' by the Governor); Illinois, March 5, 1869; Michigan, March 5, 1869; Wisconsin, March 5, 1869; Maine, March 11, 1869; Massachusetts, March 12, 1869; South Carolina, March 15, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1869; New York, April 14, 1869 (New York ''withdrew'' its consent to the ratification on January 5, 1870); Indiana, May 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June 14, 1869; New Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869; Vermont, October 20, 1869; Alabama, November 16, 1869; Missouri, January 7, 1870 (Missouri had ratified the first section of the 15th Amendment on March 1, 1869; it failed to include in its ratification the second section of the amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870; Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Rhode Island, January 18, 1870; Kansas, January 19, 1870 (Kansas had by a defectively worded resolution previously ratified this amendment on February 27, 1869); Ohio, January 27, 1870 (after having rejected the amendment on May 4, 1869); Georgia, February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3, 1870; Nebraska, February 17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after having rejected the amendment on February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (date on which approved by Governor; Delaware had previously rejected the amendment on March 18, 1869). The amendment was rejected (and not subsequently ratified) by Kentucky, Maryland, and Tennessee. California ratified this amendment in 1962 and Oregon in 1959.

8 The Sixteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on July 12, 1909, when it passed the House, 44 Cong. Rec. (61st Cong., 1st Sess.) 4390, 4440, 4441, having previously passed the Senate on July 5. Id., 4121. It appears officially in 36 Stat. 184. Ratification was completed on February 3, 1913, when the legislature of the thirty-sixth State (Delaware, Wyoming, or New Mexico) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On February 25, 1913, Secretary of State Knox certified that this amendment had become a part of the Constitution. 37 Stat. 1785.

The several state legislatures ratified the Sixteenth Amendment on the following dates: Alabama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina, February 19, 1910; Illinois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910; Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8, 1910; Georgia, August 3, 1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January 20, 1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana, January 27, 1911; Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31, 1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Dakota, February 1, 1911; Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colorado, February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa, February 24, 1911; Kansas, March 2, 1911; Missouri, March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911; Tennessee, April 7, 1911; Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected the amendment at the session begun January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 16, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911; Arizona, April 3, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28, 1912; West Virginia, January 31, 1913; Delaware, February 3, 1913; Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913; New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; Massachusetts, March 4, 1913; New Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected the amendment on March 2, 1911). The amendment was rejected (and not subsequently ratified) by Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah.

9 The Seventeenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on May 13, 1912, when it passed the House, 48 Cong. Rec. (62d Cong., 2d Sess.) 6367, having previously passed the Senate on June 12, 1911. 47 Cong. Rec. (62d Cong., 1st Sess.) 1925. It appears officially in 37 Stat. 646. Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913, when the thirty-sixth State (Connecticut) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On May 31, 1913, Secretary of State Bryan certified that it had become a part of the Constitution. 38 Stat 2049.

The several state legislatures ratified the Seventeenth Amendment on the following dates: Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912; Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, January 15, 1913; Kansas, January 17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January 25, 1913; California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January 30, 1913; Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colorado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February 6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, February 7, 1913; Wyoming, February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Illinois, February 13, 1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin, February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19, 1913; New Hampshire, February 19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, February 19, 1913; Maine, February 20, 1913; Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913; Missouri, March 7, 1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 1913; New Jersey, March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 1913; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913; Connecticut, April 8, 1913; Louisiana, June 5, 1914. The amendment was rejected by Utah on February 26, 1913.

10 The Eighteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on December 18, 1917, when it passed the Senate, Cong. Rec. (65th Cong. 2d Sess.) 478, having previously passed the House on December 17. Id., 470. It appears officially in 40 Stat. 1059. Ratification was completed on January 16, 1919, when the thirty-sixth State approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On January 29, 1919, Acting Secretary of State Polk certified that this amendment had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 40 Stat. 1941. By its terms this amendment did not become effective until 1 year after ratification.

The several state legislatures ratified the Eighteenth Amendment on the following dates: Mississippi, January 8, 1918; Virginia, January 11, 1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North Dakota, January 28, 1918 (date on which approved by Governor); South Carolina, January 29, 1918; Maryland, February 13, 1918; Montana, February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918; Delaware, March 18, 1918; South Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts, April 2, 1918; Arizona, May 24, 1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana, August 9, 1918 (date on which approved by Governor); Florida, November 27, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919; Ohio, January 7, 1919; Oklahoma, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8, 1919; Maine, January 8, 1919; West Virginia, January 9, 1919; California, January 13, 1919; Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington, January 13, 1919; Arkansas, January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919; Illinois, January 14, 1919; Indiana, January 14, 1919; Alabama, January 15, 1919; Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, January 15, 1919; New Hampshire, January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919; Nebraska, January 16, 1919; North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah, January 16, 1919; Missouri, January 16, 1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919; Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January 17, 1919; New Mexico, January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; Pennsylvania, February 25, 1919; Connecticut, May 6, 1919; New Jersey, March 9, 1922; New York, January 29, 1919; Vermont, January 29, 1919.

11 The Nineteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 4, 1919, when it passed the Senate, Cong. Rec. (66th Cong., 1st Sess.) 635, having previously passed the house on May 21. Id., 94. It appears officially in 41 Stat. 362. Ratification was completed on August 18, 1920, when the thirty-sixth State (Tennessee) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On August 26, 1920, Secretary of Colby certified that it had become a part of the Constitution. 41 Stat. 1823.

The several state legislatures ratified the Nineteenth Amendment on the following dates: Illinois, June 10, 1919 (readopted June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919; Wisconsin, June 10, 1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16, 1919; Ohio, June 16, 1919; Pennsylvania, June 24, 1919; Massachusetts, June 25, 1919; Texas, June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919 (date on which approved by Governor); Missouri, July 3, 1919; Arkansas, July 28, 1919; Montana, August 2, 1919 (date on which approved by governor); Nebraska, August 2, 1919; Minnesota, September 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September 10, 1919 (date on which approved by Governor); Utah, October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine, November 5, 1919; North Dakota, December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December 4, 1919 (date on which certified); Colorado, December 15, 1919 (date on which approved by Governor); Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode Island, January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16, 1920; Wyoming, January 27, 1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey, February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Arizona, February 12, 1920; New Mexico, February 21, 1920 (date on which approved by govrnor); Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West Virginia, March 10, 1920 (confirmed September 21, 1920); Vermont, February 8, 1921. The amendment was rejected by Georgia on July 24, 1919; by Alabama on September 22, 1919; by South Carolina on January 29, 1920; by Virginia on February 12, 1920; by Maryland on February 24, 1920; by Mississippi on March 29, 1920; by Louisiana on July 1, 1920. This amendment was subsequently ratified by Virginia in 1952, Alabama in 1953, Florida in 1969, and Georgia and Louisiana in 1970.

12 The Twentieth Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 2, 1932, when it passed the Senate, Cong. Rec. (72d Cong., 1st Sess.) 5086, having previously passed the House on March 1. Id., 5027. It appears officially in 47 Stat. 745. Ratification was completed on January 23, 1933, when the thirty-sixth State approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On February 6, 1933, Secretary of State Stimson certified that it had become a part of the Constitution. 47 Stat. 2569.

The several state legislatures ratified the Twentieth Amendment on the following dates: Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March 11, 1932; Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas March 17, 1932; Kentucky, March 17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina, March 25, 1932; Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode Island, April 14, 1932; Illinois, April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22, 1932; West Virginia, July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August 11, 1932; Indiana, August 15, 1932; Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September 13, 1932; California, January 4, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933; North Dakota, January 9, 1933; Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Arizona, January 13, 1933; Montana, January 13, 1933; Nebraska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon, January 16, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933; Washington, January 19, 1933; Wyoming, January 19, 1933; Iowa, January 20, 1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee, January 20, 1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New Mexico, January 21, 1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933; Missouri, January 23, 1933; Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23, 1933; Colorado, January 24, 1933; Massachusetts, January 24, 1933; Wisconsin, January 24, 1933; Nevada, January 26, 1933; Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont, February 2, 1933; Maryland, March 24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.

13 The Twenty-first Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933, when it passed the House, Cong. Rec. (72d Cong., 2d Sess.) 4516, having previously passed the Senate on February 16. Id., 4231. It appears officially in 47 Stat. 1625. Ratification was completed on December 5, 1933, when the thirty-sixth State (Utah) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On December 5, 1933, Acting Secretary of State Phillips certified that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 48 Stat. 1749.

The several state conventions ratified the Twenty-first Amendment on the following dates: Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933; Rhode Island, May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May 25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1, 1933; Delaware, June 24, 1933; Indiana, June 26, 1933; Massachusetts, June 26, 1933; New York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa, July 10, 1933; Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933; California, July 24, 1933; West Virginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas, August 1, 1933; Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8, 1933; Tennessee, August 11, 1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona, September 5, 1933; Nevada, September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23, 1933; Colorado, September 26, 1933; Washington, October 3, 1933; Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho, October 17, 1933; Maryland, October 18, 1933; Virginia, October 25, 1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933; Florida, November 14, 1933; Texas, November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November 27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933; Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah, December 5, 1933; Maine, December 6, 1933; Montana, August 6, 1934. The amendment was rejected by a convention in the State of South Carolina, on December 4, 1933. The electorate of the State of North Carolina voted against holding a convention at a general election held on November 7, 1933.

14 The Twenty-second Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 24, 1947, having passed the House on March 21, 1947, Cong. Rec. (80th Cong., 1st Sess.) 2392, and having previously passed the Senate on March 12, 1947. Id., 1978. It appears officially in 61 Stat. 959. Ratification was completed on February 27, 1951, when the thirty-sixth State (Minnesota) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On March 1, 1951, Jess Larson, Administrator of General Services, certified that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 16 Fed. Reg. 2019.

A total of 41 state legislatures ratified the Twenty-second Amendment on the following dates: Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan, March 31, 1947; Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947; New Hampshire, April 1, 1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3, 1947; Oregon, April 3, 1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April 15, 1947; New Jersey, April 15, 1947; Vermont, April 15, 1947; Ohio, April 16, 1947; Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947; Connecticut, May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23, 1947; Virginia, January 28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New York, March 9, 1948; South Dakota, January 21, 1949; North Dakota, February 25, 1949; Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951; Indiana, January 29, 1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February 12, 1951; Wyoming, February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951; Georgia, February 17, 1951; Tennessee, February 20, 1951; Texas, February 22, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951; Nevada, February 26, 1951; Minnesota, February 27, 1951; North Carolina, February 28, 1951; South Carolina, March 13, 1951; Maryland, March 14, 1951; Florida, April 16, 1951; and Alabama, May 4, 1951.

15 The Twenty-third Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 16, 1960, when it passed the Senate, Cong. Rec. (86th Cong., 2d Sess.) 12858, having previously passed the House on June 14. Id., 12571. It appears officially in 74 Stat. 1057. Ratification was completed on March 29, 1961, when the thirty-eighth State (Ohio) approved the amendment, there being then 50 States in the Union. On April 3, 1961, John L. Moore, Administrator of General Services, certified that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 26 Fed. Reg. 2808.

The several state legislatures ratified the Twenty-third Amendment on the following dates: Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts, August 22, 1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New York, January 17, 1961; California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland, January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961; Minnesota, January 31, 1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada, February 2, 1961; Montana, February 6, 1961; Colorado, February 8, 1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 9, 1961; Alaska, February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota, February 14, 1961; Delaware, February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961; Wisconsin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, February 28, 1961; Indiana, March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6, 1961; Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10, 1961; Illinois, March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March 15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961; Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma, March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas, March 29, 1961; Ohio, March 29, 1961, and New Hampshire, March 30, 1961.

16 The Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed by Congress on September 14, 1962, having passed the House on August 27, 1962. Cong. Rec. (87th Cong., 2d Sess.) 17670 and having previously passed the Senate on March 27, 1962. Id., 5105. It appears officially in 76 Stat. 1259. Ratification was completed on January 23, 1964, when the thirty- eighth State (South Dakota) approved the Amendment, there being then 50 States in the Union. On February 4, 1964, Bernard L. Boutin, Administrator of General Services, certified that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 25 Fed. Reg. 1717. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed this certificate.

Thirty-eight state legislatures ratified the Twenty-fourth Amendment on the following dates: Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey, December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Montana, January 28, 1963; West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Maryland, February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11, 1963; Rhode Island, February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Utah, February 20, 1963; Colorado, February 21, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963; New Mexico, March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963; Idaho, March 8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15, 1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Connecticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee, March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wisconsin, March 26, 1963; Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April 4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 1963; Missouri, May 13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 16, 1963; Kentucky, June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964; South Dakota, January 23, 1964.

17 This Amendment was proposed by the Eighty-ninth Congress by Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, which was approved by the Senate on February 19, 1965, and by the House of Representatives, in amended form, on April 13, 1965. The House of Representatives agreed to a Conference Report on June 30, 1965, and the Senate agreed to the Conference Report on July 6, 1965. It was declared by the Administrator of General Services, on February 23, 1967, to have been ratified.

This Amendment was ratified by the following States: Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13, 1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachusetts, August 9, 1965; Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona, September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20, 1965; California, October 21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7, 1965; Utah, January 17, 1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico, February 3, 1966; Kansas, February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966; Hawaii, March 3, 1966; Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March 14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New Hampshire, June 13, 1966; Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 12, 1967; Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Washington, January 26, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February 10, 1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967; Connecticut, February 14, 1967; Montana, February 15, 1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio, March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North Carolina, March 22, 1967 Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.

Publication of the certifying statement of the Administrator of General Services that the Amendment had become valid was made on February 25, 1967, F.R. Doc. 67-2208, 32 Fed. Reg. 3287.

18 The Twenty-sixth Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 23, 1971, upon passage by the House of Representatives, the Senate having previously passed an identical resolution on March 10, 1971. It appears officially in 85 Stat. 825. Ratification was completed on July 1, 1971, when action by the legislature of the 38th State, North Carolina, was concluded, and the Administrator of the General Services Administration officially certified it to have been duly ratified on July 5, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 12725.

As of the publication of this volume, 42 States had ratified this Amendment: Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23, 1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Tennessee, March 23, 1971; Washington, March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts, March 24, 1971; Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30, 1971; Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April 3, 1971; Kansas, April 7, 1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April 8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8, 1971; Maine, April 9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California, April 19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971; Texas, April 27, 1971; South Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia, April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Arizona, May 14, 1971; Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4, 1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June 29, 1971; Alabama, June 30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina, July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971; Virginia, July 8, 1971; Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.

19 This purported amendment was proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, when it passed the Senate, having previously passed the House on September 24. (1 Annals of Congress 88, 913). It appears officially in 1 Stat. 97. Having received in 1789-1791 only six state ratifications, the proposal then failed of ratification while ten of the 12 sent to the States by Congress were ratified and proclaimed and became the Bill of Rights. The provision was proclaimed as having been ratified and having become the 27th Amendment, when Michigan ratified on May 7, 1992, there being 50 States in the Union. Proclamation was by the Archivist of the United States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. Sec. 106b, on May 19, 1992. F.R.Doc. 92-11951, 57 Fed. Reg. 21187. It was also proclaimed by votes of the Senate and House of Representatives. 138 Cong. Rec. (daily ed) S 6948-49, H 3505-06.

The several state legislatures ratified the proposal on the following dates: Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873; Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine, April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, February 1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee, May 28, 1985; Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986; Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah, February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 13, 1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13, 1987; Wisconsin, July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988; Louisiana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989; Nevada, April 26, 1989; Alaska, May 6, 1989; Oregon, May 19, 1989; Minnesota, May 22, 1989; Texas, May 25, 1989; Kansas, April 5, 1990; Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, Mary 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5, 1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992. New Jersey subsequently ratified on May 7, 1992.

Protect your children

2009-05-26T23:49:00.000-07:00

May 25 2009 at 12:47PM

By Francis Hweshe, Nontobeko Mtshali and Hanti Otto

More than 900 children are reported missing in South Africa - half of them in the Western Cape.

It's as if "a whole school of children has just disappeared and people do not see that as a crisis", says Pieter Boshoff, founder and vice-chairperson of the organisation Missing Children SA.

As the world marks International Missing Children's Day today and the start of Child Protection Week, a Saldanha Bay family is still searching for 10-year-old Montesha Kekana. She has been missing for four days and the family believes she was raped and murdered.

'we sit by the sea to see if something would come out'
Of the 900 children reported missing in South Africa, Boshoff said 448 were from the Western Cape.

Statistics for other provinces included 311 children reported missing in Gauteng and 147 in KwaZulu-Natal. Limpopo had the lowest number, with four children reported missing.
"Last year we saw a dramatic increase in children being reported missing, with 1 091 children in the first eight months," Boshoff said.

In Saldanha Bay yesterday, Magdalene White, spokesperson for Montesha's family, urged the authorities to do more to find the girl or her body.

Police said Montesha was last seen walking with a 32-year-old man, who had since been arrested in connection with her disappearance on Friday. "She is still missing and the search is still on," said Captain Bernadine Steyn.

'I cannot sleep because my child is somewhere out there'
White described Montesha as "a ray of sunshine", adding that the most difficult part for the family was not knowing whether she was alive or dead, or whether her body had been hidden in bushes or thrown into the sea.

From dawn to dusk "we sit by the sea to see if something would come out", said White.

On Saturday residents searched the bushes where the girl's underwear and shirt were found, but found nothing.

Grieving mother Vanessa Kekana said she was heartbroken.

"I cannot sleep because my child is somewhere out there. I only want the body to bury," she said, her voice breaking.

Montesha's school principal, Andries Hector, described her as "a wonderful girl".

Decrying the "decay in moral values in society", he said the school and community needed to act to ensure "nothing like this ever happened again".

"We need to keep our sons and daughters in the neighbourhood safe," said Hector.

Boshoff said more than 90 percent of all children reported missing were usually found within the first week - most were those who had run away from home.

Social Development Minister Edna Molewa said communities needed to get involved and intensify the promotion of children's rights and child protection.

This year's Child Protection Week campaign runs until Saturday and focuses on the theme "Caring communities protect children".

The aim of this week was to promote partnerships between all sectors of society to improve the living conditions of vulnerable children and their families.

The Department of Social Development has joined the UN Children's Fund (Unicef) and civil society organisations to highlight the importance of child protection, with provincial departments planning activities throughout the week.

Molewa said the government had passed comprehensive legislation regarding the care and protection of children.

"These include the Children's Act 38 of 2005, the Children's Amendment Act 41 of 2007, and the Social Assistance Act 6 of 2008.

"The establishment of the Child Protection Register will assist us to gather information on the extent of child abuse, neglect or exploitation of children,"she said.

"This will enable us to plan and allocate resources to child protection services."

"I am therefore appealing to everyone to wear the green ribbon during the Child Protection Week to show support for the promotion of the rights of children," Molewa said.

A LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR

2009-05-16T18:57:00.000-07:00

Due to the overload of cases each Child Protection Services, worker, is swamped with and the Workers lack of Knowledge, Arizona’s children are slipping through the cracks, and families are being broken up, never to be as one again. And guess who is the ones to pay the ultimate price, it is our children. Each CPS worker of the state of Arizona has a case load of 14-15 cases, to handle, all at one time. With each report that CPS receives they are supposed to go through a complicated screening process, to review each call, to determine which needs to be investigated. If there happens to be previous involvement, that expedites the process, and whether or not the reports are substantiated, CPS will be at your home with in 24 hours from the day and time the report was made, and remove your child from your home. And then and only then will they actually start to investigate, whether or not there was even a need to remove the child from your home. During the first formal visit with CPS after they have removed your child, they hold the meeting at the Juvenile Court Building on Ajo Rd, where you and your husband or wife, are in a room by yourselves, with 6-7 other people who you have never met before. All who work for or with CPS. There are no lawyers there to defend you at this time, because they fail to give you one until a couple of days before the Dependency Hearing. Your first contact with your lawyer is usually 2-3 minutes before court has been scheduled to start.

Once you get into Court you are then officially ordered to comply with a case plan, if you ever want to have your child Home again. Still at this time all the allegations are unsubstantiated. It is then that a case plan with the things you are supposed to accomplish, is handed to you, and they want you to sign it. You, do, and then whether they tell you or not, you have unknowingly just agreed to all the allegations in the report. That is you admitted that you did those things.

Ok so now you have got a ton of things to get done, there are the psychology exams, the parenting classes, the test day calls every single day, with the exception of Sunday. There are the random drug screenings, the hair follicle test, the substance abuse counseling and group therapy, the Blake foundation appointments, and the scheduled visit with your child once a week, if you are lucky. And just as you start to settle in your set requiem, and you manage to deal with the measly one visit a week, totally 1 and 1/2 hours, wham they nail you again, by canceling a visit, about every other week or so. They leave you feeling hopeless, devastated empty , and lost.

The reason I know this stuff, is because I am currently going through this process, for the second time in 5 years. Five years ago, I went through this, and five years ago, I lost my children, forever. 4 of them are with a distant relatives on the fathers side who has never had anything to do with the family and still doesn’t. My other two, a boy, now, 13, is out of state with his father, and a girl, who is 12 who is in state with her father. Neither of them do, I have contact with.

But because of one of my husband’s childhood friends, who lost it, mentally, and got pissed off because I would not allow him to hang out at our house and bring any kind of drugs around period, decided to get me back, by calling Maranas Police Department, and stating that my then 13 month old baby girl was in immediate danger of child abuse and neglect. MPD showed up at my house and asked to do a welfare check on my baby, who had not even been here, all day. She spent the entire day with her aunt. MPD made us call the aunt and bring the child home immediately. We complied and about 15 minutes the aunt and my child returned. The officer saw for himself that the baby was fine, he saw that she had everything she needed. He then told us by law, he has to notify CPS of all calls regarding children. He did, and with in 24 hours, CPS was here to remove my child.

And now as of this past August 2008, I lost custody of my daughter Alexandria. I just so happens that I am pregnant again, and I was told my CPS, that if I did not relinquish my rights to Alexandria, I would have to immediately relinquish my rights to my unborn child. So I did so, feeling as though, I sacrificed one for another.

It occurred to me, about 2 months ago, that I do not have it in me, to raise another child. My soul is still aching and empty, and I would not be able to give this child, the life it deserves. So I contacted an Adoption Agency, and have begun to process of placing my unborn child up for adoption.

It is now November 2008, and emotionally I am a freaking wreck, this pregnancy is hell on my body, my mind and my soul. And I feel as though my life is falling even more apart, right before my very eyes.

So to anyone who finds themselves unfortunate enough to get tangled in the deceitful web of Child Protection Services, my heart goes out to you, and my prayers are with you. And here is some advice that I hope you follow, because, the knowledge came from learning the hard way. What ever you do, if CPS tells you to sign a case plan, telling you that upon it’s completion there will be reunification, tell them to shove it up their ass, and tell them to take you to trial, and prove the allegations against you. Also, document every time you have contact with CPS, with the date time and what topics were discussed. And, you need to learn all you can about the Juvenile Law Procedure and Laws in your state.
Knowledge is power… It would also be a good idea for you to find a local support group of other parents in the same situation. You are going to need all the support you can get.

Well for now this will conclude what I have to say. I wish all of you the Best Of Luck, and my prayers and thoughts are always with you.

Sincerely,

Jessica Lynn Hepner

Section 1

2009-05-09T18:31:00.001-07:00

Never Trust Anyone From CPS

You have to understand that CPS will not give you or your spouse a Miranda warning nor are they required to do so. If CPS shows up at your door and tells you they need to speak with you and your children, you have the legal right to deny them entry. However, before they leave, you should bring your children to the door but never open it, instead allow them to see that the children are not in imminent danger and that they are fine. If you do not at least show them your children, they could come back with an unlawful and unconstitutional warrant even though your children are not in imminent danger.

Everything CPS sees and hears is written down and eventually given to the AAG for your possible prosecution. If the focus of the investigation is on your spouse or significant other, you also need to know that though you are the non-offending spouse, you may think you are in the clear, wrong. If your spouse is charged with anything, you are likely to be charged with allowing the (alleged) offence to take place. So if a spouse gets the bright idea to lie or makes things up, he/she is also confessing that he allowed whatever is being alleged.

What you say will more than likely not be written down the way you said it or intended.

For example, the CPS worker questions the wife:

"Does your husband yell at the children?"

Your response could be, "Once in a while."

Then they ask, "Does he yell at you and argue with you?"

Your response could be, "Yes, we argue sometimes and he may raise his voice."

The next question is, "Does your husband drink alcohol?"

Your response could be, "Yes, he has several drinks a week."

Now let's translate those benign responses and see what the CPS worker may write in his/her report.

"When the father drinks, he yells at children and wife. The wife is a victim of domestic violence." This is a far cry from what actually took place in that conversation. Case-workers routinely take what you say out of context, actually fabricating their report, in order to successfully prosecute the case. They have an end game in mind and will misrepresent facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged incident.

Something similar happened to the authors where DCF employees lied in front of the judge, testifing that the husband was a victim of domestic violence, even though all 5 family members clearly stated that domestic violence never took place. The husband would like to know when this occurred because he wasn't there.

They will also misrepresent the condition of your home, as DCF did in our case. Even if you were sick or injured and had no opportunity to tidy up. CPS will not put anything exculpatory on the record. Anyone reading her reports will be lead to believe that the house was unkempt and cluttered. Never give CPS a chance to falsify the record or twist your words. Before allowing any CPS official into your home, if you choose to do so, inform them that you want your attorney present and schedule an interview. Better still schedule the interview to be held in their office instead of in your home.

Remember, CPS could care less about your rights or your children's constitutional rights. Removing a child from a safe home is more harmful than most alleged allegation, as stated by many judges. CPS workers will lie and say that they have to come in or that you are required to comply. Remember, CPS has no statutory authority to enter your home, when no crime has been committed. They are trained to use deceptive means, in order to gain access to your home, by any means possible. (This information was gained from DCF employee interviews.) Do not sign anything or agree to anything. Even if you are not guilty and you agree to go through some horse and pony show. This will be used against you, as if you admitted to the false allegation(s).

The case for Foster Care Reform ...is written in stone [picture of a head-stone]

Section 2

2009-05-09T18:30:00.004-07:00

Are All CPS Workers In The United States Subject To The 4th and 14th Amendment?

Yes they are, the 4th Amendment is applicable to CPS investigators in the context of an investigation of alleged abuse or neglect as are all "government officials." This issue is brought out best in Walsh v. Erie County Dept. of Job and Family Services, 3:01-cv-7588.

The social workers argued, "the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to the activities of their social worker employees." The social workers claimed, "entries into private homes by child welfare workers involve neither searches nor seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and thus can be conducted without either a warrant or probable cause to believe that a child is at risk of imminent harm."

The court disagreed and ruled: "Despite the defendant's exaggerated view of their powers, the Fourth Amendment applies to them, as it does to all other officers and agents of the state whose request to enter, however benign or well-intentioned, are met by a closed door." The Court also stated "The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies whenever an investigator, be it a police officer, a DCFS employee, or any other agent of the state, responds to an alleged instance of child abuse, neglect, or dependency." (Emphasis added)

The social worker's first argument, shot down by the court. The social workers then argued that there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, and that the situation was an "emergency." They state, the "Defendants argue their entry into the home, even absent voluntary consent, was reasonable under the circumstances. They point to: the anonymous complaint about clutter on the front porch; and the plaintiff's attempt to leave.

These circumstances, the defendants argue, created an 'emergency situation' that led Darnold and Brown reasonably to believe the Walsh children were in danger of imminent harm. (Thus is the old "emergency" excuse that has been used for years by social workers.) The Court again disagreed and ruled: "There is nothing inherently unusual or dangerous about cluttered premises, much less anything about such vaguely described conditions that could manifest imminent or even possible danger or harm to young children. If household 'clutter' justifies warrantless entry and threats of removal of children and arrest or citation of their parents, few families are secure and few homes are safe from unwelcome and unjustified intrusion by state officials and officers."

The Court went on to rule, "They have failed to show that any exigency that justifies warrantless entry was necessary to protect the welfare of the plaintiff's children. In this case, a rational jury could find that 'the evidence points to the opposite conclusion' and a lack of 'sufficient exigent circumstances to relieve the state actors here of the burden of obtaining a warrant." The social worker's second argument, shot down by the court.

The social workers then argued that they are obligated under law to investigate any reported case of child abuse, and that supersedes the Fourth Amendment. They argued, "Against these fundamental rights, the defendants contend that Ohio's statutory framework for learning about and investigation of all allegations of child abuse and neglect supersede their obligations under the Fourth Amendment. They point principally to § 2151.421 of the Ohio Revised code as authority for their warrantless entry into and search of the plaintiff's home. That statute imposes a duty on certain designated professionals and persons who work with children or provide child care to report instances of apparent child abuse or neglect." This is the old "mandatory reporter" excuse.

The Court disagreed and ruled: "The defendant's argument that the duty to investigate created by § 2151.421(F)(1) exempts them from the Fourth Amendment misses the mark because, not having received a report described in § 2151.421(A)(1)(b), they were not, and could not have been, conducting an investigation pursuant to § 2151.421(F)(1)." The social worker's third argument, shot down by the court.

The Court continues with their chastisement of the social workers: "There can be no doubt that the state can and should protect the welfare of children who are at risk from acts of abuse and neglect. There likewise can be no doubt that occasions arise calling for immediate response, even without prior judicial approval. But those instances are the exception. Otherwise child welfare workers would have a free pass into any home in which they have an anonymous report of poor housekeeping, overcrowding, or insufficient medical care and, thus a perception that children may be at some risk."

The Court continues: "The anonymous phone call in this case did not constitute a 'report' of child abuse or neglect." The social workers, Darnold and Brown, claimed that they were immune from liability, claiming qualified immunity because "they had not had training in Fourth Amendment law." In other words, because they thought the Fourth Amendment did not bind them, they couldn't be sued for their "mistake."

The police officers, Chandler and Kish, claimed that they couldn't be sued because they thought the social workers were not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and they were just assisting the social workers. The Court disagreed and ruled: "That subjective basis for their ignorance about and actions in violation of the fourth Amendment does not relieve them of the consequences of that ignorance and those actions." The Court then lowers the boom by stating: "The claims of defendants Darnold, Brown, Chandler and Kish of qualified immunity are therefore denied."

The 9th Circuit Court Said, Parents Have The Constitutional Right To Be Left Alone By CPS And The Police.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case, Calabretta v. Floyd, 9th Cir. (1999) "involves whether a social worker and a police officer were entitled to qualified immunity, for a coerced entry into a home to investigate suspected child abuse, interrogation of a child, and strip search of a child, conducted without a search warrant and without a special exigency."

The court did not agree that the social worker and the police officer had "qualified immunity" and said, "the facts in this case are noteworthy for the absence of emergency." No one was in distress. "The police officer was there to back up the social worker's insistence on entry against the mother's will, not because he perceived any imminent danger of harm." And he should have known better. Furthermore, "had the information been more alarming, had the social worker or police officer been alarmed, had there been reason to fear imminent harm to a child, this would be a different case, one to which we have no occasion to speak. A reasonable official would understand that they could not enter the home without consent or a search warrant."

And now the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals defines the law: "In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry. Any government official (CPS) can be held to know that their office does not give them unrestricted right to enter people's homes at will. We held in White by White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1986), a child welfare investigation case, that 'it was settled constitutional law that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even under statutory authority where probable cause existed.'

The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people's houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it."

And there we have it: "Any government official can be held to know that their office does not give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples' homes at will. ... The fourth Amendment preserves the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses ... 'without limiting that right to one kind of government official."

In other words, the parents have the constitutional right to exercise their children's and their 4th and 5th Amendment protections and should just say no to social workers especially when they attempt to coerce or threaten to call the police so they can conduct their investigation. "A social worker is not entitled to sacrifice a family's privacy and dignity to her own personal views on how parents ought to discipline their children." (The Constitution and the Bill of Rights were written to protect the people from the government, not to protect the government from the people. And within those documents, the people have the constitutional right to hold the government accountable when is does deny its citizens their rights under the law even if it is CPS, the police, a government agency, or local, state, or federal government.)

The Court's reasoning for this ruling was simple and straight forward: "The reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals in their homes includes the interests of both parents and children in not having government officials coerce entry in violation of the fourth Amendment and humiliate the parents in front of the children. An essential aspect of the privacy of the home is the parent's and the child's interest in the privacy of the relationship with each other."

Parroting Of The Phrase "Best Interest Of The Child" Without Supporting Facts Or A Legal Basis Is Insufficient To Support A Warrant Or Court Order To Enter A Home.

In North Hudson DYFS v. Koehler Family, filed December 18, 2000, the Appellate court granted the emergency application on February 6, 2001, to stay DYFS illegal entry that was granted by the lower court because DYFS in their infinite wisdom thought it was their right to go into the Koehler home because the children were not wearing socks in the winter or sleep in beds.

After reviewing the briefs of all the parties, the appellate court ruled that the order to investigate the Koehler home was in violation of the law and must be reversed. The Court explained, "[a]absent some tangible evidence of abuse or neglect, the Courts do not authorize fishing expeditions into citizens' houses." The Court went on to say, "[m]ere parroting of the phrase 'best interest of the child' without supporting facts and a legal basis is insufficient to support a Court order based on reasonableness or any other ground." February 14, 2001.

In other words, a juvenile judges decision on whether or not to issue a warrant is a legal one, it is not based on "best interest of the child" or personal feeling. The United States Supreme Court has held that courts may not use a different standard other than probable cause for the issuance of such orders. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). If a court issues a warrant based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, the warrant will not survive a judicial challenge in the higher courts. Anonymous tips are never probable cause. "[I]n context of a seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation ... a court order is the equivalent of a warrant.

" Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999).

F.K. v. Iowa district Court for Polk County, Id."

The U.S Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit Court recently ruled that child abuse investigations held on private property are unconstitutional.

The decision in the case of Doe et al, v. Heck et al (No. 01-3648, 2003 US App. Lexis 7144) will affect the manner in which law enforcement and child protective services investigations of alleged child abuse or neglect are conducted.

The decision of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found that this practice, i.e. the "no prior consent" interview of a child, will ordinarily constitute a "clear violation" of the constitutional rights of parents under the 4th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. According to the Court, the investigative interview of a child constitutes a "search and seizure" and, when conducted on private property without "consent, a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances," such an interview is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the rights of the parent, child, and, possibly the owner of the private property.

Considering that one critical purpose of the early stages of an investigation is to determine whether or not the child is in danger, and if so, from who seems to require a high threshold level of evidence to commence the interview of a child, whether the child is on private or public property.

"In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry. Any government official can be held to know that their office does not give them an unrestricted right to enter peoples' homes at will. We held in White v. Pierce County a child welfare investigation case, that 'it was settled constitutional law that, absent exigent circumstances, police could not enter a dwelling without a warrant even under statutory authority where probable cause existed.' The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into peoples' houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it."

"We conclude that the Warrant clause must be complied with. First, none of the exceptions to the Warrant Clause apply in this situation, including 'exigent circumstances coupled with probable cause,' because there is, by definition, time enough to apply to a magistrate for an ex parte removal order. See State v. Hatter, 342N.W.2d 851, 855 (Iowa 1983) (holding the exigent circumstances exception to the Warrant Clause only applies when 'an immediate major crisis in the performance of duty afforded neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate.'). Second, as noted by the Second Circuit, '[I]n context of a seizure of a child by the State during an abuse investigation . . . a court order is the equivalent of a warrant.'

Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2nd Cir. 1999).

F.K. v. Iowa district Court for Polk County, Id."

"Another recent 9th Circuit case also held that there is no exception to the warrant requirement for social workers in the context of a child abuse investigation. 'The [California] regulations they cite require social workers to respond to various contacts in various ways. But none of the regulations cited say that the social worker may force her way into a home without a search warrant in the absence of any emergency.' Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (1999). Calabretta also cites various cases form other jurisdictions for its conclusion.

Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087 (3rd Cir. 1989) held that a social worker and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity for insisting on entering her house against the mother's will to examine her child for bruises. Good holds that a search warrant or exigent circumstances, such as a need to protect a child against imminent danger of serious bodily injury, was necessary for an entry without consent, and the anonymous tip claiming bruises was in the case insufficient to establish special exigency.

The 9th Circuit further opined in Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000), that '[b]ecause the swing of every pendulum brings with it potential adverse consequences, it is important to emphasize that in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and prosecution of all crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural guarantees of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous - whether it involves children or adults - does not provide cause for the state to ignore the rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may result. In cases of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family. Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no problem of any kind previously existed...' Id. at 1130-1131."

This is the case involving DCF in Connecticut. Many of their policies are unlawful and contradictory to the Constitution. DCF has unlawful polices giving workers permission to coerce, intimidate and to threatened innocent families with governmental intrusion and oppression. They use police presences to squelch and put down any citizen who asserts their 4th Amendment rights by not allowing an unlawful investigation to take place in their private home when no imminent danger is present.

DCF is the "moving force" behind the unceasing violations of federal law and violations of the Constitution. The idea of noncompliance with the 4th and 14th Amendment is so impregnated in their statutes, policies, practices and customs, it affects everything they do. They subsequently take on the persona of exaggerated power over parents and believe they are totally immune and can do basically anything they want including engaging in deception, misrepresentation of the facts and perjury under oath. This happens thousands of times daily in the United States where the ends seemingly justifies the means even if it is unlawful, illegal and unconstitutional.

We can tell you stories for hours, where CPS employees committed criminal acts and were prosecuted and either went to jail and/or were sued for civil rights violations. CPS workers have lied in reports, court documents and coerced others to lie. They have kidnapped children without court order, crossed state lines impersonating police and were later prosecuted. In a number of cases the worker has even killed the child in question.

It is sickening the number of children who have been subjected to abuse, neglect or even killed at the hands of Child Protective Service workers. The numbers below include DCF in Connecticut.

Section 3

2009-05-09T18:30:00.003-07:00

The Fourth Amendment's Impact On Child Abuse Investigations.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said it best, "The government's interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse, but also protecting children's interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents." Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (1999).

This statement came in a case, which held that social workers who, in pursuit of a child abuse investigation, invaded a family home without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of both children and parents. Upon remand for the damages phase of the trial, the social workers, the police officers, and the governments that employed them settled this civil rights case for $150,000.00.

Contrary to the assumption of hundreds of social workers, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment applies just as much to a child abuse investigation as it does to any criminal or other governmental investigation. Social workers are not exempt from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment when they act alone. They are not exempt from its rules if they are accompanied by a police officer. And police officers are not exempt from the requirement even if all they do is get the front door open for the social worker; this would include intimidation, coercion and threatening. The general rule is that unreasonable searches and seizures are banned. But the second part of the rule is the most important in this context. All warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.

Section 4

2009-05-09T18:30:00.001-07:00

When Is Consent Not Consent?

If a police officer says, "If you don't let us in your home we will break down your door."

A parent who then opens the door has not given free and voluntary consent.

If a social worker says, "If you don't let me in the home I will take your children away."

A parent who then opens the door has not given free and voluntary consent.

If a social worker says, "I will get a warrant from the judge or I will call the police if you do not let me in."

Negate consent. Any type of communication, which conveys the idea to the parent that they have no realistic alternative, but to allow entry negates any claim that the entry was lawfully gained through the channel of consent. DCF's policy clearly tells the social worker that they can threaten parents even if the parents assert their 4th Amendment rights.

Probable Cause & Exigent Circumstances

The Fourth Amendment does not put a barrier in the way of a social worker who has reliable evidence that a child is in imminent danger. For example, if a hot line call comes in and says, "My name is Mildred Smith, here is my address and phone number. I was visiting my grandchildren this morning and I discovered that one of my grandchildren, Johnny, age 5, is being locked in his bedroom without food for days at a time, and he looked pale and weak to me." The social worker certainly has evidence of exigent circumstances and is only one step away from having probable cause.

Since the report has been received over the telephone, it is possible that the tipster is an imposter and not the child's grandmother. A quick verification of the relationship can be made in a variety of ways and once verified, the informant, would satisfy the legal test of reliability, which is necessary to establish probable cause.

Anonymous phone calls fail the second part of the two-prong requirement of "exigent circumstances" and "probable cause" for a warrant or order. Anonymous phone calls cannot stand the test of probable cause as defined within the 14th Amendments and would fail in court on appeal. The social worker(s) would lose their qualified immunity for their deprivation of rights and can be sued. Many social workers and Child Protection Services (CPS) lose their cases in court because their entry into homes was in violation of the parent's civil rights because the evidence in their possession did not satisfy the standard of probable cause.

It is not enough to have information that the children are in some form of serious danger. The evidence must also pass a test of reliability that our justice system calls probable cause. In H.R. v. State Department of Human Resources, 612 So.2d 477 (Ala. Ct. App. 1992); the court held that an anonymous tip standing alone never amounts to probable cause. The Calabretta court held the same thing, as have numerous other decisions, which have faced the issue directly. The Fourth Amendment itself spells out the evidence required for a warrant or entry order. No warrant shall issue but on probable cause. The United States Supreme Court has held that courts may not use a different standard other than probable cause for the issuance of such orders. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). If a court issues a warrant based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip, the warrant will not survive a judicial challenge in the higher courts. Anonymous tips are never probable cause.

Children are not well served if they are subjected to investigations base on false allegations. Little children can be traumatized by investigations in ways that are unintended by the social worker. However, to a small child all they know is that a strange adult is taking off their clothing while their mother is sobbing in the next room in the presence of an armed police officer.

This does not seem to a child to be a proper invasion of their person - quite different, for example, from an examination by a doctor when their mother is present and cooperating. The misuse of anonymous tips is well known. Personal vendettas, neighborhood squabbles, disputes on the Little League field, child custody battles, revenge, nosey individuals who are attempting to impose their views on others are turned into maliciously false allegations breathed into a hotline.

"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subject to the rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the law. It invites every man to become a law unto himself. It invites anarchy."

U.S. v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),

Justice Brandeis

We the people of the United States are ruled by law, not by feelings. If the courts allow states and their agencies to rule by feelings and not law, we become a lawless nation making decisions based on subjectivity and objectivity. CPS has been allowed to bastardize and emasculate the Constitution and the rights of its citizens to be governed by the rule of men rather than the rule of law. Citizens should find it alarming when governmental officials are allowed to have unfettered access to their homes. It is also very dangerous to allow CPS to violate the confrontation clause in the 6th Amendment where CPS hides and conceals an accuser/witness making anonymous reports. It allows those individuals to file fraudulent reports with CPS aiding and abetting in this violation of a fundamental right. All citizens have the right to know their accuser/witness in order to preserve the sanctity of the rule of law and the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.

Section 5

2009-05-09T18:29:00.004-07:00

Is It Illegal And An Unconstitutional Practice For CPS To Remove Children Solely Because They Witnessed A Parent As A Victim Of Domestic Violence?

Yes it is illegal and an unconstitutional practice to remove children which results in punishing the children and the non-offending parent. In a landmark class action suit in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, U.S. District Judge Jack Weinsein ruled on Nicholson v. Williams, Case No.: 00-cv-2229.

This suit challenged the practice of New York's City's Administration for Children's Services of removing the children of battered mothers solely because the children saw their mothers being beaten by husbands or boyfriends. Judge Weistein ruled that the practice is unconstitutional and he ordered it stopped.

Are Parents Guilty Of Maltreatment Or Emotional Neglect If The Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?

Not according to Judge Weistein's ruling and to the leading national experts.

During the trial several leading national experts testified regarding the impact on children of witnessing domestic violence, and the impact on children of being removed from the non-offending parent. The views of experts on the effects of domestic violence on children, and defining witnessing domestic violence by children as maltreatment or emotional neglect is a mistake.

"Great concern [regarding] how increased awareness of children's exposure [to domestic violence] and associated problems is being used.

Concerned about the risk adult domestic violence poses for children, some child protection agencies in the United States appear to be defining exposure to domestic violence as a form of child...Defining witnessing as maltreatment is a mistake. Doing so ignores the fact that large numbers of children in these studies showed no negative development problems and some showed evidence of strong coping abilities. Automatically defining witnessing as maltreatment may also ignore the battered mother's efforts to develop safe environments for their children and themselves." Ex. 163 at 866.

Effects Of Removals Of Children And On The Non-Offending Parent

Dr. Wolf testified that disruptions in the parent-child relationship might provoke fear and anxiety in a child and diminish his or her sense of stability and self. Tr. 565-67. He described the typical response of a child separated from his parent: "When a young child is separated from a parent unwillingly, he or she shows distress ... At first, the child is very anxious and protests vigorously and angrily. Then he falls into a sense of despair, though still hyper vigilant, looking, waiting, and hoping for her return ..." A child's sense of time factors into the extent to which a separation impacts his or her emotional well-being. Thus, for younger children whose sense of time is less keenly developed, short periods of parental absence may seem longer than for older children. Tr 565-65. See also Ex. 141b.

For those children who are in homes where there is domestic violence, disruption of that bond can be even more traumatic than situations where this is no domestic violence. Dr. Stark (Yale New Haven Hospital researcher) asserted that if a child is placed in foster care as a result of domestic violence in the home, then he or she may view such removal as "a traumatic act of punishment ... and [think] that something that [he] or she has done or failed to do has caused this separation." Tr. 1562-63.

Dr. Pelcovitz stated that "taking a child whose greatest fear is separation from his or her mother and in the name of 'protecting' that child [by] forcing on them, what is in effect, their worst nightmare, ... is tantamount to pouring salt on an open wound." Ex. 139 at 5.

Another serious implication of removal is that it introduces children to the foster care system, which can be much more dangerous and debilitating than the home situation. Dr. Stark testified that foster homes are rarely screened for the presence of violence, and that the incidence of abuse and child fatality in foster homes is double that in the general population. Tr 1596; Ex. 122 at 3-4. Children in foster care often fail to receive adequate medical care. Ex. 122 at 6. Foster care placements can disrupt the child's contact with community, school and siblings. Ex. 122 at 8.

Section 6

2009-05-09T18:29:00.003-07:00

Do Children Have Legal Standing To Sue CPS For Their Illegal Abduction From Their Home And Violating Their 4th And 14th Amendment Rights?

Yes they do, children have standing to sue for their removal after they reach the age of majority. Parents also have legal standing to sue if CPS violated their 4th and 14th Amendment rights. Children have a Constitutional right to live with their parents without government interference. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 7th Cir. (2000) A child has a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship and society of his or her parents. Ward v. San Jose, 9th Cir. (1992) State employees who withhold a child from her family infringe on the family's liberty of familial association. K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan, 7th Cir. (1990)

The forced separation of parent from child, even for a short time, represents a serious infringement upon the rights of both. J.B. v. Washington county, 10th Cir. (1997) Parent's interest is of "the highest order." And the court recognizes "the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials." Thomason v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc., 8th Cir. (1996)

You must protect you and your child's rights. CPS has no legal right to enter your home or speak to you and your child when there in no imminent danger present. Know your choices; you can refuse to speak any government official whether it is the police or CPS as long as there is an open criminal investigation. They will tell you that what they are involved with is a civil matter not a criminal matter. Don't you believe it. There is nothing civil about allegations of child abuse or neglect. It is a criminal matter disguised as a civil matter. Police do not get involved in civil matters if it truly was one.

You will regret letting them in your home and speaking with them like the thousands of other parents who have gone through this. Ask a friend, family member or some one at work. They will tell you if you agree to services, they will leave you alone or you can get your kids back.

Refusing them entry is NOT hindering an investigation, it's a Fourth Amendment protection and CPS or the juvenile judge can not abrogate that right as long as your children are not in imminent danger. Tell them to go packing.

Do Not sign anything, it will come back to be used against you in any possible trial. You are protected by FERPA and HIPAA regarding your children's educational and medical records. They need a warrant. Tell them they need a lawful warrant to make you do anything. CPS has no power; do not agree to a drug screen or a psychological evaluation.

Section 7

2009-05-09T18:29:00.001-07:00

Family Rights (Family Association)

The state may not interfere in child rearing decisions when a fit parent is available. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).

A child has a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship and society of his or her parent. Ward v. San Jose (9th Cir. 1992)

Children have standing to sue for their removal after they reach the age of majority. Children have a constitutional right to live with their parents without government interference. Brokaw v. Mercer County (7th Cir. 2000)

The private, fundamental liberty interest involved in retaining custody of one's child and the integrity of one's family is of the greatest importance. Weller v. Dept. of Social Services for Baltimore (4th Cir. 1990)

State employee who withholds a child from her family may infringe on the family's liberty of familial association. Social workers could not deliberately remove children from their parents and place them with foster caregivers when the officials reasonably should have known such an action would cause harm to the child's mental or physical health. K.H. through Murphy v. Morgan (7th Cir. 1990)

The forced separation of parent from child, even for a short time (in this case 18 hours); represent a serious infringement upon the rights of both. J.B. v. Washington County (10th Cir. 1997)

Absent extraordinary circumstances, a parent has a liberty interest in familial association and privacy that cannot be violated without adequate pre-deprivation procedures. Malik v. Arapahoe Cty. Dept. of Social Services (10 Cir. 1999)

Parent interest is of "the highest order," and the court recognizes "the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials." Thomason v. Scan Volunteer Services, Inc. (8th Cir. 1996)

Section 8

2009-05-09T18:28:00.001-07:00

Warrantless Entry

Police officers and social workers are not immune for coercing or forcing entry into a person's home without a search warrant. Calabretta v. Floyd (9th Cir. 1999)

The mere possibility of danger does not constitute an emergency or exigent circumstance that would justify a forced warrantless entry and a warrantless seizure of a child. Hurlman v. Rice (2nd Cir. 1991)

Police officer and social worker may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure in a suspected child abuse case absent exigent circumstances. Defendants must have reason to believe that life or limb is in immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion is reasonable necessary to alleviate the threat. Searches and seizures in investigation of a child neglect or child abuse case at a home are governed by the same principles as other searches and seizures at a home. Goodv. Dauphin County Social Services (3rd Cir. 1989)

The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends beyond criminal investigations and includes conduct by social workers in the context of a child neglect/abuse investigation. Lenz v. Winburn (11th Cir. 1995) The protection offered by the Fourth Amendment and by our laws does not exhaust itself once a warrant is obtained. The concern for the privacy, the safety, and the property of our citizens continues and is reflected in knock and announce requirements. United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 9th Cir.1991)

Making false statements made to obtain a warrant, when the false statements were necessary to the finding of probable cause on which the warrant was based, violates the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The warrant clause contemplates the warrant applicant be truthful: "no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation." Deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth violates the warrant clause. An officer who obtains a warrant through material false statements which result in an unconstitutional seizure may be held liable personally for his actions under § 1983. When a warrant application is materially false or made in reckless disregard for the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause. A search must not exceed the scope of the search authorized in a warrant. By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit. There is a requirement that the police identify themselves to the subject of a search, absent exigent circumstances. Aponte Matos v. Toledo Davilla (1st Cir. 1998)

WHAT EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW

The Family Rights Act

The Constitutional Right to Be a Parent

RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR COURTS IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Right to Assistance of Counsel: First Appeal

The 6th Amendment's Confrontation Clause

AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

MIRANDA RIGHTS

Your Rights in the Criminal Justice System

Christy Ann Fornoff's murder not easily forgotten

Inmate executed with 1st Arizona use of new drug

MY CHILDREN TODAY

More Than 200 Tips Received On Boy's Identity Memorial Grows Where Boy's Body Found

PRESS RELEASE

Subject: Fw: Parent of Columbine HS slain student

Death Sentence for Arizona Child Killer

Tucson man convicted of child abuse in death of newborn

Investigation into the Death of Alex B.

More Than 200 Tips Received On Boy's Identity - Manchester News Story - WMUR Manchester

Maine police follow hunch, seek Navy’s help in death of boy ​​- The New Haven Register - Serving New Haven, Connecticut

Discovery of child’s body in same town Jeffrey Curley found - BostonHerald.com

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious

Dozens Gather For Vigil In Support Of Child's Death

Maine Police Look For Clues In Mystery Boy’s Death - Story Analysis by BuzzBox

Review: CPS errors, bias contributed to child's death - CPS - sacbee.com

OCA: Investigation Into Death of Alex B.

death inv protocol.pdf (application/pdf Object)

maine state police - latest news

Body of Child Found in Maine May be Connected... | Gather

Body of unidentified boy found in Maine, death suspicious | Reuters

Maine police investigate 100 leads in boy's death | 7online.com

Maine police seek truck in child's death

Death Sentence for Arizona Child Killer - Yahoo! News

Tucson man convicted of child abuse in death of newborn

Charges could be dropped in Tucson child-death case

CHRISTINA TAYLOR GREENE -9 yo- Tucson AZ

HAL838 : Message: CPS hands over reports involving murdered children

Calif. allows sealing murdered children's records - KGUN9 On Your Side, Tucson News, Weather & Sports

ANGEL DIAZ - 7 Months - Tucson AZ

Maine Police Flooded With Tips In Mystery Boy’s Death « CBS Boston

The History Of Child Protection

Mom pleads guilty in connection with son's death

Tucson mom accused of harming baby pleads not guilty to attempted murder, child abuse charges

AUTHORS UPDATE

The 2008 NASW Delegate Assembly approved the following revisions to the NASW Code of Ethics:

Bill of Rights

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America

Protect your children

A LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR

Section 1

Section 2

Section 3

Section 4

Section 5

Section 6

Section 7

Section 8

Maine police follow hunch, seek Navy’s help in death of boy - The New Haven Register - Serving New Haven, Connecticut